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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
EXAMINING PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA’S NEAR-MONOPOLY  
OF RARE EARTHS 
by 
Gregory J. Bryant 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Thomas Breslin, Major Professor 
 China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths has come under increasing 
scrutiny in recent years. This thesis first examines the underlying causes behind China’s 
rise to the status of rare-earths near-monopolist, including government support; lax 
environmental controls; unregulated production; and relatively low costs compared to the 
rest of the world. Second, the thesis also examines the preeminent international and 
domestic factors influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. 
International factors include international demand; international trade pressure; 
international price-setting authority issues; and geopolitical factors. I next identify 
domestic factors that exert influence over China’s rare earths-related behavior: 
environmental protection; rare earth resource protection; rare earths industry regulation; 
and protecting and aiding China’s domestic rare earths industry. The study concludes 
with a synthesis of the factors influencing China’s rare-earths-related behavior in the 
overall context of support and direction by China’s Central Government. 
 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER           PAGE 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...
 Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Research 
Questions……………………………………………………………………………......2 
Findings………………………………………………………………………………... 3 
Methodology…………………………………………………………………………… 5 
 
CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WORLD RARE EARTHS 
PRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………… 6 
What Are Rare Earths Elements?.................................................................................... 7 
Rare Earths Production Around the World…………………………………………… 10 
Rare Earths Production in China………………………………………………………12 
Government Support………………………………………………………………….. 18 
World Rare Earths Production Data………………………………………………….. 21 
China’s Rare Earths Production Data………………………………………………… 27 
 
CHAPTER 2: CHINA'S PATH TO NEAR-MONOPOLY OF RARE EARTHS……….40 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 40 
(1) Government Support……………………………………………………………… 41 
(2) Environmental Factors……………………………………………………………. 46 
(3) Illegal Mining of Rare Earths……………………………………………………... 56 
(4) Low Costs of Rare Earths Production…………………………………………….. 61 
 
CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA'S     
BEHAVIOR AS NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS………………………... 66 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 66 
(1) International Demand……………………………………………………………... 67 
(2) Trade Conformity Pressure……………………………………………………….. 70 
(3) Rare earths pricing………………………………………………………………... 76 
(4) Geopolitical factors such as relations with Japan………………………………….80 
 
CHAPTER 4: DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA'S BEHAVIOR AS 
NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS…………………………………………... 85 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 85 
(1) Environmental Protection………………………………………………………….86 
(2) Rare Earth Resource Protection…………………………………………………... 92 
(3) Strengthening Rare Earths Industry Regulation…………………………………... 97 
 viii
(4) Protecting and Aiding China’s Domestic Rare Earths Industry………………….101 
CHAPTER 5: TOWARD A SYNTHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA'S BEHAVIOR        
AS A NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS…………………………………... 105 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….. 105 
International Factors………………………………………………………………… 107 
Domestic Factors……………………………………………………………………. 117 
The Overarching Role of the Chinese Government………………………………….122 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………… 128 
 
APPENDIX…………………………………………………………………………….. 148 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
In September, 2010, China and Japan were diplomatically at each other’s throats, 
again. The issue of dispute was the collection of rocky atolls known on the Chinese 
Mainland as the “Diaoyudao islands” (钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿), the “Diaoyutai islands” 
(釣魚臺列嶼) in Taiwan, and the “Senkaku islands” (尖閣諸島) in Japan. The Chinese 
trawler “Minjinyu 5179” (闽晋渔 5179) had rammed Japanese coast guard vessels in 
waters surrounding the disputed islands (an event known as the “2010 Senkaku boat 
collision incident” or the “Minjinyu 5179 incident”), setting off a small-scale diplomatic 
crisis. The Japanese coast guard authorities detained the Chinese trawler captain, Zhan 
Qixiong (詹其雄) and his crew. China responded by cancelling all Sino-Japanese 
meetings of a ministerial level and above. The diplomatic spat ended in defeat for the 
Japanese when the Japanese authorities returned captain Zhan to China. The Chinese 
people, some of whom had taken to the streets in protest on behalf of the “inalienable 
territory” of the Diaoyu islands, rejoiced at the diplomatic victory; in Japan, leaders were 
criticized for a weak handling of the crisis.  
Though the Chinese government has never directly admitted to its truthfulness, it 
was widely reported that the key factor leading to the eventual diplomatic defeat of Japan 
was China’s administrative “embargo” of rare earths exports to Japan. Rare earths, the 
so-called vitamins of modern technology, are mineral elements critical to the production 
of much of Japan’s array of high-tech products, from small electronics to hybrid and 
electric automobiles. Japan was (and still is, although not to such an extent) highly 
 2
dependent on cheap rare earths elements from China to fuel its high-tech industry. Thus, 
China’s de facto embargo caught the attention of Japanese leaders—fast—eventually 
pressuring Japan into capitulating to China’s demands for the release of the trawler 
skipper, Mr. Zhan. Or so the story goes according to major Western media such as The 
New York Times (Bradsher, 2010). Literally overnight, the eyes of the world honed in on 
a group of little-heard-of elements, the so-called “rare earths”.  
Regardless of whether or not China actually imposed an embargo on the export of 
rare earths to Japan, the fact that China, which at the time produced over 90% of the 
world’s rare earths, had a near-monopoly on rare earths, and therefore had the capability 
of imposing debilitating export restrictions which would have direct negative effects on 
rare-earths dependent countries, was reason enough for major concern in Japan and the 
United States—countries that were, and still are, highly dependent on China’s rare earths.  
Rare earths are considered critical strategic resources by governments around the 
world. The potential for supply disruption and price hikes has forced world leaders to 
find alternatives to China’s cheap rare earths. In the world outside of China, many saw 
and see China as a threat in the rare earths realm; whereas China justifies its actions as 
environmentally protective.  The significance of the present study is to examine, on the 
basis of the current literature, both in the Chinese and English languages, the behavior of 
China as a near-monopolist of rare earths.  
Research Questions 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following two research questions: 
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(1) On the basis of the extant literature in the public domain, how did China achieve 
the status of near-monopolist of rare earths production?  
(2) Has China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths been influenced by 
international or domestic factors?  
Findings 
 
The two research questions above have guided the process of examining China’s 
status as a rare earths near-monopolist and its behavior as such. I have found that, in short, 
the answers to the two research questions can be summarized thus: 
Question 1: From my examination of the extant literature in the public domain, 
China has achieved a near monopoly on rare earths production as a result of the following 
four factors, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2: (1) Strong support for the development of the 
rare earths industry by the Chinese government; (2) lack of or disregard for 
environmental regulations regarding the production of rare earths; (3) illegal and/or 
unregulated production; (4) relatively low cost of rare earths production in China 
compared with the rest of the world.  
Question 2: China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths is influenced by 
several factors—both international and domestic. International factors, discussed in 
Chapter 3, include international demand, which was heightened by production difficulties 
in several countries outside of China, and low rare earths prices in China; international 
trade pressure, including strong opposition to China’s export restriction policies by 
several WTO nations; international “price-setting authority” issues, which many Chinese 
scholars see as evidence that China is actually the “underdog” in the world rare earths 
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pricing scheme; and geopolitical factors, such as the China-Japan dispute over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which gave China the opportunity to use rare earths as a 
geopolitical bargaining chip.  
My research also found several domestic factors that exert influence over China’s 
rare earths-related behavior, which I have outlined in Chapter 4: environmental protection, 
which in recent years has become a new rhetorical rallying point for the Chinese 
government with regard to rare earths; rare earth resource protection, which is a principle 
that underlies nearly all protective/restrictive measures regarding rare earths on the part 
of the Chinese government; rare earths industry regulation, which is key to China gaining 
and maintaining ultimate control over rare earths production and export; and protecting 
and aiding China’s domestic rare earths industry, a protectionist reality often denied by 
the Chinese government.  
The study concludes in Chapter 5 with a synthesis of the factors influencing 
China’s rare-earths-related behavior in the overall context of support and direction by 
China’s Central Government. I have found that the entirety of China’s behavior as a near-
monopolist of rare earths cannot be understood outside the context of the overarching 
direction of the State. The rare earths industry holds strategic significance to China, and 
is an indivisible part of China’s technological development thrust. As such, the 
development of rare earths in China not only falls under the wide category of national 
development—a mantra that China has chanted in earnest beginning with the Reform and 
Opening Up in 1978—it is a literally irreplaceable part of that development, and has 
significant implications for China’s technological future. 
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Methodology 
 
In these pages, I have conducted a historical review of the extant literature in the 
public domain relating to China’s near-monopoly on rare earths, using Chinese-language 
sources not usually accessed by Western researchers. I have analyzed official statements 
and publications from the various related government organs and news agencies of the 
People’s Republic of China (in Chinese), and official statements, white papers, hearings, 
and news reports from Western government agencies and news outlets (in English). I 
have also referenced commercial publications, industrial bulletins, and any other extant 
official statement with a relation to China’s near-monopoly on and exports of rare earths 
(in Chinese and/or English).  
I have examined varied sources—some available in English, and some found only 
in Chinese1, and have arrived at a multifaceted, synthetic understanding of the factors 
influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. My methodology has 
consisted of straightforward textual and historical analysis, and the findings of my 
research are all rooted in my synthesis of the foresaid sources.   
                                                 
1 If not otherwise noted, all Chinese-English translations are mine. 
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CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WORLD RARE EARTHS 
PRODUCTION 
 
In 2010, in the midst of a China-Japan diplomatic struggle, China’s alleged 
administrative halt on exports of rare earths to Japan brought the rarely discussed 
elements to the front-page news. In 2012, the media spotlight focused on rare earths once 
again as a joint WTO case was raised by the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union against China pinpointing China’s restrictive export policies and near-monopoly 
status of rare earths. As of this writing, China was found to be in violation of WTO rules, 
and as of January 1, 2015, has officially cancelled its export quotas for rare earths 
elements in a move generally welcomed in the West and criticized in China. 
As will be shown in the following chapters, China has a near-monopoly on world 
rare earths production and exports. China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths, 
especially with regard to production and export, has become the object of increasing 
Western concern and scrutiny in recent years, as China has introduced considerable 
production and export restrictions on rare earths that have had direct and unfavorable 
consequences on the high technology and defense industries of the rest of the world.  
Before discussing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths (the 
central focus of this thesis), it is valuable to provide a brief historical introduction of the 
rare earths themselves, in order to give the reader an understanding of the significance of 
rare earths to the world, and the history of their discovery and production. The current 
chapter will outline the nature of rare earths; the circumstances surrounding their 
discovery; as well as the history of rare earths production worldwide, with a focus on 
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China in particular. This chapter serves as a historical background for the discussion in 
later chapters regarding China’s rare earths policies, especially those relating to exports. 
What Are Rare Earths Elements? 
 
The rare earths elements (REE) are a set of 17 elements, including 15 of which 
appear in the lanthanide series of the periodic table (atomic numbers 57-71), as well as 
scandium (atomic number 21) and yttrium (atomic number 39) (Hurst, 2010). Rare earths 
can be found in low concentrations in many locations in the earth’s crust, but “discovered 
minable concentrations” for rare earths are significantly lower than for other ores. The 
name “rare earths” was suggested by Johann Gadolin in 1794, precisely because Gadolin 
believed the minerals to occur only rarely in the earth’s crust, and because, as oxides, 
they had an “earthy” appearance (Massari & Ruberti, 2013). The designation of “rare 
earths” as “rare” was later proved to be a misnomer (Gambogi, 2014), but the name stuck. 
The rare earth elements have applications in various fields and products, such as 
glass coloring and lighting (including carbon arc lighting used in the film industry); 
misch metal used to make flints for lighters; metal strengthening in aircraft engines; 
permanent magnets in hybrid automobiles; luminous paint, atomic batteries, and 
thickness measurement devices; phosphors used in television sets; metallurgy, neutron 
therapy, and MRI technology; crystal stabilizers for fuel cells, and naval sonar systems; 
control rods in nuclear reactors, as well as in Terfenol-D, a material with the highest 
known room-temperature magnetostriction; fiber optics as an optical amplifier; and laser 
technology, etc (Green, 2012; Doerr, Rotter & Lindbaum, 2005; Extavour, 2011). 
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The rare earths are essentially “irreplaceable” (“Rare Earth Elements”, 2013) in 
the many high-tech applications that have benefited both the civilian and military 
industries for years. According to James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, in 
his “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, “rare earth 
elements (REE) are essential to civilian and military technologies and to the 21st century 
global economy, including the development of green technologies and advanced defense 
systems” (Clapper, 2013).2 
The rare earths are the largest chemically coherent group within the periodic table 
(Haxel, Hedrick & Orris, 2002), and are divided into two main categories: light rare 
earths (LREEs), which are found in high concentrations in bastnäsite deposits; and heavy 
rare earths (HREEs), found in higher concentrations in monazite deposits.3 (See Figure 1) 
Light rare earths are used in such diverse applications as glass polishing, catalytic 
converters, catalysts for polyethylene production, magnets for wind turbine generators, 
and high strength magnets in hybrid and electric automobiles, etc. Compared to heavy 
rare earths, the light rare earths occur in greater minable quantities, but the heavy rare 
earths are used for more high tech applications, such as fiber optics, lasers, phosphors, etc. 
While it is important to recognize the collective unity of the rare earths elements 
from a geological perspective, it is also necessary to recognize that the technological use 
                                                 
2 In a comprehensive 2013 Yale University study, researchers found that there are currently no reliable 
replacements for the rare earths (Dennehy, 2013). Though the United States Department of Energy is 
pressing forward with attempts to find viable replacements (e.g. nanomaterials) for rare earths, especially 
those that help form permanent magnets, at present, there are still no successful replacements readily 
available for rare earths, and the recycling rate of rare earths is not particularly high (Piesing, 2013). 
 
3 LREEs (atomic numbers 57-64) are noted for having increasing unpaired electrons, whereas the HREEs 
(atomic numbers 65-71 plus atomic number 39) have paired electrons. Scandium (atomic number 21) does 
not exhibit properties of either LREEs or HREEs, and therefore does not fall under either category 
(Generalic, 2014). 
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of rare earths elements is a highly individualized matter. As Du & Graedel (2013) pointed 
out in their informative research on the end uses of rare earths between 1995 and 2007, 
“while REE can often be treated as a group as far as geology is concerned, their 
employment in modern technology largely depends on the chemical and physical 
properties of the individual elements. Thus, understanding the individual composition in 
the total end uses helps evaluate the risks in future REE supply, as some industrial sectors 
use only a single REE, while others employ several”.  
 
Figure 1. Rare earths elements are divided into Light Rare Earths Elements (LREEs) and Heavy 
Rare Earths Elements (HREEs). 
 
 
In 1787, Swedish army lieutenant and chemist Carl Axel Arrhelius discovered a 
unique black mineral in a feldspar and quartz mine (Hedrick, 2003) near the village of 
Ytterby, not far from Stockholm, Sweden. The black mineral contained several types of 
rare earths, including cerium (atomic number 58), the most abundant form of rare earths. 
During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, chemists from various parts of the globe—
predominately Europe4—respectively laid claim to the discovery of the other rare earths 
elements (See Appendix), with the last “straggler”—promethium—being officially 
discovered in 1945.  
                                                 
4 The rare earths were discovered by chemists from Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
States, with Swedish scientists making up the majority by far. 
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Before embarking on the historical review of rare earths production, I must define 
two key terms which will be used throughout the thesis: 
(1) Rare earths resources (稀土资源): A concentration of rare earths in the 
earth’s crust in such a form that economic extraction is considered 
feasible, either currently or at some future time (“Geological Survey 
Circular 831”; “Mineral Reserves, Resources, Resource Potential, and 
Certainty”). 
(2) Rare earths reserves (稀土储量): That portion of the identified rare 
earths resources from which usable rare earths can be economically 
and legally extracted at the time of determination, or the portion that 
has already been extracted and is held in reserve (储备) (Ibid).5 
Rare Earths Production Around the World 
 
During the last decade of the 20th century, China would become the primary 
producer and exporter or rare earths. But from a historical perspective, the worldwide 
rare earths industry went through an evolutionary process lasting approximately one 
hundred years before the age of China’s supremacy. In the early years (1880s-1940s), 
rare earths mining, processing, application, and export were parts of the economies of 
several countries, with the United States eventually taking the lead from the 1950s 
through the 1970s, and dominating the rare earths scene for most of the 1980s, during the 
latter part of which China gained competitive advantage in the world rare earths market.  
                                                 
5 In this sense, “reserve” (储备) is similar to “stockpile”. For example, see “the U. S. Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve”, which is “the largest stockpile of government-owned crude oil in the world”, “established in the 
aftermath of the 1973-74 oil embargo” (“Petroleum Reserves”).  
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Since the discovery of rare earths, there had always been a curiosity in the 
scientific community regarding their possible applications, but it seemed that much 
regarding rare earths was shrouded in mystery during the early days of discovery and 
exploitation. During the nineteenth century, production of rare earths was severely 
impeded because of challenges in separation processes. Rare earths elements are 
chemically similar, and it was not until the twentieth century that efficient separation 
methods were developed (Castor & Hedrick, 2006). Sir William Crookes, a noted British 
chemist and physicist of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2014), is claimed to have said the following regarding rare earths (Emsley, 
2001): 
 
The rare earth elements perplex us in our researches, baffle us in our speculations, 
and haunt us in our very dreams. They stretch like an unknown sea before us, 
mocking, mystifying and murmuring strange revelations and possibilities.  
 
In 1945, when the last of the rare earths (promethium) were discovered, extraction 
and production were difficult because of technological constraints, a state of affairs that 
continued into the 1950s, when rare earths production was limited as a result of 
production technology mainly consigned to monazite placers. Pre-1965, a vast majority 
of rare earths were mined from placer deposits in India and Brazil, with South Africa 
coming on the scene as the largest rare earth producer during the 1950s (“REE – Rare 
Earth Elements and their Uses”).  
In 1949, rare earths were discovered in Mountain Pass, California, and production 
ensued in 1952. By 1966, the Mountain Pass rare earths mine, owned by Molybdenum 
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Corporation of America (later Molycorp), had become the world’s largest miner of rare 
earths. Production of rare earths at Mountain Pass, California, steadily rose from 1965 
through 1985, as demand for the europium (atomic number 63) used in color televisions 
increased. Substantial environmental and regulatory problems began to compromise the 
productivity (see Figure 2) of Mountain Pass during the late 1990s (Venton, 2012), and 
the mine fell into a state of intermittent operation due to pressures and constraints related 
to waste water management, etc., during the 2000s.  
Mountain Pass held the distinction of being the world’s most productive rare 
earths mine until the late 1980s, when China’s production exceeded Mountain Pass. As 
will be discussed in the following section, after a transition period from 1984 to 1990, 
China emerged as the dominant world producer of rare earths (Haxel et. al., 2002). At 
present, China plays the role of near-monopolist, “semimonopolist” (Shambaugh, 2013), 
or “quasi-monopolist” of rare earths (Brumme, 2014) in the world market. 
Rare Earths Production in China 
 
Bad news for Molycorp’s Mountain Pass mine was the harbinger of good tidings 
for China’s growing rare earths industry, which was not encumbered by as many 
environmental and regulatory restraints in the 1990s and early 2000s6. China’s latent 
potential as a country rich in rare earths found realization during a “perfect storm” of 
opportunity, namely tougher environmental and regulatory restrictions in the United 
                                                 
6 China’s lax environmental restraints with regard to rare earths mining will be discussed at greater length 
in Chapters 2 and 4. 
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States, lax regulations in China, and the resultant cheap Chinese rare earths7. As a result 
of these “favorable” circumstances, China gained the position of near-monopolist of rare 
earths. In the end, America also found its own position of relative benefit in a rare-earths 
world dominated by China—a position of importing large quantities of cheap Chinese 
rare earths (and stockpiling) while choosing not to engage in further mining efforts on 
American soil. 
According to Martin Jacques (2012), China is a country relatively poor in natural 
resources in relation to the needs of its vast population; the one exception to that rule 
being in regard to rare earths, the majority of which are produced in China. China is 
frequently accused of monopolist and mercantilist behavior with regard to rare earths 
(Shambaugh, 2013), an issue that this thesis will address in later chapters. However, it 
took more than a few decades for China to emerge as the dominant world producer of 
rare earths. 
Long before China’s rare earths supremacy, the situation was much different. 
When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, though China had an 
abundance of rare earth resources, its rare earth industry was non-existent. In 1953, 
Jinzhou Oil Plant Number 6 began production of thorium nitrate for use as a catalyst in 
the oil industry. Because of increased demand for automobile light mantles, the Shanghai 
Yonglian Chemical Plant began processing monazite for the extraction of thorium nitrate. 
Rare earths produced as a result were set aside in piles as mere byproducts (“Zhongguo 
Xitu Lishi Huigu”, 2013).  
                                                 
7 As will be discussed later, for many years, China’s rare earths industry had/has not included 
environmental costs in the overall accounting of rare earths mining and production costs, thereby 
contributing to lower prices for exported rare earths. 
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During the mid-1950s, scientists such as Zhong Huanbang 钟焕邦 began 
research on the separation of rare earths at the Changchun Applied Chemistry Research 
Institute under the control of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院长春应用化
学研究所). In July 1958, Beijing’s General Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals (北
京有色金属研究总院) was successful in separating sixteen different REOs from 
monazite and brown ytterbium nobium.  
In 1960, the General Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals used the ion 
exchange method and half countercurrent extraction to create favorable conditions for the 
preparation of sixteen REOs and provided excellent reason for the establishment of 
smelting works. During the 1960s, the Changsha Plant Number 602, Shanghai Yue Long 
Plant, and Baogang 8861 Plant came into operation, leading China’s rare earths industry 
out of the chemistry lab and into the chemical plant (“Zhongguo Xitu Lishi Huigu”, 
2013). 
During the politically and socially tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), progress was nevertheless achieved in China’s development of rare earths 
processing. Through a series of industrial experiments involving several government 
research institutes,8 acid processing and recycling were both improved significantly, and 
between 1973 and 1979, production at the Harbin Flint Plant, Baogang Rare Earths Plant 
Number 3, and Gansu Plant Number 903 using first-generation acid processing expanded 
                                                 
8 The research organizations involved included Beijing’s General Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals 
(北京有色金属研究总院); Beijing Nonferrous Metallurgical Design Institute (北京有色冶金设计总院); 
Baotou Metallurgical Research Institute (包头冶金研究所); Shanghai Yue Long Processing Plant (上海跃
龙化工厂); Changchun Applied Chemistry Research Institute (长春应用化学研究所); and Baogang Rare 
Earths Plant Number 3 (包钢稀土三厂). 
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China’s production capacity to over 10,000 metric tons of rare earths per year.  When 
second-generation acid processing was introduced in 1979, it constituted a tremendous 
boost for China’s rare earths industry. From this point, China’s rare earths production 
began looking beyond China’s domestic market to the international market. 
China’s rare earths, as so many other things in the vast country, are split between 
north and south—the north being represented by Inner Mongolia’s Bayan Obo (白云鄂博 
Baiyun E’bo) mining area, surrounded by approximately 60 rare earths separation plants, 
20 of which are quite large (Zeng & Wu, 2012); and the south represented by a broad 
spread of mines and processing facilities in China’s tropical southern provinces (Moran, 
2010).  
While the majority (83%) of China’s minable rare earths are located in Inner 
Mongolia, rare earths resources have been discovered in a total of 1000 locations (Cheng 
& Che, 2010) scattered across twenty-two provinces in China, including Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shandong, Sichuan, etc. China has traditionally 
split domestic rare earths production figures into the following categories according to 
geographical location: Inner Mongolia’s Bayan Obo region (83%), Shandong Weishan 
(8%), Sichuan Liangshan (3%), the Seven Southern Provinces (3%), and Other (3%) 
(“Wu Jingkuang Chengjiao Jiao Pingwen Xitu Yongci Gegu Puzhang”). 
In early July, 1927, geologist Ding Daoheng 丁道衡9 (1899-1956), part of the 
China-Sweden Northwest Scientific Exploratory Mission, discovered shiny black rocks 
on the side of the road near Baiyun Bulage on the Wulanchabu prairie in what is now 
                                                 
9 Ding Daoheng was grandson of the foreward-thinking Qing dynasty governor of Sichuan Province (四川
总督) and Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运动) leader Ding Baozhen 丁宝桢 (1820-1886). 
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Inner Mongolia. From his perch on a camel, he noted the geological features of the 
nearby mountain. The following are his recollections as recorded in his journal:  
On the morning of July 3rd…as we had just reached the foot of the mountain, I 
saw a great amount of iron ore strewn along the gully. The closer we approached 
to the mountain, the richer the ore became. I raised my head to gaze at the 
mountain peak, towering lofty and firm, covered in black spots, and I knew that 
this was the site of the ore deposit. Half way up the mountain, there were layers 
upon layers of ore, and the quality of ore became purer and purer the higher we 
went. Once we looked down from a certain height, we could see that the entire 
south face of the mountain was a mining field.10 
 
In 1935, He Zuolin 何作霖 (1900-1967), professor of geology at Shandong 
University, Beijing Normal University, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Ralph & 
Chau, 2014), identified two types of rare earths-containing minerals at the Bayan Obo 
site (Wang & Li, 2014), monazite and bastnäsite (“Guojia Yankuang Huashi Biaoben 
Ziyuan Gongxiang Pingtai”). Geologist Huang Chunjiang 黄春江 (1916-2008), working 
for the Japanese North China Development Corporation, the right arm of Japan’s 
economic plundering of northern China’s industrial and mining resources (Wang Shihua, 
1993), followed in the exploratory footsteps of Ding Daoheng, making another visit to 
the Bayan Obo area in 1944, discovering two more mine areas, one to the east, and one to 
the west of Bayan Obo’s main mine. Upon returning from his expedition, Huang 
Chunjiang published, in Japanese, a geological survey report entitled “List of rare-
elements minerals” (“Huang Chunjiang Jiaoshou”). It is clear that Imperial Japan had its 
eyes set on the large steel and rare earths deposits of Bayan Obo, and most certainly 
would have exploited the resources were it not for Japan’s defeat in 1945, and the end of 
WWII.  
                                                 
10 Wang and Li, 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all Chinese-English translations of text are mine. 
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Bayan Obo is rich in three primary minerals: iron, rare earths, and niobium. The 
mine was the first and largest to be prospected, explored, and exploited by the 
Communist Chinese government. In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China was 
established, with government headquarters in Beijing. On May 23, 1950, the newly 
established government sent out its first official exploration group—the Central People’s 
Government Bayan Obo Geological Survey Team, under the leadership of head engineer 
Yan Kunyuan 严坤元 (“Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Dizhi Diaocha Dui Pucha Baiyun 
Ebo Zhukuang”). From 1950 to 1952, the geological team made a general survey of the 
entire extant mining area. In 1952, the team changed its name to the “241 Geological 
Team”. The 241 Geological Team’s research led to a report early in 1953 that pushed for 
the establishment of a large iron and steel company in Baotou for the purpose of iron 
refining. Two more official summary reports were completed in 1954 and 1955.11 In 
February 1957, the Baotou Iron and Steel Bayan Obo Iron Mine Company was set up. 
In 1957, Bayan Obo officially began operations as a mine, with a clear purpose: to 
provide raw materials to what would later become Baogang (包头钢铁集团) (Baotou 
Iron and Steel Group). Eventually, in 1959, electric locomotives took the place of human 
laborers, and the road was paved for the introduction of more technological and 
mechanical advances.  
In 1959, the mine at Bayan Obo welcomed its first blast furnace, and completed a 
Sino-Soviet cooperative research project on iron, fluorine, rare earths, and rare elements 
                                                 
11 The two reports were “Nei Menggu Baiyun Ebo Zhu Dong Kuang Dizhi Kantan Baogao” (《内蒙古白
云鄂博主、东矿地质勘探报告》), “Geological Survey Report on the Main and East Mines at Bayan Obo 
of Inner Mongolia”; and “Nei Menggu Baiyun Ebo Tiekuang Xikuang Dizhi Kantan Baogao” (《内蒙古白
云鄂博铁矿西矿地质勘探报告》), “Geological Survey Report on the West Iron Mine at Bayan Obo of 
Inner Mongolia” (“Guojia Yankuang Huashi Biaoben Ziyuan Gongxiang Pingtai”). 
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(“Guojia Yankuang Huashi Biaoben Ziyuan Gongxiang Pingtai”).  In the same year, 
China shot a movie depicting the fearless resistance of Bayan Obo natives to the 
advances of the pillaging Japanese who had set their mark on taking over the rich mineral 
resources of Bayan Obo. The film, entitled “Morning Song Over the Prairie” (《草原晨
曲》), though filled with the communist propaganda of the time, is nevertheless an 
intriguing reflection of the struggle for control of mineral resources in China’s Inner 
Mongolia region (“Guochan Mengzu Heibai Lao Dianying ‘Caoyuan Chenqu’”) during 
the years of Japanese invasion. 
Also in 1959, Baotou Iron and Steel Group made its first attempt at producing a 
rare earths ferrosilicon, which formed a key part of the birth of China’s rare earths 
industry (“Baogang Xitu Chanye Gaikuang”). The Baotou Research Institute of Rare 
Earths (包头稀土研究院), primarily dedicated to rare earths research and development, 
was established not long after, in 1963; to this date, it is one of the largest research and 
development facilities dedicated to rare earths (Mancheri, et al., 2013). 
Government Support 
 
Baotou Iron and Steel Group has taken the lead in China’s rare earths production, 
and has become an object of special attention by top Chinese leaders. Each time a major 
leader has visited, his statements can be used as a gauge of the mentality of the Chinese 
Central Government regarding rare earths at particular times. In 1964, Deng Xiaoping 
visited Baogang, leaving behind these words: “Keep iron first here, while making 
comprehensive use of [all the minable resources]” (“Baogang Xitu Hangye Gaikuang”). 
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Deng did not mention rare earths in particular, but rather lumped them together with the 
other minerals which should be comprehensively used. 
During the early years of the Deng Xiaoping reforms in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the Chinese government, in order to increase productivity in low-profit industries 
like mining, gave greater fiscal freedom and responsibility to local governments 
(Fairbank, 1992). From 1978 to 1986, Vice Premier Fang Yi visited Baotou Iron and 
Steel Group seven times to assist in the implementation of the “comprehensive use” plan 
for Baotou’s resources, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s 1964 admonition, calling 
over two hundred government research units into play in the process.  
In March 1986, in the face of increasing competition from technological 
advancements outside of China, the Chinese government endorsed the State High-Tech 
Development Plan, also known as the 863 Plan (863 计划,after the Chinese date format 
for March, 1986: 86/3). The plan, drawn up by Chinese engineers Wang Daheng 王大珩, 
Wang Ganchang 王淦昌, Yang Jiachi 杨嘉墀, and Chen Fangyun 陈芳允 in March, 
1986, was originally titled “Suggestions regarding following and researching the 
development of foreign strategic high technology” (“Guojia Gao Jishu Yanjiu Fazhan 
Jihua”)12. At the time, Deng Xiaoping gave this important comment (批示): “Speedy 
determination must be made with regard to this matter; it cannot be delayed”13 (“Guojia 
Gaojishu Yanjiu Fazhan Jihua”).  
                                                 
12 In Chinese: 国家高技术研究发展计划. 
 
13 In Chinese: “此事宜速作决断，不可拖延”. 
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The 863 Plan has placed special emphasis on rare earths research and the 
development of rare-earths-related end products. Over the years since the 863 Plan was 
put into motion, Baotou Iron and Steel Group has spearheaded much of rare-earths-
related research in China. Between 1978 and 1989, China steadily increased its 
production output for rare earths, bringing increasingly larger amounts of rare earths raw 
materials to the world market at low prices. It was in 1992 that Deng Xiaoping reportedly 
compared China’s rare earths with the oil of the Middle East (Krugman, 2010),14 
emphasizing China’s rich endowment in these valuable resources. During the 1990s, 
China’s “rare earth wings” matured (翅膀硬了). With arguably the most abundant rare 
earth resources of any country in the world, and the endorsement of the highest 
government leaders, the door of immense potential had opened, and China’s unobstructed 
road to world dominance in both rare earth production and possibly related high-tech 
development was paved. 
Under the large umbrella of the 863 Plan, the Chinese government put into place 
the 973 Program in 1997, also known as the National Basic Research Program (国家重点
基础研究发展规划), with projects ranging across the fields of agriculture, health, 
information, energy, environment, resources, population and materials. Research on the 
nature and applications of rare earths has been a critical part of the 973 Program. China’s 
Ministry of Science and Technology places extremely high importance on research 
projects related to finding solutions to the multitude of problems in producing and 
exploiting what it calls “non-renewable important strategic resources” (“973 Jihua 
                                                 
14 The famous saying by Deng goes thus in Chinese: “中东有石油，中国有稀土”. In English, it can be 
literally translated as: “The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths”.  
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Qidong Xitu Gaoxiao Tichun Zhongda Yanjiu Xiangmu”), of which rare earths are a 
prime example. 
It was through the momentum of state impetus, that China has become not merely 
a supplier of key upstream rare earths resources to the world market at low prices; it is 
also, through the 863 Plan and 973 Program, attempting to become a world leader in 
downstream fields that depend on rare earths, such as biotechnology, space technology, 
information technology, laser technology, automation, energy, and new materials 
(Mancheri, et al.).  
 In 1999, Jiang Zemin, during a visit to Baogang, left behind these words of 
wisdom: “Do well at the development and applications of rare earths, so as to turn 
resource advantages into economic advantages”15 (“Baogang Xitu Hangye Gaikuang”). 
Over the years since the opening of mining operations in Bayan Obo, the Chinese 
government has gradually shifted its focus from the iron ore (which takes up the majority 
of deposits in the Bayan Obo mine area) to the rare earths found there.  
But if it were not for the repeated emphasis of China’s top leadership—over the 
years since the Reform and Opening Up under Deng Xiaoping—on indigenous creativity 
and innovation, it is possible that China would have remained a supplier of cheap rare 
earths oxides, and that alone. 
World Rare Earths Production Data 
 
As a matter of historical review, an overview of rare earths production amounts 
over the years is valuable as a way to gain perspective on the historical scale of rare 
                                                 
15 Jiang’s statement in the original Chinese reads: “搞好稀土开发应用，把资源优势转化为经济优势”.  
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earths production. First, the world (excluding China) will be examined, followed by a 
summary of historical production figures for China in the following section. The 
information presented in the next two sections of this chapter provides an important 
background for understanding China’s behavior as the near-monopolist of rare earths—
the main subject of this thesis.  
Unsurprisingly, the first commercial production of rare earths occurred in Sweden 
(where rare earths were originally discovered) and Norway during the 1880s. Production 
in Scandinavia was prompted by the invention of the Welsbach incandescent lamp mantle, 
which initially required the rare earth elements lanthanum and yttrium, but which after 
later refinements, only called for cerium. Although it was reported that a small tonnage of 
rare earths were mined in the United States as early as 1887, the first officially recorded 
production occurred in North Carolina in 1893, with South Carolina beginning monazite 
production in 1903. Also in the 1890s, commercial production of gas mantles made from 
lanthanide oxides and other metals occurred in Vienna (Massari & Ruberti, 2013). 
Monazite production in Brazil also began as early as 1887, and India commenced the 
extraction of the ore in 1911 (Hedrick, 1999). Unfortunately, production figures for the 
early years of rare earths exploitation are limited. 
From the late 1940s through the early 1960s, rare earths production/exploration 
occurred around the world in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Congo (region), Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay. According to available production figures, 
production rates for monazite were highest for South Africa, with a yearly short tonnage 
in excess of 9,000 tons in the late 1950s (Parker, 1962).  
 23
In addition to continued efforts in the countries and regions listed above, 
production/exploration activities for rare earths continued through the end of the 1970s in 
places like Burundi, Finland, France, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, 
Norway, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Thailand, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
By the end of the 1960s, Australia, India, Brazil, and Malaysia led foreign production, 
with tonnages in the 4,000s, 3,000s, 2,000s, and 1,000s, respectively (Parker, 1969). 
During the 1970s, the former U.S.S.R. and China added their names to the list of rare 
earth producers, and Australia nearly quadrupled its yearly monazite production by the 
end of the decade, with production totaling 17,000 tons in 1979 (Moore, 1979).  
Over the 1980s, more players joined the game of rare earth production/exploration, 
including Denmark, Gabon, Greenland, Guyana, Mozambique, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
the Republic of Germany, Venezuela, and Zaire (Hedrick, 1985; Hedrick, 1987). Apart 
from China (which moved into first place in production during the late 1980s) and the 
United States, the four foremost productive countries in the world—Australia, Brazil, 
India, Malaysia—were overtaken in production by the former U.S.S.R., with the former 
U.S.S.R. out-producing Australia by the end of the decade. (Hedrick & Templeton, 1989; 
Hedrick, 1991).  
The next two decades brought little change to the list of countries 
producing/exploring rare earths. As the China-US rare earths competition picked up 
steam, the following countries began production/exploration of rare earths: Austria 
(Hedrick, 1998), Turkey (Hedrick, 1992), Vietnam (Hedrick, 1996), Kyrgyzstan (Hedrick, 
2002), the Gambia (Hedrick, 2004), and Zambia (Hedrick, 2007). Also, apart from China 
and the United States (through the late 1990s), the two countries to produce the most rare 
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earths were India and Malaysia, though production in Australia and the United States had 
sputtered to a start again by 2014 (Gambogi, 2014).  
Using data from the United States Geological Survey, during the first few years of 
the twentieth century, the United States produced a token amount of rare earths, with 
average production from 1900 to 1910 amounting to just over 178 metric tons per year. 
From 1911 to 1949, production figures are largely unavailable, with the exception of the 
years 1915-1917, 1925, and 1948. Overall, rare earths ores production within the United 
States during the years 1900-1949 was miniscule by later standards, and demand was 
relatively low (“U.S. Geological Survey”). 
When the United States Geological Survey began tracking the rare earths 
elements through its Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook in 1936, there was low 
domestic demand for rare-earths-related products; little if any production of rare earths 
materials from domestically mined sources; and very small imports. In that year, the only 
use of rare earths that was considered “even moderately well known” was for making 
sparking flints, called “misch metal”, for pocket cigarette lighters. At the time, the 
majority of rare earths were considered “scientific curiosities”, due to a lack of practical 
applications for rare earths. United States rare earths production data are not available for 
193616, and its imports were a grand total of 22 pounds of ferrocerium and other cerium 
alloys, and less than one pound of cerium metal (Tyler, 1937). 
From the mid-1930s through the end of World War II, applications for rare earths 
steadily expanded. It was during this period that rare earths were first used to create 
                                                 
16 The United States Geological Survey concludes that production for 1936 is “N/A”. U.S. Geological 
Survey. 2014.  
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photographic lenses with greater light-gathering capabilities. Misch metal, though 
continuing to serve its primary function of making sparking flints for handheld lighters, 
also helped facilitate the making of “malleablized iron”. In 1939, one of the new uses 
discovered for rare earths compounds was the mothproofing and rot-proofing of fabrics. 
With regard to the sources of rare earths, Canada was a major import source during this 
period. 
With the “accidental” discovery of the Mountain Pass mine in San Bernardino 
County, California, in 1949, the United States stumbled upon its “mother lode” of 
bastnäsite-locked rare earths. Production at Mountain Pass began in 1950, and with the 
exceptions of 1956 and 1962, production data are available for each year to the present. 
From 1950-1964, the United States, relying heavily on Mountain Pass, consistently 
produced several hundred metric tons of rare earths each year, with spikes over 1000 
metric tons/year occurring in 1952, 1960, and 1961.  
A turning point came in 1965, when rare earths production jumped from 265 
metric tons (1964 figure) to 2900 metric tons (a more than 1000% increase year-on-year) 
following a rise in demand for the sought-after elements used to make color television 
sets. In 1966, US rare earths production leapt once again to 12,200 metric tons (a more 
than 4600% increase compared to 1964 figures). Production never dipped below 10,000 
metric tons/year through the end of the 1960s.  
During the 1970s, though production slipped below 10,000 metric tons/year in 
1970 and 1971, the average for the decade was a robust 14,103 metric tons/year, with a 
peak of 19,900 metric tons in 1974. The 1980s recorded higher production yields, 
peaking at 25,300 metric tons in 1984. This production figure has not been matched since. 
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The average for the decade was 16,070 metric tons/year, and never once was production 
lower than 10,000 metric tons/year. 
The 1990s was the best decade for US rare earths production in history, with a 
yearly average of 17,600 metric tons, and a peak production of 22,700 metric tons in 
1990, in which year the United States once again produced more rare earths than any 
country (Hedrick, 1990). But US rare earths production ended down on the eve of 2000, 
with 1998 production freefalling from 20,000 metric tons/year in 1997 to 10,000 metric 
tons/year, and cutting that number in half once more in 1999 to 5000 metric tons/year. 
Omens of difficulty to come, the 1990s’ statistics played out in harmony with an ancient 
Chinese saying, meaning “dragon head, snake tail” (龙头蛇尾), referring to anticlimactic 
behavior in which there is a spectacular start, and a poor finish. 
The 2000s were bleak years for US rare earths production. The United States is 
the second-richest country worldwide in the natural endowment of rare earths (“Meiguo 
Yongyou Fengfu Xitu Ziyuan Chuliang Quanqiu Di Er Jin Ciyu Zhongguo”, 2010), and 
for many years led the world in rare earths production. Due to environmental regulation 
constraints and the competition from low Chinese rare earths prices, Mountain Pass went 
offline from 2001 to 2011, leaving the grand production total for the decade at 5000 
metric tons, all produced in the year 2000. In 2010 and 2011, concern over China’s near-
monopoly on rare earths production led to a push for reopening the embattled Mountain 
Pass mine in an effort to embark down a new path of rare earths independence. (See 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Total US Rare Earths Production in Metric Tons 1950-2012. Source: United States Geological 
Survey, 2014.   
China’s Rare Earths Production Data 
 
According to the United States Geological Survey, there are few data for China’s 
rare earth production before 1960 (Pui-Kwan Tse, Email Correspondence, 2014). In 1963, 
the Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths (包头稀土研究院), China’s largest rare 
earths technology research and development institution, was established. It was originally 
named “Baotou Metallurgical Research Institute” (包头冶金研究所); the name was 
changed to “The Rare Earths Research Institute of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry” 
(冶金工业包头稀土研究院) on August 1, 1985. The research institute took its present 
name in 1992 when it became a part of Baotou Steel Group, and thus is also known as 
“The Baotou Steel Group Rare Earths Research Institute” (包钢集团稀土研究院). 
Following is a chronological summary of the English-language data on China’s 
rare earths production from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), which started 
to trickle in beginning in 1978-1979. It was reported by the USGS that the three Japanese 
corporations, Inoue Japax Research, Inc., Mitsui Metal Mining Company and Mitsui & 
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Company all sought to undertake joint research of rare earth development and technology 
with China. The USGS also reported for the first time that China was in the process of 
establishing two rare earth treatment facilities, one of which was located at Baotou, Inner 
Mongolia (Moore, 1979). 
During the 1980s, with each passing year, new details continued to be added to 
the picture of China’s burgeoning rare earth’s industry. It was reported that the Bayan 
Obo mine had reserves of 1 billion tons of iron ore, of which rare earths comprised 
concentrations of 1%-6% and in certain parts 10%. Rare earth recovery at the time was 
“minimal”, and for the first time, rare earths production was decentralized on a trial basis 
(Hedrick, 1980).  
From the beginning of the 1980s, Japan and the United States imported rare earths 
from China. According to Hedrick (1981), the Chinese Rare Earth Company estimated 
total rare earth chlorides production in 1981 at 5,600 tons, more than a third of which 
(2,035 tons) was exported to Japan. During the same year, the United States reportedly 
signed a three-year contract that would guarantee Chinese rare earths exports to the tune 
of 2,000 tons per year. Also in 1981, production was reported in provinces of Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangxi, Henan, Guangdong, Hunan, and Fujian, with 20% of production 
occurring at the Bayan Obo site in Inner Mongolia.  
In 1982, China opened its third rare earths plant near Baotou for the processing of 
rare earths compounds and metals. The first and second plants were engaged in 
production of rare earth alloys and rare earth ferroalloys, respectively (Hedrick, 1982). 
By 1983, USGS reports were already talking of the United States and China in the same 
breath in the opening paragraph of its mineral yearbook summary of world rare earths 
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production: “Basnasite, the world’s principal source of rare earths, was mined as a 
primary product in the United States and as a byproduct of iron ore mining in China” 
(Hedrick, 1983). It was reported that Guangdong and Guangxi became important 
producers of monazite, although it is especially interesting to note (in light of China’s 
dismal rare earths environmental record) that China’s national standards for radioactive 
materials were so strict as to make the handling of monazite increasingly difficult, forcing 
China to extract the radioactive thorium from monazite, leaving rare earth chloride 
behind (Hedrick, 1983).  
In 1984, China had 80% of world reserves of rare earths. In that year, rare earth 
ties between Japan and China tightened as Mitsui Mining & Smelting Company signed a 
five-year contract for the annual export of 200 tons of rare earths (Hedrick, 1984). In 
June 1985, a third rare earth separation plant was completed at Baotou, increasing 
production capacity for several rare earths, including neodymium, whose production 
capacity rose dramatically from 0.5 tons to 20 tons per year (Hedrick, 1985).  
Rare earths production was reported at 12,200 tons17 of REO in 1985, with 
deposits being noted in Bayan Obo as well as Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. Jiangxi 
rare earths were highlighted due to their high concentrations of heavy rare earth elements, 
especially yttrium, samarium, europium, terbium, and ytterbium (Hedrick, 1986). In 1986, 
China reportedly produced a total of 11,860 tons of equivalent REO (Hedrick, 1987). 
By 1987, China’s total rare earths reserves were reported to account for 76% of 
world reserves, and total production stood at 15,100 tons of REO, pushing China into 
                                                 
17 The figure provided by the same USGS mineral yearbook report from 1987, changed this number to 
11,860 tons, citing as the source the China Rare Earth Information Centre. See Hedrick, 1987. 
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close second behind the United States in world production of rare earths. In 1987, 
China’s domestic consumption of rare earths increased, and a new rare earths plant 
opened in Jiangxi province. Also, Can-Pacific Rare Earths & Metals Corporation 
announced news of its joint venture 1000-ton-per-year separation plant scheduled to 
commence building in 1988 (Hedrick, 1987). 
History was made in 1988 when the China Rare Earth Information Centre 
reported an annual production of 18,660 tons of equivalent REO, surpassing United 
States production of rare earths for the first time. According to the USGS report, this 
increase in production was primarily due to heightened production of iron-adsorption-
type ore in Jiangxi province. In wake of higher REO production, China’s largest rare 
earth processing plant (Shanghai Yue Long 上海跃龙化工厂) doubled its production 
capacity to 4,000 tons per year, and a new 100,000-ton-per-year mixed rare earth 
separation plant began operations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Hedrick and 
Templeton, 1988).  
In 1989, China continued to hold top place for rare earths production, despite 
reduced output from southern mines. Total production was reported at 19,760 metric tons 
of REO, up 5.4% from 1988 (Hedrick and Templeton, 1989). 1990 marked a drop in 
production, and China lost its top-producer status for two years, with only 16,480 metric 
tons of rare earths produced in China compared to approximately 22,700 in the United 
States (Hedrick, 1990). In 1991, China continued to report a lower production rate of 
only 16,150 metric tons of equivalent REO (Hedrick, 1991). Though it is difficult to 
prove a definitive connection, it is of significance to note that these years, and their lower 
production figures, correspond to the years of post-Tiananmen “sanctions” by the United 
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States and other western powers.  In 1992, China edged out the United States as the 
leading producer of rare earths at 21,340 metric tons of REO (Hedrick, 1992), and 
reported production of 22,100 metric tons of REO in 1993. 1994 marked another jump in 
rare earths production, with a reported total production of 30,650 metric tons of REO 
(Hedrick, 1994). 
Increasingly higher rare earths production levels in China translated to lower and 
lower prices globally—prices pushed down by what the Chinese rare earths community 
calls “cabbage” and “turnip” prices (“Xitu Jiage Ru Guoshanche Cong Baicai Jia 
Shunjian Zhang Zhi Huangjin Jia”, 2014; “Zhongguo Xitu Bei Jianmai Huangjin Maichu 
Luobo Jia”, 2010). A well-accepted figure from the late 1990s-early 2000s claims that 
China’s Southern Rare Earths Company produced a half-kilogram of either promethium 
or neodymium for approximately $30, while the United States produced the same amount 
of rare earths at the Mountain Pass mine for around $40 per half-kilogram. At the time, 
the United States decided to close the Mountain Pass mine for more than merely 
environmental reasons18: When the production cost of one half-kilogram of rare earths 
                                                 
18 According to Ali (2014), the environmental issues faced by the Mountain Pass rare earths mine in the 
1990s-2000s involved leakage from a piping system used to carry wastewater to an evaporation system. 
There were more than 60 known spills related to the faulty pipes uncovered by Federal investigation, and in 
the end the entire piping system was replaced. With regard to rare earths, for many years, the United States’ 
environmental protection policies centered around such laws as the Clean Air Act (1970) and the Clean 
Water Act (1972) and other general environmental protection laws that regulated the general release of 
pollutants into the environment. Only recently (2012), has the Environmental Protection Agency 
undertaken the task of systematically researching the potential harmful effects on the environment by rare 
earths mining (“Rare Earth Elements: A Review of Production, Processing, Recycling, and Associated 
Environmental Issues”). Nevertheless, the temporary end of active mining operations at Mountain Pass in 
2002 was due to the United States’ satisfactory and gradually increasing implementation of existing 
environmental laws during the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, even though there was a lack of industry-
specific laws for rare earths in the United States, healthy implementation of other environmental laws had 
significant effects on the US rare earths industry; whereas in China, general environmental laws had less 
power on the ground during the same time period, and industry-specific environmental protection laws 
were non-existent. 
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rose to between $35 and $40, it was no longer economically viable to produce 
domestically (“Riben Zhan Jin Wo Xitu Pianyi Jia Gong Hou Jiage Kan Bi Zuanshi”, 
2010).  
The year 1995 was another year of record rare earth production for China, with a 
total combined output of 48,00219 tons of REO, translating to a 56.6% increase in 
production year-on-year. While the majority of rare earths production originated in Bayan 
Obo (26,905 tons REO), output from the rest of China was significant, as is reflected 
from the following figures: Sichuan Province (8,500 tons), Shandong Province (963 tons), 
Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, and Fujian combined production of rare earths from ion-
adsorption-type clays (9,770 tons) (Hedrick, 1995). 
According to the United States Geological Survey, in 1996, China held 43%20 of 
the world’s rare earths reserves, the largest share of any country, and its production had 
increased to 55,000 tons of REO. New plants continued to open in various parts of China. 
Xingguang North Rare Earths Materials Company, Ltd. Established a rare earth refining 
plant in Chenyang, Liaoning Province with a production capacity of 2,000 metric tons per 
year of cerium oxide and cerium chloride. Panxi Rare Earth Company, Ltd. of Xichang, 
Sichuan Province began processing bastnäsite at its new plant; and Advanced Materials 
                                                 
19 Revised to 48,000 tons in 1996. See Hedrick, 1996. 
 
20 In 1984, according to an estimate by the Bureau of Mines, world rare earths reserves were 45 million 
tons of contained REO, and China’s share of world rare earths reserves stood at 80% (approximately 36 
million tons). By 1996, world reserves had increased to approximately 100 million tons of contained REO, 
with China’s reserves accounting for 43%, approximately 43 million tons. Thus, the apparent drastic drop 
in reserves on the part of China between 1984 and 1996 was actually a net increase from 36 million tons to 
43 million tons; but due to the dramatic increase in world reserves over the period, China’s reserve 
percentage dropped relative to that of the rest of the world. 
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Resources, Ltd., of Toronto, Canada announced a 128% increase in cerium carbonate 
production at its Zibo, Shandong plant (Hedrick, 1996). 
The year 1997 marked a significant point on China’s breakneck production 
trajectory for rare earths. The State Planning Commission (国家计划委员会, now the 
National Development and Reform Commission 国家发展和改革委员会) announced 
that new rare earths projects would be placed on hold in an attempt to decrease 
production. At this early stage in China’s rise to rare-earth near-monopoly, the 
government recognition of the seriousness of the over-exploitation of rare earths 
resources is significant, as it is an issue that has not been completely solved, even as of 
the writing of this thesis. As a result of direction from the State Planning Commission, 
China’s production of rare earths for 1997 stood at 53,250 tons, a 3.8% decrease from the 
1996 level (Hedrick, 1997).  
Despite government efforts to curtail overproduction, including the 
implementation of the rare earths export quota system, China’s overall mine production 
of rare earth oxides increased to 60,000 tons in 1998. During the year, two companies 
contributed to the growth of Chinese rare earths production capacity—Advanced Material 
Resources (Canada) and Rhodia (France) announced increases in production capacity due 
to new technology and equipment purchased from Japan’s Nippon Yttrium Corporation, 
and the signing of an agreement for the construction of new production facilities in 
Baotou for rare earth alloys and metal hydride powder, respectively. Magnaquench, an 
American company, expanded its rare earth permanent magnet business by acquiring a 
neodymium alloy production facility and announcing plans for the construction of a 
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neodymium-iron-boron powder magnet plant near Tianjin on China’s northeastern 
seacoast (Hedrick, 1998).  
China continued its efforts to control excess production. In 1999, the Chinese 
government announced that it would not be issuing any new rare earth production permits, 
in addition to the fact that it would be placing greater restrictions on foreign investment 
in rare earth processing plants and metallurgical operations within China. 
Notwithstanding, China’s total rare earth oxide production for 1999 reached 70,000 
metric tons, a 16% increase from 1998 levels (Hedrick, 1999). In November 1999, the 
Inner Mongolian Rare Earth Group, Inc. (IMREG) was established at Baotou, Inner 
Mongolia, to “address the status of the industry”. Its primary goals included integrating 
rare earth research and development, production, and trade; to provide quality products; 
and to monitor the rare earths industry in the region. IMREG, a state-owned entity, 
focuses on the downstream aspects of the rare earth chain, and places emphasis on 
international cooperation. Overall, the Chinese rare earth market continued to expand and 
mature in 1999, despite bankruptcy filed on the part of Sichuan Panxi Rare Earth, Ltd., 
which previously had a 2000 ton/year capacity for bastnäsite concentrate (Hedrick, 2000).  
In 2000, China’s rare earth oxide production increased to 73,000 tons, and a joint-
venture agreement was signed amongst Santoku Corporation, Baotou Rare Earth High 
and New Technology Industry Development Zone, Rhodia, and Westlake. The 
rechargeable batteries company formed as a result was named Baotou Santoku Battery 
Materials Company, Ltd. (BSBM) (Hedrick, 2001). By 2001, China’s rare earth 
production had hit recorded highs of 80,600 metric tons of rare earth oxides. New 
developments in China’s rare earths industry included the formation of a new joint 
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venture, Jiangxi Rare Earth Group, with a total of ¥350 million (US$42.3 million) of 
capital invested by the city of Ganzhou (¥170 million), Jiangxi and Jiangxi Rare Earth 
Metal Tungsten group (¥180 million) (Hedrick, 2002). 
“What goes up should come down” was the message from the Chinese 
government to the domestic rare earth industry in the late 1990s-early 2000s. In 2002, 
China’s rare earth oxide production reached 88,000 tons, and then 92,000 tons in 2003. In 
an effort to control overproduction, China’s Ministry of Land and Resources (中华人民
共和国国土资源部; CMLR) announced that it would regulate the production of 
antimony, rare earths, and tin. Also, CMLR claimed it would close down illegal mining 
operations, and guarantee the compliance of all legitimate rare earth operations with 
health and safety standards. During the same year, Baotou Huamei Rare Earth Products 
Company, Ltd. of Baotou and eight other rare earths investment projects in the Baotou 
region were slated to begin production. Most of the new projects were battery-related. In 
addition, China reported the development of a new compound of ytterbium, gallium, and 
germanium that would not expand or contract under high heat levels, and that could 
withstand temperatures over 2,000° C. Expected use was to be in heat insulation for 
manned spacecraft (Hedrick, 2003).  
In 2004, China’s rare earth oxide production stood at 98,000 tons, with the 
majority (58,000 tons REO) coming from the Baotou, Inner Mongolia region. Jiangxi 
Province’s iron-adsorption ores accounted for 25,000 tons, and other mines throughout 
China recorded 15,000 tons of rare earths production. China’s REO production hit new 
record highs in 2005, with a grand total of approximately 119,000 tons—a nearly 18% 
increase compared to 2004 (Hedrick, 2005). In 2006, it appeared at first that China’s rare 
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earth concentrate production stayed at essentially the same level as in 2005, 
approximately 119,000 tons. Later reports claimed 133,000 tons (Hedrick, 2007). In 
addition, Chinese domestic demand for rare earths continued to increase (62,800 tons of 
equivalent REO), accounting for nearly half of total production (Hedrick, 2006). 
By 2007, China’s rare earths production had become increasingly diversified, 
with the following characteristics: (1) High production; (2) high domestic demand; (3) 
increased exports; and (4) tightened tariffs. Total rare earths production for 2007 was 
approximately 120,000 tons (Cordier & Hedrick, 2008). Domestic demand increased to 
72,550 tons of equivalent REO, up from 62,800 tons in 2006. Exports increased to 54,393 
tons of rare earth compounds and metals, up from 52,230 tons in 2006. Of particular note, 
in 2007, China enacted export tariffs on various rare earth products in order to increase 
prices and reduce exports (Hedrick, 2007). The rare earth export tariffs were 10% in 2007. 
Restricting exports would become a trend in later years.  
In 2008, it was reported that rare earth materials were in tight supply in China. 
Simultaneously, partially due to the general world financial downturn in 2008, demand 
for certain rare earths fell and there existed an overall sluggish mood in the rare earths 
market throughout the year. Nevertheless, total production for rare earth oxides in China 
amounted to 125,000 metric tons, 5,000 metric tons higher than 2007 (Cordier & Hedrick, 
2008). In 2009, though China’s total production increased to 129,000 metric tons, 
production and export quotas tightened, and Chinese rare earth metals exports to Japan 
dropped steeply (Cordier, 2009).  
According to the United States Geological Survey, China’s rare earth mine 
production accounted for 97% of world mine production in 2010. Citing domestic 
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environmental concerns, China controlled exports of REOs through taxes and quotas. 
While the Chinese government set the production quota for the year at 89,200 tons of 
contained REO, actual production was approximately 130,000 metric tons (Gambogi & 
Cordier, 2010). In 2011, although China accounted for 95% of world rare earth mine 
production, a drop in production was measured (105,000 metric tons equivalent REO), 
with greater restrictions imposed by the Chinese government. In 2011, it appeared that 
environmental restrictions were beginning to take effect, as it is claimed that the Chinese 
government began withholding export quotas for companies that did not meet 
environmental protection guidelines (Gambogi, 2011).  
According to the latest data from the United States Geological Survey, China’s 
production of rare earth oxides for 2012 and 2013 was 100,000 metric tons and 100,000 
metric tons, respectively (Gambogi, 2014). In 2012, China continued to clamp down on 
rare earths production and exports, citing domestic environmental concerns as the 
underlying reason. Producers of rare earths were required to undergo government 
inspections, and their feed material was to come from licensed rare earth mines. Also, 
rare earths traders were required to have registered capital of ¥50 million ($8 million).  
In 2012, according to China’s estimate, it had a 23% share in world rare earths 
reserves (“Situation and Policies of China’s Rare Earth Industry”), although USGS 
estimates placed China’s rare earths reserves at approximately 50% of the world total. In 
2012, following requests from the European Union, Japan, and the United States, the 
World Trade Organization launched an investigation into China’s restrictive rare earths 
trade policies. In addition, India expected the year-end opening of a 10,000-ton-per-year 
monazite processing plant. In Malaysia, plans for a rare earth oxide processing plant in 
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Malaysia were stalled by outcries from environmental activists, though production was 
expected by year-end from the Lynas facility—purported to be the largest rare earths 
processing facility in the world (Gambogi, 2013; Tan, 2012). While China still 
maintained its stranglehold on the rare earths market as a whole, increasing efforts 
worldwide to find alternatives to China’s rare earths were signs that could not be 
ignored.21 
In 2013, according to United States Geological Survey data, China’s production 
and export quotas for rare earths were 93,800 tons and 31,000 tons, respectively. 
According to recent USGS reports, China’s rare earths production for 2013 was 95,000 
metric tons—close to its production goals. It could be argued that China made strides 
toward its goal of controlling rare earths production and putting the lid on illegal 
production (Gambogi, 2014; Gambogi, 2015).  
As of 2013, China had over 170 rare earths production plants, with the majority of 
plants producing between 1000 and 2000 metric tons of rare earths per year. There are 
only five locations with production capacities of over 5000 metric tons per year. China’s 
rare earths industry can be divided into three major areas, based on geography: (1) The 
North, represented by more than 80 companies concentrated in Baotou (Inner Mongolia) 
and Gansu with a production capacity of 75,000 metric tons of rare earths material per 
year; (2) the South, which produces approximately 20,000 metric tons of rare earths 
materials per year, most of which are heavy rare earths elements (HREEs); and (3) the 
                                                 
21 According to a recent Jamestown Foundation report, Japan is currently in discussions with high-ranking 
mining officials in Mongolia regarding cooperating in exploiting Mongolia’s rare earths resources. This 
comes as both governments seek to strengthen ties in hopes of blunting Sino-Russian influence in the 
region (Campi, 2015).  
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Sichuan region, which produces between 15,000 and 20,000 metric tons per year. 
(“Zhongguo Xitu Lishi Huigu”, 2013). 
According to the latest available information from the USGS, China’s rare earths 
production for 2014 was 95,000 metric tons, the same as production figures for 2013. 
From this figure, it would seem that China is gaining greater overall control of its rare 
earths production. In 2014, China’s export quota for rare earths was 31,000 tons. This 
rare earths export quota was perhaps China’s last, as the WTO ruled against China in a 
case brought against China by the United States, the European Union, and Japan accusing 
China of unfair export quotas for rare earths. As of January 1, 2015, China has cancelled 
rare earths export quotas. It is important to also note that according to the USGS, in 2014, 
China’s rare earths reserves maintained the level of 55,000,000 tons, a number China has 
claimed since 2010 (Gambogi, 2015; Gambogi, 2011; Gambogi, 2012; Gambogi, 2013; 
Gambogi, 2014); but since world reserves have increased to 130,000,000, China’s 
relative share has dropped to approximately 42%. 
The current chapter has examined the topic of rare earths from a historical 
perspective, primarily tracing the history of the discovery and exploitation of rare earths, 
concluding with a snapshot of China as the near-monopolist of rare earths (the result). In 
Chapter 2, based on the current literature, I will examine the specific reasons behind 
China’s rise to rare earths supremacy (the means). Combined with the historical review 
provided in Chapter 1, such an analysis will provide a helpful context within which to 
understand China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. 
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CHAPTER 2: CHINA’S PATH TO NEAR-MONOPOLY OF RARE EARTHS  
Introduction 
In order to understand China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths, one 
must first examine the roots of the near monopoly. In other words, it is imperative that 
my study first take up the question of exactly through which means China arrived at its 
position of rare earths supremacy, before undertaking an analysis of how it has behaved 
in that position of dominance. The current chapter will attempt to examine the means 
wherewith China came to a near-monopoly of rare earths, using the extant literature in 
English and Chinese.   
As shown through the previous short history of rare earths production, China is 
strategically positioned as the near-monopolist of rare earths production worldwide.22 
Some Chinese researchers have used the word “monopoly” (垄断) to describe China’s 
rare earths production (Wu & Yu, 2012), though for the purposes of this thesis I suggest 
the use of “near-monopoly”, because China, while dominating the world rare earths 
market, does not enjoy complete monopoly on world rare earths production.  
In my analysis, I argue that China has achieved a near-monopoly on rare earths 
production on the basis of the following factors: (1) Strong support for the development 
of the rare earths industry by the Chinese government; (2) lack of or disregard for 
environmental regulations regarding the production of rare earths; (3) illegal and/or 
                                                 
22 In fact, China is first in at least four rare earths related areas: (1) reserves, (2) production, (3) sales, and 
(4) consumption (Cheng & Che, 2010).  
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unregulated production; (4) relatively low cost of rare earths production in China 
compared with the rest of the world.  
(1) Government Support 
 
During the Mao era (1949-1976), China’s centrally planned (or command) 
economy, apart from stagnating because of near-nonexistent market competition, 
government price setting, and excessive central control of the majority of industries 
through the seemingly omnipresent state-owned enterprises (SOEs), it was also plagued 
by a seemingly never-ending stream of “campaigns” or “movements” which, for the most 
part, proved disastrous for the growth of the economy and the well-being and quality of 
life of China’s citizenry23 (Wang, Liu & Li, 2003). One example of such campaigns was 
the so-called “Great Leap Forward”, through which chairman Mao planned to surpass 
Britain in steel production, but which resulted in a vast tonnage of very bad steel and a 
“Mao-made” famine that killed 20-40 million Chinese (McNeill & McNeill, 2003; 
Fairbank, 1992). 
                                                 
23 A Taiwanese history of the Communist Party of China comments on China’s economy during the Mao 
years and shortly afterward: “After the establishment of the communist state, Mao Zedong fantasized that 
he could use the methods of ‘class struggle’ and ‘excessive poverty’ to create a communist society in China 
ahead of schedule. Thus, during the 1950s, after a complete transplant of the Soviet Union’s centralized 
planned economic system, and after initiating the ‘Three Red Banners’ movement in 1958, in which he 
attempted to expedite economic development through the method of mass movement, the end result was 
three years of great famine. In 1966, the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ caused the Mainland’s economy to fall 
into recession once again. Once Mao Zedong died in 1976 and the ‘Gang of Four’ crumbled, the 3rd Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China admitted that the entire domestic 
economy was on the brink of collapse. It was then that the Communist Party was forced to make revisions 
and reforms to its economic policy and system” (Wang, Liu & Li, 2003). The original Chinese reads thus: “
中共建立政權後，毛澤東幻想用‘階級鬥爭’和‘窮過度’的方式，提早進入共產主義社會。於是
五十年代在全盤移植蘇聯中央極權計劃經濟制度之後，1958 年又在大陸發動‘三面紅旗’運動，企
圖以群眾運動之方式加速經濟建設，結果是帶來三年的大飢荒。1966 年發動‘文化大革命’運動，
復使大陸經濟呈現衰退；直到 1976 年毛澤東死亡、‘四人幫’垮臺，中共在十一屆三中全會上承
認大陸整個國民經濟已經面臨崩潰邊緣，迫使中共在經濟政策路線及體制上進行修正與改革”. 
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As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” (改革开放) policy 
initiated in the late 1970s and carried out in full force especially from the 1980s to the 
early 2000s, China’s government placed paramount emphasis on economic growth, 
creating the economic miracle of a thirty-year annual average GDP growth rate of 9.8% 
(“Zhongguo Shishi Qiannian Fazhan Mubiao Jinzhan Qingkuang Baogao: Gaige Kaifang 
30 Nian Yu Zhongguo Fazhan”)—a feat unequaled in human history. This steep 
economic take-off, fueled by Deng’s market reforms and opening up to the world, put the 
Chinese government on a trajectory of success beyond imagination. When Chinese 
leaders set the goal of quadrupling the economy by 2002—which sounded “ludicrously 
overambitious” at the time, not many outside of China would have guessed that the goal 
would be met two years ahead of schedule. China’s economic explosion, though slowing, 
still continues today.24 
Economic growth rate was one of the key criteria against which Chinese 
communist cadres of positions high and low were evaluated for many years. A well-
known Chinese saying seems to sum up this “forward-looking” principle of action: “一切
向钱看”25. Money-madness has consumed not only the worldviews of many Chinese 
                                                 
24 The state-designed Chinese economic miracle is expected to continue for at least another ten to fifteen 
years (Shirk, 2008). China’s economic growth has shown its resilience through three major tests, one 
political and two financial: (1) The Tiananmen Square incident; (2) the Asian financial crisis; and the (3) 
worldwide financial downturn of 2008. Though annual GDP growth rates are down from pre-2008, and 
there is no lack of pessimistic outlooks on China’s economic future (Davis, 2014), China is still the fastest 
growing major economy in the world, and many analysts do not predict a change in that status for the near 
future (Rapoza, 2014). 
 
25 The phrase originally read as “一切向前看” (“yí qiè xiàng qián kàn”), meaning “looking forward in 
everything”. A homophonic play on words switched out the “前” (qián), meaning “front” or “forward” for 
“钱” (qián), meaning “money”, to render the phrase “putting money above everything else” (literally, 
“looking to money in everything”). 
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consumers, the mindset has also deeply influenced the modus operandi of many cadres, 
especially on the lower end of the hierarchical spectrum, where career future has been, 
until recently,26 tied almost exclusively to economic productivity. As noted by Chen 
(2009), since the “early 1990s, China’s officialdom has formed a culture whereby GDP 
growth is a major indicator to measure administrative chiefs’ performances and even 
determines their future job promotions.” 
Within the context of the Chinese government’s seemingly one-sided focus on 
economic development, one of the most important goals of development was 
technological advancement. Interestingly, the development of China’s rare earths 
industry matched both of these needs: During the early years of rare earths development, 
China followed the guidance of leadership27 by turning abundant resources into (1) 
economic returns; later, China began to establish her own complete “mine-to-magnets-
style” industry chain, including an ever-maturing research and development component, 
which could go far toward enabling China to reach its goal of (2) technological 
advancement. 
                                                 
26 Under Xi Jinping, the performance metrics of cadres’ success or failure have been further diversified to 
include environmental and social criteria, although it seems too early to tell just how effective these new 
measures will be in curbing China’s looming ecological problems (Sanderson, 2014). 
 
27 Deng Xiaoping is claimed to have made the following statement in 1992: “The Middle East has oil, 
China has rare earths” (Krugman, 2010). In the Chinese: “中东有石油，中国有稀土”. Jiang Zemin once 
said, “Do well at the development and applications of rare earths, so as to turn resource advantages into 
economic advantages” (“Baogang Xitu Hangye Gaikuang”). In the Chinese: “搞好稀土开发应用，把资源
优势转化为经济优势”. 
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In China, industries28 thrive or die depending on the level of governmental 
support. If this is true for industries like textiles, papermaking, and catering, it is even 
more so for “strategic” industries like coal, oil (“The long arm of the state”, 2011), and 
rare earths. If it were not for the guiding, supporting hand of the Chinese central 
government, in establishing the 863 Plan and 973 Program, which placed priority on 
high-tech development, including rare earths, it is certain that China would have had 
neither the drive nor stamina to become the near-monopolist of rare earths. 
Shirk (2008) notes: “As the country that gave the world gunpowder, paper, and 
the compass, China is reclaiming its heritage of technological inventiveness. Its 
capabilities still lag behind the United States and Japan, but it is trying to catch up fast”. 
In 1986, when Deng Xiaoping approved the request of four highly respected scientists to 
launch a research and development impetus by which China could “catch up” with the 
rest of the world in high-tech development, China was the underdog of the rare earths 
world, but possessed a great potential in raw rare earths resources. In 1986, China 
produced 12,200 tons of REO. By the end of the 1990s, China’s resolute decision to 
develop rare earths had paid off, with production figures of approximately 65,000 metric 
tons of equivalent REO in 1999, compared with 5000 metric tons produced in the United 
States during the same year (Hedrick, 2000).  
From the current literature, it is abundantly clear that China’s success in gaining a 
near-monopoly on the world rare earths market is inseparable from the strong support and 
                                                 
28 I refer to legitimate industry, although it could be argued that illegal, underground, or black-market 
industry could not survive and thrive if it were not for some form of tacit approval from government. 
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preferential treatment of the Chinese government. Morrison & Tang (2012), in a 
Congressional Research Service report, make this insightful summary:  
To many observers, China’s rare earth policies are part of a complex web of 
Chinese government industrial policies that seek to promote the development of 
domestic industries deemed essential to economic modernization. In the late 1980s, 
the United States was the global leader in rare earth production. However, 
preferential policies by the Chinese government and lax environmental standards 
there quickly enabled China to become a dominant, low-cost producer of rare earths 
by the late 1990s. 
  
 While it is true that the “preferential policies” mentioned above include 
subsidization, etc., the fact must not be overlooked that such preferential policies came 
about and existed for only one reason: the Chinese government placed high priority on 
the development of rare earths production, application, and trade. In other words, without 
the deliberate, calculated, over-arching support of the Chinese government for the rare 
earths sector, there would have been no significant protection of the industry.  
In addition, since the ultimate goal of the economic development of the 1980s and 
1990s can be summarized by “economic development” itself, perhaps one of the greatest 
“preferential policies” of China’s government for the rare earths industry was its near-
tunnel-vision approach to economic development, and the lax environmental protection 
that occurred by default. “Pragmatic” “economic madness” (Jacques, 2012) had 
consumed China, and each booming industry, including rare earths, fought its way to the 
holy grail of success with the smiling approval of Deng’s “black-cat-white-cat”29 (“Deng 
                                                 
29 Deng Xiaoping, throughout his political career, referred more than once to what would be later called “
猫论” (“Cat theory”). The saying upon which the theory is based can be summed up in one sentence: “It 
does not matter whether the cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice, then it is a good cat” (不管白
猫黑猫，捉到老鼠就是好猫。). The saying originated long before Deng’s time, and is recorded in Pu 
Songling’s Qing dynasty work, Strange Tales of Liaozhai (《聊斋志异》): “Yellow foxes or black foxes, 
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Xiaoping Tongzhi ‘Heimao Baimao Lun’ Beihou De Gushi”, 2006) development policy. 
By allowing China’s rare earths industry to develop at the cost of environmental 
degradation—by not including the environmental cost of rare earths development in the 
overall accounting of rare earth production cost for so many years—thereby, China 
gained its greatest advantage, and simultaneously buried for a time the monstrous 
problem that only now China’s government is facing head-on: serious environmental 
degradation (to be discussed in more detail below, and in Chapter 4). 
 
(2) Environmental Factors 
 
As a matter of historical review, it is abundantly clear that the United States, the 
country that enjoyed the title of the world’s top rare earths producer from the 1950s 
through the late 1980s, was almost completely edged out of the rare earths market by 
China (Hurst, 2010; Morrison & Tang, 2012; Wübbeke, 2013). It is also evident that a 
significant part of the reason for the downturn in US rare earths production at Mountain 
Pass, CA (the major US rare earths producer) during the 1990s was environmental 
compliance cost challenges (Ali, 2014) surrounding groundwater pollution (Massari & 
Ruberti, 2013). In China, however, until recently, few such constraints have existed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
it matters not which kind it is—the kind that catches mice is the greatest” (“黄狸黑狸，得鼠者雄”). A 
similar saying is also prevalent in the Sichuan dialect of Chinese, and most likely Deng borrowed the 
phrase from his native dialect, as he hailed from Sichuan. Eventually, the saying became attributed to him, 
and the interpretation that sums up “Cat theory” is: Command economy or market economy—this is not the 
question, for these are only means to the end of resource allocation, and have nothing to do with political 
systems.  
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though in theory the idea of “sustainable development”, including environmental 
protection, has been part of the Chinese rhetoric since the early 1990s.30 
A common Western perspective on the relationship between China’s rare earths 
development and the environment is that it was the closure of the Mountain Pass Rare 
Earths Mine in the 1990s that caused China’s rare earths production to “flourish” (Ali, 
2014). It could be argued that China’s rare earths industry was already flourishing before 
the Mountain Pass mine closure, which only strengthened China’s grasp on the market by 
default. Cheng and Che (2010) concur that there is a price tag for the development of 
many of China’s rare earths enterprises: the over-exhaustion of resources and the 
destruction of the ecological environment.31 The fact that China’s rare earths industry has 
caused environmental degradation is openly admitted by the Chinese government. In an 
official government document from 2011 (“Guowuyuan Guanyu Cujin Xitu Hangye 
Chixu Jiankang Fazhan De Ruogan Yijian”), China’s State Council makes the following 
frank statement:  
After many years of development, China’s rare earths mining, 
metallurgy/separation, and applied technology research and development have 
                                                 
30 The United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development’s 1987 report, Our Common 
Future (a.k.a. the “Brundtland Report”), defined “sustainable development” thus: “Humanity has the ability 
to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (“Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: Our Common Future”, 1987, emphasis mine). This is commonly accepted as the first 
major reference to “sustainable development” in an international context. The Communist Party of China 
interprets the United Nations’ goals of sustainable development (including those the Millennium 
Declaration) to include economic development, social development, and environmental protection. 
According the Communist Party of China, the goals of sustainable development have been a part of the 
country’s top priorities since the early 1990s (“Dang He Zhengfu Tichu De ‘Ke Chixu Fazhan’ Zhanlue 
Juti Neirong Shi Shenme?”, 2006).  
 
31 In Chinese: “大量稀土企业的发展，在一定程度上仍是以资源的过量消耗和生态环境的破坏为代
价的”. Also, Sun (2011) points to a lack of an environmental protection mindset as the ultimate source of 
failure in environmental practice (“环保意识薄弱”). 
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achieved fairly large improvements, and the scale of the industry is continually 
expanding. Yet problems continue to exist within the rare earths industry, e.g. 
illegal mining in the face of numerous prohibitions; increasing overcapacity in 
metallurgical and separation industrial potential; destruction of the ecological 
environment and serious waste of resources; lagging in the development of high-
end applied technologies; and relative chaotic disorder of rare earths exports, all 
affecting the healthy development of the industry (emphasis mine).32 
 
The following are examples of rare-earths-related environmental degradation in 
China33: (1) Bayan Obo (白云鄂博). The pit is located in an arid, dusty, desert 
environment, and the tailing dam associated with the mine continues to grow higher and 
larger with passing time. Thorium, a radioactive element commonly associated with the 
extraction of rare earths, is found in the Bayan Obo tailing dam at a concentration of 
0.056%. Radioactive contamination has spread to the ground outside of the dam. Blowing 
dust is already a problem in the region, and thus airborne radioactive contamination is a 
real and dangerous hazard to the inhabitants of the surrounding region (Sun, 2011).  
(2) Liangshan, Sichuan (四川凉山). Here the environmental destruction has taken 
the form of massive soil erosion, which has led to the clogging of riverbeds; as well as 
major safety hazards induced by haphazard, irresponsible mining methods. (3) Southern 
China. The majority of rare earths mined in the southern Chinese provinces can be 
classified as weathered crust elution-deposited rare earths ores (风化壳淋积型稀土矿), 
formerly (and more commonly) known as ion-adsorbed rare earth ores (离子吸附型稀土
                                                 
32 The original Chinese reads: “经过多年发展，我国稀土开采、冶炼分离和应用技术研发取得较大进
步，产业规模不断扩大。但稀土行业发展中仍存在非法开采屡禁不止，冶炼分离产能扩张过快，生
态环境破坏和资源浪费严重，高端应用研发滞后，出口秩序较为混乱等问题，严重影响行业健康发
展。” 
 
33 Cheng & Che (2010). 
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矿). The actual rate of exploitation of these mines is rather low; yet large swaths of 
vegetation in the vicinity have been damaged and destroyed; and soil runoff and general 
destruction of the ecological environment are particularly serious (Cheng & Che, 2010).  
It is estimated that for the production of one metric ton of heap-leached raw ore 
with a thickness of 4-8 meters, 180 square meters of mine surface must be destroyed, and 
an area covered in various mining side-products such as rocks, stone fragments, etc., 
expands over an average area of 220 square meters. Adding to this the various damages 
caused by the destruction of the upper layers of soil and the piling of various mining-
related waste products at mining sites, the production of one metric ton of rare earths raw 
ore destroys approximately 450 square meters. According to 2010 estimates (Cheng & 
Che, 2010), China loses 25 square kilometers of land to rare-earth-related man-made 
desertification every year; and these figures do not represent the uncalculated loss 
sustained from general environmental damage caused by rare earths mining. 
Southern China’s ion-adsorbed rare earths industry has significantly contributed 
to environmental degradation in the following areas: downstream gullies and valleys have 
been seriously clogged;34 riverbeds have been elevated; fields have been destroyed; water 
has been polluted; thereby creating a “man-made desert”. Mining techniques used in 
southern China—heap leaching and pond leaching—have caused “extreme degradation” 
(“破坏极大”) to the natural environment. Also, because of changes caused to the 
geological structure of mining areas, in the event of heavy rains, the risk of landslides is 
greatly heightened (Song & Yang, 2013). 
                                                 
34 A case study on a Jiangxi mine supports this conclusion. See Yang & Chen, 2013.  
 50
In Jiangxi, one of southern China’s rare-earths-rich provinces, locals near ion-
adsorbed rare earth mines call the process of rare earths leaching the “Mountain-Moving 
Movement” (“搬山运动”). The process leaves hills hole-ridden and virtually stripped of 
vegetation. Effusion and acid precipitation produce waste-water run-off high in ammonia 
nitrogen and heavy metals, which in turn pollutes the local supply of drinking water and 
irrigation water. Also, land polluted by rare earth tailings automatically becomes a non-
arable wasteland. According to estimates by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology of the People’s Republic of China, the environmental pollution/damage 
caused by rare earths mining in southern Jiangxi amounts to ¥38 billion (approximately 
$6 billion), but the entire 2011 profit for rare earths production province-wide in Jiangxi 
was a drop-in-the-bucket ¥6.4 billion (approximately $1 billion) (Liu & Wang, 2013). 
A case-control study on the relationship between rare earths pollution and 
leukemia offers a valuable perspective on the relationship between environmental 
pollution caused by rare earths mining and human health. In the study, a strong 
connection was established between the occurrence of leukemia and the drinking of rare-
earth contaminated river water (Wu, Zhou, and Zhong, 2003). On an interesting side-note, 
Wu et al. also claimed that drinking tap water in the vicinity of the mining area did not 
lead to an increased risk for leukemia.35 Though leukemia cases caused by China’s rare 
earths pollution may truly be a issue, it is uncertain how significant rare earths pollution 
is as a cause for leukemia in China as whole. The study, nevertheless, does coincide with 
                                                 
35 The authors also claimed that cigarette smoking and consumption of alcohol were not risk factors for 
leukemia. Though smoking and drinking have not been absolutely proven as risk factors for leukemia, it is 
known that smoking and drinking are associated with higher risks of cancers in general. See “Alcohol Use 
and Cancer”, 2014. 
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purported findings in at least one other place, Malaysia, where it is reported that leukemia 
cases were linked to pollution from a rare earths plant developed by Japan’s Mitsubishi 
Corporation. The rare earths plant was shut down more than twenty years ago. These 
reported “facts” have been part of the rallying cry of anti-rare-earths protesters in 
Malaysia in recent years (Tan, 2012).   
Recent research also examines the toxicology of rare earths in the soil, and their 
effects on plants, animals, and microorganisms. Findings show that exposure to rare 
earths in plants can cause inhibition of growth, chromosomal aberration, DNA damage, 
structure changes of cells, and destruction of chloroplast structure. In animals, exposure 
resulted in the decrease of lymphocyte proliferation and immunity in mice; chromosome 
damage; oxidative damage of the nervous system; also, sperm malformation rate 
increased, and sperm motility rate decreased. In microorganisms, observations included 
inhibition of bacteria, actinomyces and fungi activity; as well as significant inhibition of 
the microbial respiration rate. High concentrations of rare earths in soils, resulting from 
rare earths mining and production, could possibly pose human health hazards (Jin & 
Huang, 2014)   
Fang, Zhang, Li, Du, and Ma (2013), in a study on rare earth resources 
management policies, make the following three conclusions regarding rare earths 
environmental pollution: (1) Every link in the rare earth chain, including mining, 
metallurgy, separation, processing, and materials production, is still characterized by 
serious pollution problems; (2) environmental degradation has not been included in 
production costs as of yet; (3) there is a lack of effective constraining measures for 
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environmental protection in China, and the compliance rate for such regulations among 
rare earths enterprises is low. 
Along a similar vein, “During the rare earths production process, including 
mining and separation, the environmental cost generated is extremely high. Nevertheless, 
China’s rare earth pricing does not completely include this environmental cost. Therefore, 
the returns gained from rare earths exports are far from making up for the environmental 
cost” (Wu & Liao, 2012).  
The English-language literature on the topic of the environmental effects of the 
rare earths industry in China leaves the reader with a somewhat different perspective than 
that available in the Chinese-language literature. McLellan, Corder, Golev, and Ali 
(2014), in a paper on the sustainability of the rare earths industry, came to the conclusion 
that information on the environmental impact of China’s rare earths industry is limited 
and not necessarily trustworthy, because, according to McLellan et al., only “broad 
estimates”, mostly from government sources, are available.  
While lack of broad, detailed, and accurate information may plague research on 
the environmental impact of the rare earths industry in China, it is a widely accepted view 
in the English-language literature that China’s lax rare earths environmental record and 
regulations are a major contributor to the low costs of China’s rare earths (Hayes-Labruto, 
Schillebeeckx, Workman, & Shah, 2013); and it is China’s low cost “bottom line” that 
has given it ultimate advantage over the United States and other countries in the world 
rare earths market. 
Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013) point out that China’s rare-earths-related 
environmental degradation mainly takes the form of downstream water pollution, as in 
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the case of Baotou Steel’s production, which pollutes the near Yellow River, thus 
contaminating the irrigation and fishing for 150 million users downstream. Also, one 
must not forget that toxicity from chemicals has caused measurable amounts of disease, 
occupational poisoning, and farmland destruction in and nearby Baotou, Inner Mongolia.  
China’s rare-earths environmental record is dark. For every ton of rare earth 
produced, the resulting pollutants include 8.5 kilograms of fluorine and 13.5 kilograms of 
dust; and if concentrated sulfuric acid high temperature calcination techniques are used to 
produce approximately one ton of rare earths, the process generates 9,600 to 12,000 cubic 
meters of waste gas containing dust concentrate, hydrofluoric acid, sulfur dioxide, and 
sulfuric acid, approximately 75 cubic meters of acidic wastewater, and about one ton of 
radioactive waste residue (Hurst, 2010).  
The situation outlined in the paragraph above is merely the tip of the iceberg, as the 
entire Baotou region produces over 10 million tons of various kinds of improperly treated 
waste water each year. The pollution contaminates potable and irrigation water in the 
region. Apart from the water pollution issues associated with rare earths mining and 
production near Baotou, the improper disposal of rare earths tailings and the black-lung-
causing radioactive pollutants that rare earth workers come into contact with during the 
course of occupational activities are also major concerns. The most common illness in 
Baotou at the time of Hurst’s study (2010) was pneumoconiosis (“black lung”), and cases 
in Baotou accounted for 50% of all cases in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region. 
Though slightly out-dated36, Hurst’s portrayal of the environmental hazards posed by 
                                                 
36 Hurst’s research (2010) came before the implementation of China’s 2011 “Emission Standard of 
Pollutants for the Rare Earths Industry (GB 26541—2001)”. One of Hurst’s key points was the fact that at 
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China’s rare earths industry and the lack of effective regulation still hold much truth, as 
China has many miles to cover on its path to environmental responsibility. 
According to the extant literature, China’s rare earths industry has caused/does 
cause great ecological and environmental damage, and that the environmental damage is 
one result of China’s corner-cutting approach to rare earths mining and production, which 
in turn has contributed to China’s rise to the position of near-monopolist of rare earths 
production—in the light of these facts, what kind of environmental regulations does 
China have in regard to rare earths? How did cutting corners environmentally give China 
the advantage in regard to rare earths, eventually leading it to become the near-
monopolist? 
 China first passed its Environmental Protection Law (《中华人民共和国环境保
护法》) on December 26, 1989, and has amended it several times since then. The most 
recent amendment occurred on April 24, 2014. The law, as it reads, gives great 
importance to environmental protection, proclaiming that the it was formulated for the 
protection and betterment of the human and ecological environment, to prevent pollution 
and other hazards, to ensure health, and to promote the development of a socialist 
modernity (“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa”). Though the 
Environmental Protection Law and other rare-earths-restrictive laws and regulations have 
strict stipulations for the mining industry, according to the extant literature, there exists a 
dichotomy between the laws passed in Beijing and the actual mining situation on the 
ground. Laws, when not enforced, are worthless; China’s rare earths environmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
the time, China had only “general pollution control standards”, and that “the country” had “never actually 
worked out pollutant discharge standards for the rare earth industry”, a fact which changed in 2011. 
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record stands as evidence to this truth. Thus, when I refer to China’s “lax environmental 
regulations”, I specifically refer to the lack of implementation of regulations, not 
necessarily a lack of laws on the books. In other words, we can call China’s 
environmental restrictions “lax” because the positive results of such restrictions and 
regulations, in reality, have been much less than the intentions. 
 The rare earths industry is restricted by that part of the environmental protection 
law concerned with minerals. Mining is referenced twice in the document. The first 
mention occurs in Chapter 1 (Overview 总则), Article 7: “The responsible administrative 
departments for land, mining, forestry, and water resources of the local People’s 
Governments at the County level and above should regulate and manage resource 
protection according to the legal regulations” (Ibid). Again, mining appears in Chapter 5 
(Legal Responsibility 法律责任), Article 44: “[Anyone] engaged in the destruction of 
land, forest, grassland, water, mineral, fishing, or wild animal resources, shall be legally 
responsible according to the regulations of related laws” (Ibid). Chapter 5, Article 41, is 
more forceful, but equally as unspecific and broad-principle-oriented as Articles 7 and 44: 
“Anyone causing environmental pollution hazards has the responsibility to remove the 
hazard, and compensate the entity or individual for the loss”. According to Chapter 5, 
Article 38, entities responsible for causing environmental pollution “accidents” may be 
fined, and the individual personally responsible may be dealt administrative discipline. 
 Other environmental protection laws that have bearing on the rare earths industry 
include the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water 
Pollution” (《中华人民共和国水污染防治法》), and the “Law of the People’s 
 56
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution” (《中华人
民共和国大气污染防治法》). The former was adopted on May 11, 1984, and the latter 
on August 29, 1995. It is the stated purpose of both laws to protect and improve the 
environment and safeguard human health, and both laws have indirect bearing on the rare 
earths industry, which both present serious hazards to the atmosphere and water.37  
On January 24, 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国环境保护部) and the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China (国家
质量监督检验检疫总局) co-issued the “Emission Standard of Pollutants for the Rare 
Earths Industry (GB 26541—2001)” (《稀土工业污染物排放标准》 （GB 26451—
2011）), effective October 1 of the same year. The standard detailed new regulations for 
the rare earths industry mainly in the areas of water pollution and atmospheric pollution. 
Later in 2011, the Chinese government published “Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earths 
Industry” (《国务院关于促进稀土行业持续健康 发展的若干意见》), acknowledging 
the serious damage to the environment that the rare earths industry has caused, and 
calling for greater adherence to existing environmental policies. China’s environmental 
policies with regard to the rare earths industry will be discussed in more detail in later 
chapters. 
                                                 
37 Other laws and regulations that restrict pollution from the rare earths industry are the “Marine 
Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China” (《中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法》), 
adopted August 23, 1982, and effective as of March 1, 1983; and the “Decision of the State Council on 
Implementing Scientific Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection” (《国务
院关于落实科学发展观  加强环境保护的决定》), published in December, 2005. 
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(3) Illegal Mining of Rare Earths 
 
China’s overproduction of rare earths in relation to world demand and the 
resulting upheaval of world rare earth supply/demand during the 1990s eventually led to 
the significant lowering of rare earth prices worldwide. As a result, China emerged as the 
near-monopolist in the rare earths market by the late 1990s-early 2000s. Even though 
China has made it a stated priority for many years to control overproduction, only 
recently (1998-99) did it implement production quotas for rare earths, and even then, it 
seemed difficult to keep production within quota limits, although as of the writing of this 
thesis, China has officially cancelled its export quotas for rare earths in an apparent 
compromise with the World Trade Organization after losing a recent WTO case brought 
against China by the United States, Japan, and the European Union.  
One of the main factors leading to China’s rare earth overproduction and the upset 
in the worldwide rare earths market was unregulated and illegal mining. Though 
regulations exist in theory that would hamper the illegal mining, implementation was less 
than desirable, as has been noted above. As a consequence of the lucrative nature of rare 
earths mining, unregistered, permit-less rare earths producers popped up in rare-earth-rich 
areas just like “bamboo after spring rain” (雨后春笋).38 
Rare-earths leaching methods in developed countries such as the United States are 
considerably different from those that have been used in China, where illegal mining is 
still rampant. In situ leaching—the most common approach in places like the United 
States and Canada—though less destructive of the environment, is also more expensive 
                                                 
38 The saying “雨后春笋” (“yǔ hòu chūn sǔn”) is used similarly to “spring up like mushrooms” or the verb 
“to mushroom” in English. See http://www.iciba.com/雨后春笋. 
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than other leaching practices, and requires more high-tech instruments. Pool leaching is 
more commonly used in China, because of its lower cost, even though its environmental 
toll is much higher than in situ leaching. It is reported that a country farmer in Jiangxi 
with a limited understanding of science can easily become a “rare earths elements 
producer”. All he/she needs to do is shovel a truckload full of rare-earth-rich soil, mix in 
high quality fertilizer, and submerge the mixture evenly in a backyard leaching pool. The 
result of this “home-style pool leaching” process is lucrative rare earth elements. There is 
no need for permits or inspections, as the entire operation takes place “off the grid” (Liu 
& Wang, 2013).   
Attracted by the monetary gain promised by rare earths mining, some individuals 
and groups have been operating without permits, infringing on the mining rights of others, 
and engaging in random and unrestrained excavation. The situation became increasingly 
worse over time, and caused havoc in the order of mining. The main factor driving the 
disorderly state of affairs in the rare earths mining community39 is the pursuit of 
economic gain, which lures opportunist types to strike out for “easy money”. The results 
of permit-less rare earths production are (1) overproduction of rare earths; (2) destructive 
domestic competition; (3) the overall low efficiency of rare earths mining; (4) increases 
in the wasting of rare earths; (5) soil erosion, and (6) destruction of the ecological 
environment (Cheng & Che, 2010). The connection between permit-less producers of 
rare earths and higher rates of environmental damage is worthy of note. 
                                                 
39 The situation is the most severe in the mining of southern China’s weathered crust elution-deposited rare 
earth ore (风化淋积型稀土矿). 
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An ironic state of affairs exists in the Chinese rare earths industry today in exact 
opposition to that which ushered the glory days of China’s rare earths mining in the 
1990s and 2000s. While China currently owns the largest share of the world rare earths 
market, it is fast losing its position because of several factors, two of which are illegal 
mining and the inordinately speedy expansion of rare earths industrial capacity (Wu & 
Liao, 2012; see also Fang et al., 2013), a fact which is in turn tied closely to the 
mushroom-like growth of illegal mines. Because of these and other factors, China’s share 
of total world rare earths reserves is quickly dwindling. Thus, illegal mining, which 
worked in China’s favor during the days of rare earths market flooding (“dumping”) in 
the 1990s, is now a serious liability. Also, Wu & Liao (2012) agree with Cheng & Che 
(2010) on the connection between lack of regulation and environmental degradation: 
“The small size, large numbers, low-tech nature, and difficulty of regulation of 
enterprises, are considered the main reasons for environmental degradation and 
waste of resources in the rare earths industry”.40 
 
China’s unrestrained mining/production/export spree during the rare-earth heyday 
years (1990-2005) led to growth of China’s rare earths by 800.65%. While production 
and exports were booming, prices remained low, and China, for the time being, enjoyed 
its “top of the pile” status. Supply and demand dictates that when supply exceeds demand, 
prices drop. The partially uncontrollable (China did seek to control it early on) excess in 
                                                 
40 The original Chinese reads: “稀土行业的企业规模小、数量多、技术水平低、难以监控被认为是造
成环境破坏和资源浪费的主要原因”.  
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China’s supply due to illegal mining and overproduction was a double-edged sword, 
bringing a crisis (危机)41 of opportunity and danger. 
As noted above in the review of China’s environment-related laws, the rare earths 
industry in China is restricted to different degrees by several laws. One which comes to 
bear on the illegal mining issue is the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (《中华人民共和国矿产资源法》), adopted by China’s government on March 19, 
1986, and amended on August 29, 1996. In Chapter 6, “Legal Liability”, Article 39, the 
law states that: 
If a person, in violation of the provisions of this Law, mines without a mining 
license, enters and mines without authorization in a mining area that is embraced 
in State plan or a mining area that is of great value to the development of the 
national economy or mines without authorization specified minerals of which 
protective mining is prescribed by the State, he shall be ordered to stop mining, 
compensate for the losses caused, and his mineral products and unlawful proceeds 
shall be confiscated, and he may also be fined. If he refuses to stop mining and 
thus causes damage to the mineral resources, the persons who are directly 
responsible shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 156 of the Criminal Law. Any units or individuals who enter 
and mine in the mining areas of State-owned mining enterprises and other mining 
enterprises established by others in accordance with law shall be punished in 
accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.42 
 
From the wording above, unlicensed rare earths production clearly falls into the 
category of criminal activity, and is punishable by under the provisions of the law. Alas, 
China’s rare earths industry is not corruption-free, and many times, regulatory clout loses 
force in the face of economic gain, and the rare earths black market continues to survive 
regardless of written laws and regulations (Torrisi, 2014). 
                                                 
41 The Chinese characters “危” (danger) and “机” (opportunity), when put together form the word “危机” 
(wēijī), meaning “crisis”. Thus, a “crisis”, in the Chinese understanding, contains both danger and 
opportunity. 
42 This is the official English translation provided by the Chinese government at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34342.htm. 
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Guanxi (关系), or social connections, are an important protective canopy under 
which high-polluting enterprises operate within the existing regulatory environment. As 
Chen (2009) notes: If enterprises  
keep good relations (guanxi) with local officials through bribery in forms of cash, 
valuable gifts, invitation to banquets, and all-expense-paid trips abroad, it is not 
difficult for them to avoid compliance of strict environmental standards and thus 
lower the manufacturing cost. The key figures for polluting companies to 
maintain good guanxi with are those cadres in the local party committee, the 
administrative departments, and the courts. For the environmental administrative 
fines or pollutant discharge fees collected by the local environmental protection 
bureaus, if is possible for the related entrepreneurs to bargain with the 
administrative staff due to lack of supervision.  
(4) Low Costs of Rare Earths Production 
 
According to Chinese-language scholarly sources, the strategic nature of rare 
earths forms a glaring contrast with the low prices of rare earths exported from China. In 
1990, the average price of a ton of rare earths for export was $13,600; in 2005, the same 
ton of rare earths was exported for an average of $7322, representing a more than 46% 
drop over a 15-year period. If the devaluation of the US dollar were to be factored in, the 
price drop would be even greater (Liu, 2013). Regardless of how these figures are 
interpreted, one fact is certain—Chinese rare earths dropped in price significantly during 
the 1990s and early 2000s. 
China’s position of near-monopoly on the production of rare earths was ultimately 
solidified due to one “bottom line” factor: cost. Disregard for the environment; mining 
and producing without permits; or a combination of the two ultimately worked in favor of 
lower prices for China’s rare earths. Though many Chinese academics today lament that 
presently, China, while endowed with the most abundant rare earths resources and the 
greatest rare earths production capacity on the planet, does not have the ability to control 
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world market prices for rare earths, one thing is certain about the past: China’s rise to 
near-monopolist status was directly tied to its low costs and ample supply of rare earths. 
Lower costs do not just happen—they are the result of cutting costs all along the rare 
earths industry chain—from mining to smelting/separation to production of rare earths 
ores, rare earths metals, etc. Until recently, it seems that this corner-cutting approach was 
met with an “open-one-eye-close-one-eye” (睁一只眼闭一只眼)43 stance by many local 
Chinese government officials.44  
According to a historical overview of rare earths pricing, Hayes-Labruto et al. 
(2013) point out that world rare earths prices were noticeably affected when China’s rare 
earths mines “came into full force in the 1990s”. As a result, “supply quickly outstripped 
demand, driving prices down significantly”. Add to this the fact that due to growing 
demand for neodymium magnets in the 2000s, China produced higher amounts of all rare 
earth elements, because rare earths cannot be mined separately. The result was 
overproduction of rare earths in general, and low rare earths prices worldwide. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s rare earths production was an expensive and 
technically challenging undertaking. After Xu Guangxian 徐光宪, “China’s Father of 
Rare Earths” (稀土之父), created an invention for the cheaper separation of rare earths 
elements, China’s production capacity increased to 10,000 tons/year in the early 1980s. 
There are two reasons for China eventually overtaking the United States to become the 
                                                 
43 In English, the saying could be translated “look the other way”.  
 
44 China’s Central Government has put forth considerable effort to regulate the rare earths industry and 
other high-polluting industries through laws and standards since the 1980s. Nevertheless, as the fact of 
wave after wave of campaigns against sub-standard rare earths mining and production so aptly 
demonstrates, the discontinuity between legislation and implementation is a chasm not easily bridged. See 
“Zhongguo De Xitu Zhuangkuang Yu Zhengce” (2012). 
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top producer of rare earths: the Mountain Pass Mine’s own environmental issues and 
cheap Chinese rare earths (Wübbeke, 2013). For the purposes of this chapter, I take 
special note of the latter of the two reasons. 
Morrison & Tang (2012) make the following statement regarding China’s rise to 
rare earth production dominance: “In the late 1980s, the United States was the global 
leader in rare earth production. However, preferential policies including significant 
subsizidation by the Chinese government and lax environmental standards quickly 
enabled China to become the dominant, low-cost producer of rare earths by the late 
1990s.” Note that Morrison & Tang’s emphasis is on China’s low-cost production of rare 
earths. The connection between lax environmental standards/lack of enforcement and the 
low-cost production of rare earths is evident; and according to Morrison & Tang’s 
analysis, the result of the combination of these factors is market domination.  
Also, “through the 1990s, China’s exports of rare earth elements grew, causing 
prices worldwide to plunge. This undercut business for Molycorp (Mountain Pass Mine) 
and other producers, and eventually either drove them out of business or significantly 
reduced production efforts” (Hurst, 2010). It is understood here that China’s exports 
continued to grow in quantity, and prices remained low. If it were not for the low cost 
and high volume of Chinese rare earths during the 1990s, it would have been difficult to 
drive rare earths giants like Molycorp temporarily out of the market.  
There are at least three more factors that have contributed to the low cost of 
Chinese rare earths production. The first is connected with the rampant phenomenon of 
illegal rare earths mining. Although China adopted laws as early as 1986 (see “Mineral 
Resources Law” above) requiring mining corporations to obtain the necessary permits 
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(and pay the necessary fees) before engaging in mining or any form of rare earths 
processing or production, the reality of the situation up until recent times, and especially 
during the rare earths “boom” period during the 1990s, was that regulation was lax, and 
illegal mining common. Illegal mining not only destroyed environments, but led to an 
unnatural lowering of rare earths costs (成本). Because illegal rare earths producers did 
not pay regulatory fees (either because the related requirements were lax to begin with or 
such requirements were evaded by the rare earths producers), this drop in production cost 
gave Chinese rare earths an overall price advantage over countries such as its largest 
competitor at the time, the United States, where environmental regulatory overhead 
added considerable cost. 
Second, China is known as the world’s factory (世界工厂). The three largest 
reasons for this are (1) China’s Reform and Opening policy during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s opened China up for foreign investment, and ultimately led to the building of 
virtually innumerable factories, manufacturing centers, etc. (2) China is fairly rich in raw 
materials, which makes manufacturing there all the more convenient. (3) Most important 
of all, China’s was, up until recently, one of the cheapest labor forces on the planet. 
Blakely, Cooter, Khaitan, Sincer & Williams (2011) conclude that China’s cheap labor 
factored in significantly to China’s rise to rare earth near-monopolist status. 
Third, the rare earths industry of China was highly government-subsidized during 
the boom years of the last decade of the 20th century. Jeffrey A. Green states that during 
the 1990s, China: 
Flooded the market by more than tripling the previous world supply of the materials. 
During this time, Chinese rare earth-producing firms were largely unprofitable but 
were allowed to survive through direct and indirect support by the Chinese 
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government. This backing enabled China’s rare earth industry to continue to mine 
and export these materials at prices far below the actual costs of production. With 
the additional industrial advantage of a low labor cost, questionable environmental 
standards, and export taxes, the impact of these efforts were swift and dramatic: 
within 20 years China went from producing roughly one-third to nearly all of the 
world’s supply of rare earths. Mines in the United States and elsewhere, unable to 
remain profitable against cheap Chinese exports, went out of business. The United 
States was completely dependent on imports. With the mines shuttered, companies 
in the United States that refined the rare earths metals and alloys and manufactured 
rare earth magnets moved overseas or simply closed” (“China’s Global Quest for 
Resources and Implications for the United States”, 2012). 
 
With low labor costs, along with rampant illegal mining, lack of investment in 
environmental protection, and the powerful backing of the Chinese government through 
subsidization and science-and-technology-driven initiatives such as Programs 863 and 
973,45 the Chinese rare earths industry lunged forward at high speeds during the 1990s 
and early 2000s. By that time, China had established itself as the near-monopolist in the 
world rare earths market. Therefore, according to some, China began reformulating its 
game, suddenly becoming more serious about issues like the environment, illegal mining, 
labor costs, etc., because of its fear that such reckless exploitation of strategic resources 
could one day lead China to become entirely dependent on foreign rare earths imports. 
In summary, the current literature supports the conclusion that China has gained its 
current position of near-monopolist of rare earths based on (1) strong government support 
for the development of the rare earths industry, (2) disregard for the environment, (3) 
illegal and/or unregulated mining, and (4) the low cost of rare earths production. At this 
juncture, the thesis turns to the review of the international and domestic factors that have 
affected China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. 
                                                 
45 The 863 Plan and 973 Program are ongoing initiatives spearheaded by the China’s Central Government 
for the express purpose of sharpening China’s high-tech competitive edge. Rare earths research and 
development projects have traditionally enjoyed high-priority status under these government initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA’S          
BEHAVIOR AS NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS 
Introduction 
 
China’s behavior as the major producer and exporter of rare earths has gained the 
attention of the world in recent years. In September of 2010, after the collision of the 
Chinese fishing trawler “Minjinyu 5179” (闽晋渔 5179) with two Japanese coastguard 
vessels (Blakely et al.) in the vicinity of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the 
subsequent Japanese detainment of the Chinese trawler’s skipper, it was reported that 
China placed an administrative hold on exports of rare earths to Japan, sparking 
immediate reactions of alarm in Japan and the West (Bradsher, 2010). Much western 
media portrayed the incident as an example of China flexing its geopolitical muscles 
through a stranglehold on rare earths resources. Whether or not this was actually the case 
has yet to be proven beyond question, though western media such as the New York Times 
have implied China’s use of rare earths as an economic weapon on numerous occasions 
(Ibid).  
The trawler collision incident has amply spotlighted China’s near-monopoly on 
rare earths in an international context. But what exactly are the international factors that 
influence China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths? In this chapter, I identify 
the following factors: (1) international demand for rare earths in the context of lower rare 
earths production outside of China; (2) international pressure on China to conform to 
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certain trade regulations; (3) international “price-setting authority” issues on the part of 
China; (4) geopolitical factors such as the condition of relations with Japan, etc. 
(1) International Demand  
 
In the opinion of Mao & Wu (2012), “due to the over-pollution associated with 
the production of rare earths raw materials, the resulting environmental cost, and the fact 
that some developed countries have strict environmental regulations, these developed 
countries are unwilling to produce rare earths raw materials. This is one of the main 
reasons that China’s production of rare earths raw materials takes such a high percentage 
of world rare earths raw materials production.” Mao & Wu also point to three types of 
rare earths costs that are higher outside of China, thus forcing international rare earths 
producers to shut down or decrease production thereby increasing demand for China’s 
rare earths: (1) production costs, (2) tax costs, and (3) social costs (environmental, etc.). 
All of these costs are considerably higher internationally compared with China. It seems 
that the rare earths industries of many countries, after a calculation of the costs associated 
with rare earths production, have either stopped or significantly reduced rare earths 
production, and opted in favor of purchasing cheap rare earths from China.46  
From the international perspective, China has rare earths trade relations with 
numerous countries due to international demand for rare earths for use in high-tech 
manufacturing and industry/government stockpiling. This international demand has 
                                                 
46 Taking the metals of praseodymium and neodymium as an example, production costs for China Southern 
Rare Earths Company (中国南方稀土公司) hovered around $30 per kilogram, whereas pre-closure costs at 
the Mountain Pass mine in California, US had been as high as $40 per kilogram. According to Yang 
(2011), when production costs of these two rare earths metals are between $35 and $40 per kilogram, it 
becomes uneconomical for the United States to produce the rare earths, let alone the fact that Chinese 
production prices were well below $35 per kilogram.  
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directly influenced China’s behavior as the rare-earths near-monopolist, leading it to 
increase production of rare earths, which in turn has contributed to China’s status as a 
rare earths near-monopolist. Add to this the reality of increasing environmental 
regulations imposed on rare earths mining and production internationally, and the 
demand only increases. Also worthy of note is that China originally emerged as the near-
monopolist of rare earths production in a large degree due to its disregard for 
environmental concerns. As noted in Chapter 2, China’s rare earths industry has been and 
continues to be a significant cause of environmental degradation and human health 
hazards. Yet the very fact that rare earths mining and production is environmentally 
detrimental has increased international demand for rare earths from China. As Blakely et 
al. (2011) comment: 
The environmental detriment caused by the production of rare earths is a notable 
side effect of mining and processing.  Within the production process, radioactive 
thorium, uranium and, later in separation, acid baths consisting of toxic chemicals 
are used. Due to the severe risk of using such hazardous materials and strict 
environmental legislation giving rise to high production costs, developed countries, 
such as the United States and Canada, have in recent years preferred to import rare 
earths from China instead of mining their own reserves (emphasis mine). 
 
 In other words, developed countries desire to reduce pollution caused by rare earths 
mining on their own soil, and at the same time seek to find the most cost-effective 
method to produce the rare earths worldwide. At present, China is the answer to the 
dilemma of the rest of the world. Through arrangements with China, other countries are 
able to produce (either in China or domestically) the rare-earth-dependent end-products 
that their high-tech markets need, while mitigating a large degree of pollution on their 
own soil—a winning combination for Western corporations that deal in rare earths and 
rare-earths-related products and materials. 
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 The demand for China’s rare earths is sometimes couched in language of 
desperation, as if there is no alternative. At the time of the 2010 China-Japan rare-earths 
spat over the fishing trawler, for countries like the United States, there were no easy 
alternatives, as the record from a Senate committee hearing in September 2010 reveals: 
Fifteen years ago, the United States was the world’s largest producer of rare earth 
elements. Since then our country has become almost entirely dependent on imports 
from China. Unfortunately, the Chinese industry is on track to absorb all Chinese 
rare earth production as soon as 2012. In July, China’s Ministry of Commerce 
announced that China would cut its export quota for rare earth minerals by 72 
percent, raising concerns around the world about supply disruptions (“Rare Earths”, 
2010). 
  
 Of primary concern is the United States’ near-complete dependence on China for 
rare earths as of 201047. In the year 1990, the United States produced over 22,000 tons of 
equivalent REOs, and most of its rare earths imports came from France (Hedrick, 1990). 
In 2000, France had taken a far second to China, which had not even been on the import 
horizon for the United States ten years earlier, and the United States’ rare earths 
productivity had significantly decreased to approximately 5,000 tons per year (Hedrick, 
2000). Also, from 2002 to 2011, “the quantity of U.S. rare earth imports from China as a 
percent of total U.S. rare earth imports averaged 78.3%” (Morrison & Tang, 2012). The 
trend during the 2000s, especially during the non-productive years for the United States 
rare earths mining industry, was toward ever-increasing dependence on China’s rare 
earths exports. U.S. reliance on China for its supply of rare earths, though alarming for 
reporters, industry experts, and politicians in the United States, was just one example of 
China’s rare earths near-monopoly. During this same time period, resource-poor Japan 
                                                 
47 Since 2010, American dependence has been slightly assuaged by the reopening of the Mountain Pass, 
CA rare earths mine, yet the United States lacks a complete rare earths production chain, and many rare 
earths oxides, once mined at Mountain Pass, must be sent to China for processing. 
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was even more dependent on China for rare earths, absorbing approximately one third of 
China’s rare earths exports (King & Armstrong, 2013). 
Simply put, China’s near-monopoly on rare earths production has been fueled and 
in part caused by the gap in production in the West. Of course, there are many factors, 
such as environmental degradation, low costs, government subsidization, etc., that also 
factor in to the equation (see Chapter 2). But from a purely international perspective, as 
the competition (the United States) has been effectively marginalized (at least for the 
time being),48 and the United States and other countries continue to have high volume 
requirements for rare earths; the natural beneficiary of the situation is China, simply 
because it produces such a large percentage of the world’s rare earths (approximately 
90%).  
(2) Trade Conformity Pressure  
 
Now that it has been established that the international factor of demand for China’s 
rare earths has contributed significantly to China’s status as rare earths near-monopolist, 
we turn to an inquiry into the nature of China’s behavior as a rare earths near-monopolist. 
From an international perspective, the main behaviors that nearly all rare-earths-
dependent countries are concerned about are China’s recent increased restrictions (since 
2005-2006) on rare earths exports49.  
                                                 
48 According to US government-published industry estimates (“Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 
Chain”, 2010) in 2010, at the time of the statement, it would take approximately 15 more years (until 2025) 
to rebuild the United States’ rare earths industry supply chain. 
 
49 Some of these restrictions have been/will be removed as of 2015, e.g. the rare earths export quota system 
was cancelled on Jan. 1, 2015, and rare earth export duties are due to be abolished in May 2015. 
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China is undeniably the leader in the rare earths market, and many developed 
nations, including the United States, Japan, and the countries of the European Union (EU) 
depend on China’s exports of rare earth oxides, metals, etc. to fuel their high-tech and 
defense industries. Nevertheless, though China holds supremacy in rare earths mining 
and production, China does not hold a controlling influence in the decision-making 
process of worldwide trade. Thus, while in reality, China holds the key to the world’s 
largest rare earths powerhouse, organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
still believe themselves to have the final say in trade issues relating to rare earths. 
Therefore, China’s behavior as a rare earths near-monopolist, though begrudgingly, is 
indeed influenced, and indeed controlled, to a certain extent, by international factors such 
as WTO decisions. 
China has restricted rare earths exports since 199950 (“Zhongguo De Xitu 
Zhuangkuang Yu Zhengce”), yet recent limits went further than the international market 
expected. China’s increased restrictions on rare earths exports, which led to a subsequent 
hike in rare earths prices from 2010 to 2011, was opposed formally by the WTO in 2012. 
When the United States, Japan, and the EU decided to simultaneously file three cases (DS 
431, DS 432 and DS 433) through the WTO against China for its restrictive rare earths 
trade policies, China reacted by emphasizing that rare earths cannot be traded limitlessly, 
due to their exhaustible nature, and that China’s restrictive trade policies are in the best 
interest of the natural environment. But the interesting fact is, though China is the near-
monopolist of rare earths, it is not the hegemon of the world trade system, and thus, 
China must seriously consider injunctions originating with the WTO. 
                                                 
50 Other figures cited earlier state 1998. 
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The three WTO cases against China were essentially one, though filed separately 
by three different countries. The official record states that Japan, the United States, and 
the EU requested “consultations with China with respect to China’s restrictions on the 
export of various forms of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum” (Dispute DS433, 
2014). The three complainants were later joined by the following third parties: Brazil, 
Canada, Colombia, India, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Viet Nam, Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Turkey, Peru, and the 
Russian Federation. 
In the “summary of key findings” released by the WTO, the issues were 
encapsulated thus: 
This dispute concerns Chinese export restrictions on rare earths, tungsten, and 
molybdenum. These are raw materials used in the production of various kinds of 
electronic goods. China argued that the restrictions are related to the conservation 
of its exhaustible natural resources, and necessary to reduce pollution caused by 
mining. The complainants disagreed, arguing that the restrictions are designed to 
provide Chinese industries that produce downstream goods with protected access to 
the subject materials. China imposes three distinct types of restrictions on the 
export of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum: first, it imposes duties (taxes) on 
the export of various forms of those materials; second, it imposes an export quota 
on the amount of those materials that can be exported in a given period; third, it 
imposes certain limitations on the enterprises permitted to export the materials 
(Ibid). 
 
The WTO panel assigned to the case took over two years of deliberation and 
discussion before issuing a 257-page report in English, which outlined the three-pronged 
argument referenced above. In short, in regard to duties on rare earths, tungsten and 
molybdenum, the complainants claimed that China had overstepped the boundaries set in 
its 2001 accession to the WTO. Annex 6 of the accession protocol (“Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China”) lists “Products subject to export duty”. 
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With the exception of tungsten ore and concentrates, for which export duty rates are not 
to exceed 20%, neither rare earths nor molybdenum were listed within Annex 6. 
Therefore, the United States, Japan, and the EU held that China should not be allowed to 
assign export taxes for these items.  
China, in its own defense, called on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (GATT 1994), claiming that the “General Exceptions” provision in Article XX gave 
precedent for such duties for the protection of “human, animal or plant life or health” 
(Dispute DS433, 2014). The complainants countered that the provision in Article XX was 
not available as a grounds for disregarding the accession protocol, and that in addition, 
the duties themselves are not necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health. In other words, it is specifically the mining process of rare earths, tungsten and 
molybdenum that creates environmental hazards, and these hazards cannot be mitigated 
through export taxes.  
The second issue at hand was the export quotas for rare earths, tungsten, and 
molybdenum. While China acknowledged that such quotas were not in harmony with 
WTO member obligations as outlined in the GATT 1994, it did reference the exceptions 
allowed in Article XX of the GATT 1994, namely that a member country had the right to 
restrict exports of certain items for the sake of conservation. This argument was 
eventually rejected by the WTO panel on the basis that China was not using export 
quotas for the protection or conservation of natural resources, but for (1) the control of an 
international market and (2) the benefit of domestic industries that used the elements in 
question.  
By way of side-note, it is noteworthy that China’s rare earths export quota system 
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was in place by 1999, long before China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001. This begs 
the question: Why did the WTO not address the issue of rare earths export quotas in 
2001? Why did the WTO not make the cancelling of such quotas a precursory condition 
to China’s accession to the organization? Would the quota system have been allowed to 
continue indefinitely without contest if it were not for the drastic cuts in export quotas in 
2010-2011 and the adverse reaction in the world market? These are questions that, 
unfortunately, cannot be answered with certainty, but nevertheless, are worthy of 
consideration. 
Finally, China imposes certain restrictions on the right of enterprises to export 
certain resources. In this case, China also appealed to Article XX of the GATT 1994 and 
its provision for the conservation of exhaustible resources. However, the panel found that 
China had not explained itself satisfactorily, and that it was not clear how Article XX 
justified China’s trading rights restrictions. All in all, as of the writing of this thesis, the 
case has amounted to a loss for China. 
Recent Chinese research has spotlighted China’s current position as the losing party 
in the WTO decision to oppose China’s rare earths export restrictions, primarily seeking 
for the most beneficial future path for rare earths management. Li & Xu (2014) approach 
the subject from the perspective of the protection of rare earths resources and 
environmental protection, which they claim are the two major rare-earth policy goals of 
the Chinese government. According to the article, China’s over-mining of rare earths 
since 1985 has caused a rapid depletion in China’s rare earths resources. Taking the 
Bayan Obo mine as an example, the most recent estimates put total mine reserves at 1/3 
of the original amount. The situation for ion-adsorption rare earths in southern China is 
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also not promising. In light of the seriousness of the depletion of China’s rare earths 
resources, and to protect the remaining resources and the environment, the Chinese 
government prioritized the implementation of two types of policies: (1) rare earths export 
restrictions and (2) rare earths production control. 
According to Li & Xu, rare earths export restrictions take two forms: (1) export 
quotas and (2) export taxes. As early as 1999, China began using export quotas, although 
the simultaneous export encouragement given through export rebates kept exports high. 
In October 2003, China began slowly fazing out export rebates for rare earths, a process 
that was complete by May 2005. In October 2006, China began levying taxes on certain 
rare earths products, and eventually increased the number of taxable rare earths products 
and the tax rate. Originally, the Chinese government sought to accomplish two goals 
through rare-earths export quotas and export taxes: (1) decrease foreign demand for 
China’s rare earths, thereby decreasing mining and production, and as a result causing 
less environmental damage and resource depletion; (2) balance the lopsided supply-
demand relationship in the world rare earths market by decreasing supply, which had 
been in excess.  
According to the authors, neither of these goals have been met, because foreign rare 
earths consumers have moved production to China, greatly increasing China’s percentage 
share of world rare earths consumption. In 2000, China’s consumption of rare earths 
stood at 19,000 tons REO, accounting for 24% of worldwide rare earths consumption. By 
2013, however, China’s rare earths consumption had jumped to 85,000 tons REO, or 
nearly 70% of world consumption of rare earths. During this time period, China’s 
production of rare earths hit record highs above 130,000 tons REO. 
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In addition, overall, China’s rare earth export quotas have not reflected the actual 
export volume for rare earths in recent years. Between 2004 and 2013, only in one year—
2010—did China exceed export quotas; every other year, exports (not including 
smuggled rare earths) did not meet quotas. Also, China’s high export taxes have created a 
two-tiered pricing system, whereby rare earths for domestic use are significantly less 
costly than those for export. This has created lucrative margins for smugglers, who have 
taken great advantage of the domestic-export price gap. 
Apart from rare earth export restrictions, China’s protective policies include a 
second part: production control. In the opinion of Li & Xu, China should take full 
advantage of production control as a way to mitigate environmental degradation and 
protect rare earths resources. The authors also insightfully point out that this method of 
protecting China’s rare earths resources would be more palatable for the international 
community, especially the WTO, because in the recent case brought against China by the 
United States, the EU, and Japan, issue was taken with China’s export quotas, export 
taxes, and regulatory measures, not with production quotas, which would provide a way 
to conserve resources in a non-discriminatory way. 
(3) Rare earths pricing 
 
Many Chinese researchers believe that China’s rare earths pricing is abnormally 
low, and that based on objective factors, China should be able to set higher international 
prices for rare earths. Mao & Wu (2012), in an analysis of the relationship between rare 
earths pricing and rare earths reserves, make the following claim: China’s rare earths 
should sell for higher than current prices, due to application values (high-tech and 
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military), relative scarcity, environmental costs, and supply monopoly.51 According to the 
authors, not only are export prices of rare earths too low, domestic prices are also below 
desirable levels.  
The article begins by addressing an issue that is a matter of “discussion for every 
part of society” in China: the question of why China does not have the true ability to set 
prices for rare earths in the international market. The authors state that China’s rare earths 
exports have been characterized by a long history of cheap export prices, and that even 
though recently rare earths prices jumped significantly by 300 to 500 percent, the fact 
that China has the ability to create price hikes is not equivalent with the ability of China 
to set market prices for rare earths. For, as Mao & Wu argue, the sharp increase in rare 
earth prices followed by a steep price fall is ample evidence that China does not have a 
true say in the matter, but that what the world witnessed was simply the natural and 
temporary result of China restricting rare earth supply, which, according to the authors, is 
not a long-term solution to stopping the outward flow of cheap rare earths. 
Mao & Wu cite and summarize the work of several Chinese researchers (including 
Xu Guangxian, the “father Chinese rare earths”), who have all, over recent years, called 
for China to create strategic rare earths reserves. In the opinion of these well-known 
Chinese scholars, the creation and maintenance of rare earths reserves is the only 
dependable way to truly gain international say in rare earth pricing. Xu Guangxian once 
said, “I strongly urge our country to establish a reserve system of strategic rare earth 
elements. Our country should invest approximately $1 billion in the procurement of rare 
                                                 
51 It is interesting to note that Chinese sources often use the word “monopoly” to refer to China’s rare earth 
supremacy, whereas Western researchers tend to shy away from such absolute terminology in favor of 
“near-monopoly” or “quasi-monopoly”, etc.  
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earths at a time when market prices are low, and add to that the protection of our own 
rare earths resources, thereby reclaiming international price-setting authority”. 
Nevertheless, the authors acknowledge that the use of strategic reserves of certain 
materials as a means of setting/controlling market prices is usually a tactic of buyer 
countries, and not seller countries; and China is the seller country in this scenario. Thus, 
more research is necessary into how China, in its role as seller, could control rare earths 
prices through maintaining strategic reserves. 
In the 2010 article, “From Large to Strong in Rare Earths: How Can China 
Change?” published in Rare Earth Information, the issue of “price-setting authority” (定
价权) is set against a broader background. “China controls over 90% of the rare earths 
metals market, yet it lacks the ability that countries like Australia and Brazil have to 
control world prices.52 A strange phenomenon exists in the worldwide commodity 
market: taking oil, coal, and iron ore as examples, whenever China is in the exporting 
stage, prices are extremely low; but as soon as China becomes an importer, prices soar”. 
The article refers to America’s import/stockpile strategy, in which the United States 
chooses against mining its own resources in favor of importing and stockpiling against a 
future “rainy day”, when America could introduce rare earths into the world market as a 
price-lowering tactic, in the event that prices were to rise inordinately high. 
Zhang & Mao (2012) consider China’s lack of “price-setting authority” as a grave 
international factor influencing China’s rare earths industry. The authors identify two 
major problem areas, and make several suggestions for China’s rare earths industry, in 
hopes of rectifying the situation. First, from a macro-scale, China’s rare earths industry is 
                                                 
52 Literally, it lacks the “world price-setting authority” (世界定价权). 
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systemically monolithic and cumbersome. The industry takes directives from the 
Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development 
and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, large 
Central Government-owned enterprises, and local government departments, etc. Second, 
from the perspective of individual enterprises, it is difficult to arrive at a unified price 
system (统一的价格机制) due to the “numerous and spread-out” (散而多) nature of 
China’s rare earths enterprises.  
The authors point to the crux of the matter: China’s rare earths market relies too 
heavily on its low-cost price advantage, focusing on the immediate benefits of the current 
international pricing system by which China can “steal the market with low prices” (低价
抢市); whereas what China’s rare earths enterprises should be doing is thinking about 
long-term profitability and price-setting authority. Zhang & Mao believe that the key to 
realizing this international goal is cooperation of domestic enterprises for the good of 
China’s entire rare earths industry. In other words, individual enterprises should stop 
malicious competition, and begin cooperative competition, with the goal of bringing the 
greatest benefit to individual enterprises as well as the entire industry. The authors use 
the term “prisoner’s dilemma” to describe the impasse that exists between China’s rare 
earths enterprises and the industry at large in China, and analyse the related pricing issue 
by using static and dynamic Nash equilibriums from game theory. In their analysis, the 
authors illustrate in simple terms the negative effect on the entire market caused by 
malicious, uncooperative competition by individual enterprises within a market 
characterized by a static Nash equilibrium and lack of complete information. In a 
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dynamic Nash equilibrium situation, in which information is shared freely, the outcome 
for both the individual enterprises and the market as a whole are maximized through 
cooperation and sustained prices, as opposed to continual price dropping.  
In summary, Zhang & Mao see only one way for China’s rare earths industry to 
recover the “price-setting authority” for rare earths exports: greater cooperation and 
greater self-control in the domestic rare earths market. As a result, not only will the 
industry as a whole and China’s international rare earths status be greatly benefited—
China’s individual rare earths enterprises will also be protected and strengthened. 
(4) Geopolitical factors such as relations with Japan  
 
Though China has never officially admitted to using administrative measures to halt 
rare earths exports to Japan, it is commonly accepted in the international community that 
during the Sino-Japanese trawler crisis of September 2010, China suspended shipments 
of rare earths to Japan in protest of Japan’s detention of a Chinese fishing trawler’s 
skipper, Zhan Qixiong (詹其雄). 
 In September 2010, during the Chinese administrative embargo on rare earths 
exports to Japan, the United States Senate, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing on rare earths in which China was referred 
to as a “one-nation OPEC for rare earths”. During the hearing, Lisa Murkowski, U.S. 
senator from Alaska, in a prepared statement, called out China’s use of certain minerals 
(rare earths) as a “weapon to strike back against vulnerable countries who have failed or 
who are unable to meet their own needs with domestic production”, referring to Japan 
and in extension the United States. David Sandalow, Assistant Secretary, Policy and 
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International Affairs, Department of Energy, put it this way in his statement during the 
hearing: “The recent maritime dispute between China and Japan in which there were 
unconfirmed53 reports that China threatened or adopted a de facto ban on such exports to 
Japan underscore the geopolitical risks associated with these issues” (“Rare Earths”, 
2010). 
In a 2011 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, the United States government 
officially described China’s actions in September 2010 thus:  
In September 2010, the People’s Republic of China shocked the world by halting 
critical rare earth mineral exports in retaliation to a territorial dispute with Japan in 
the East China Sea. The Chinese action sent a clear and unmistakable message to 
Japan and the rest of the world: China is willing to use economic tools to achieve 
diplomatic goals.  
 Two months later, when the export ban was lifted, the price of cerium soared 
from approximately $5 per kilogram before the ban to $67 per kilogram after the 
ban. The price of neodymium went from $42 per kilogram in April 2010 to $142 
per kilogram 3 months after the ban. Then, the price of dysprosium nearly doubled 
from $250 per kilogram to $400 per kilogram in January 2011.  
 China’s actions against Japan fundamentally transformed the rare earths 
market for the worse. As a result, manufacturers can no longer expect a steady 
supply of these elements, and the pricing uncertainty created by this action 
threatens tens of thousands of American jobs (“China’s Monopoly on Rare Earths: 
Implications for US foreign and security policy”). 
 
The outcry in the United States did not only stem from the rare earths price hikes 
brought about by China’s suspension of rare earths exports. The United States, up until 
September 2010, had been dependent on Japan54 for the production of rare-earth rich 
magnets for defense purposes. It was the consideration that in the future, the United 
                                                 
53 Reports were unconfirmed at the time. 
 
54 Also, Japan was heavily dependent on China’s supply of rare earths. From 2002 to 2009, China supplied 
86.75% of Japan’s total rare earths imports. In 2010, even after China’s tightening of rare earths exports, 
Japan imported 82% of its rare earths from China (Sun, 2011).  
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States would be forced into complete dependence on China—a seemingly less-than-
dependable rare earths provider—for these products, that created a degree of alarm in 
Washington (Bradsher, 2010). 
The root cause of China’s decision to halt rare earths shipments to Japan has been 
the object of discussion and debate. Though China’s then-Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
made a strong statement claiming otherwise55 56, many scholars agree with the conclusion 
of the Congressional hearing report referenced above that China used rare earths as a 
bargaining chip in a geopolitical-related conflict. It is a well-known fact that China and 
Japan have been at odds for years over the sovereignty of certain portions of the East 
China Sea, especially the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. It was precisely in this disputed 
location that Mr. Zhan’s trawler rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels, eventually 
resulting in Mr. Zhan being taken into Japanese custody. The holding of the Chinese 
trawler skipper resulted in major anti-Japan sentiment in China, and even produced anti-
Japan protests in cities across the country that could be seen as part of a strengthening 
sequence of nationalistic anti-Japan protest waves in China over recent years (Reilly, 
2013). In this context, the actions of China in placing a temporary halt on exports of rare 
earths to Japan seem clearly in the realm of the geopolitical, and more than mere 
coincidence.  
Ting & Seaman (2013) call rare earths “the new elements of geopolitical power”. In 
the new age of green high technology, rare earths have become essential to the normal 
                                                 
55 Wong, Edward; Bradsher, Keith. 2010. “Chinese Leader Denies Using Mineral Exports for Political 
Ends.” The New York Times. October 8, 2010. Accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/world/asia/09china.html?_r=0. 
 
56 “No discrimination in rare earth supply”. 2012. The People’s Daily Online. Accessed at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/7719811.html. 
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functioning of high tech industry as we known it. According to the authors, China’s near-
monopoly on rare earths has left countries like Japan and South Korea dependent on 
Chinese rare earths elements and vulnerable to changes in supply from their giant 
neighbor to the west. In the case of the trawler incident of 2010, Japan and South Korea 
felt acutely threatened by China’s actions, and have since been actively looking for 
alternative sources of rare earths. From a geopolitical perspective, Ting & Seaman 
conclude that China’s actions as a rare earths near-monopolist have left the region of East 
Asia less stable, as countries like South Korea and Japan seek to exploit alternative 
sources57 to China’s rare earths, such as sea-bed mining in the region, which has ignited 
new potential for conflict over sovereignty.  
Thus, the international factor of geopolitical conflict seems to have a significant 
effect on China’s behavior as a rare earths near-monopolist. At the same time, China’s 
actions as a rare earths near-monopolist have also fueled geopolitical conflict, as the 
limiting of rare earths exports creates volatility in the world rare earths market, thus 
contributing to a vicious cycle that gives little hope of ending soon.  
 Similarly, Wübbeke (2013) and Blakely et al. (2011) see China’s rare earths-related 
behavior both being influenced by and influencing the geopolitical scene. On one hand, 
disputes in the East China Sea have influenced China’s behavior, providing opportunity 
                                                 
57 The Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), responsible for the security of Japan’s 
rare earths, is constantly searching for new mines across Asia, Africa, and the Americas (Blakely et al., 
2011). In addition, on the tail of geopolitical tensions relating to the Diaoyu/Senkaku-fishing trawler-rare 
earths export administrative embargo issue, in October of 2010, Japan began actively seeking out countries 
like Vietnam as potential non-Chinese sources of rare earths elements. In a “political and strategic 
decision”, Japan’s then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his counterpart, Vietnam’s Nguyen Tan Dung, 
arrived at an agreement by which Japan would be allowed to mine for rare earths in Vietnam in exchange 
for assisting Vietnam develop its nuclear power industry (“Rare Earths Supply Deal Between Japan and 
Vietnam”, 2010). 
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to use rare earths as a playing card in the geopolitics of the region. While China denies 
any “politicization” of the rare earths issue, and has cooperated thus far in the WTO 
deliberations regarding rare earths export restrictions (see chapter 2), simultaneously, 
China’s behavior as a rare earths near-monopolist in applying an unofficial embargo on 
rare earths exports to Japan during escalation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku conflict indicates a 
“strategic use of REE in order to achieve political concessions”, thus exerting a 
considerable influence on the geopolitics of the region. Though geopolitical 
considerations do not seem to be foremost for China’s rare earths industry—after all, 
restrictions on rare earths exports began without any obvious geopolitical motivations—
nevertheless, it is one of the international aspects that should be factored in to discussions 
of China’s behavior as a rare earths near-monopolist. 
In summary, international rare-earth demand, international rare-earth trade 
pressure, international rare-earth pricing issues, and international rare-earth-related 
geopolitical factors each influence and/or are influenced by China’s behavior as a near-
monopolist of rare earths. Anyone desiring to understand the factors bearing on China’s 
actions as the supreme rare earths producer and exporter, must take into consideration 
these international factors. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, domestic factors 
also have a serious affect on China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. After 
all, it was domestic influences that, to a large degree, facilitated China’s rise to near-
monopolist status during the late 1980s and 1990s, at a time when heavenly, earthly, and 
human factors (天时地利人和) worked in harmony to catapult China into position as the 
world’s foremost rare earths producer and exporter. It is these domestic factors, touched 
on in Chapter 2, to which we turn to in more detail in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA’S 
BEHAVIOR AS NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, we examined international factors affecting and motivating China’s 
behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. In the current chapter, I will seek to review, 
based on the current literature, the domestic factors influencing China’s behavior as rare 
earths near-monopolist.  
It is worthy of note that the factors to be discussed in this chapter are similar to 
those in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we discussed factors that contributed to China becoming 
the supreme rare earths producer. Ironically, many of these same factors have now 
become reasons behind China’s restrictions on rare earths production and export, and the 
overall framework of state leadership of the rare earths industry is emphasized again. The 
domestic factors leading to and influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare 
earths include: (1) Environmental protection; (2) rare earth resource protection; (3) 
strengthening rare earths industry regulation; and (4) protecting and aiding China’s 
domestic rare earths industry. 
Each of the four domestic factors listed above can be seen as policies 
implemented by the Chinese Central Government. Just as China strongly supported the 
development of its rare earths industry as part of a nation-wide economic renaissance 
known to the rest of the world as the “Reform and Opening Up”, in recent years the 
Central Government has placed priority on cleaning up the environmental mess caused by 
its domestic rare earths industry, and regulating the disorderly operations of the industry. 
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Each of the factors discussed in the current chapter exist only under the guiding and 
watchful eye of Beijing’s top party officials and legislators: each factor a tool in the chest 
of a master, tools by which an industry is re-invented. 
(1) Environmental Protection 
 
China has climbed its way to the top of the rare earths pyramid, partly based on its 
objective inherent advantages, e.g. considerable exploitable rare earths resources; and 
partly based on a wide range of human factors. The first human factor to consider is lax 
environmental protection. It is a well-known fact in the mining industry that rare earths 
extraction takes a serious toll on the wellbeing of earth’s natural environment (see 
Chapter 2). It was China’s lack of environmental protection that allowed an inordinate 
amount of cheap, destructive mining practices to flourish during the 1990s and into the 
2000s, giving China a production advantage over countries like the United States, whose 
environmental policies made rare earths production a more expensive pursuit.  
During the writing of this thesis, a pollution documentary entitled “Under the 
Dome” (《穹顶之下》), by Chai Jing 柴静, a famous Chinese journalist, took China by 
storm, with hundreds of millions of views by an audience for the most part locked in the 
grip of a smog nightmare from which China is only now seeming to be slowly awakening 
(Kuhn, 2015). Air quality is just one aspect of the environment that is affected by China’s 
pell-mell sprint toward “modernity”. Water and ground pollution are also major concerns, 
and rare earths contribute to the pollution of them all. In China, serious environmental 
protection seems to be a fairly new idea having emerged within the last few years, and 
gaining greater ground as “the country’s basic policy” only recently in 2014. Chinese 
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Premier Li Keqiang, in an annual parliamentary meeting in March 2014, said that China 
would “resolutely declare war on pollution as [it] declared war on poverty” (Kaiman, 
2014). But new as it may be, the greater push for environmental protection is indeed a 
domestic factor directly influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. 
While the degree to which environmental protection in China is being implemented is 
questionable (Ibid), the fact that China has made a conscious and specific effort to clean 
up its rare earths industry for environmental protection purposes, cannot be ignored.  
According to the “basic principles” (基本原则) section of a 2011 State Council 
directive regarding the healthy development of the rare earths industry, environmental 
protection was a top priority for China’s Central Government: “Basic principles. To 
persevere in environmental protection and resource conservation, implementing stricter 
policies in regard to protective exploitation of rare earths resources and putting into place 
more stringent ecological environmental protection standards”58 (emphasis mine). The 
idea of environmental protection is mentioned 11 times in the State Council directive, 
emphasizing the importance the Chinese Central Government has attached to rare-earths-
related environmental issues (“Guowuyuan Guanyu Cujin Xitu Hangye Chixu Jiankang 
Fazhan De Ruogan Yijian”).  
The State Council directive was based on another legal document previously 
published in January 2011 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (中华人民共和国国
家质量监督检验检疫总局). The document, entitled “Emission Standard of Pollutants 
                                                 
58 In the original Chinese: “基本原则。坚持保护环境和节约资源，对稀土资源实施更为严格的保护
性开采政策和生态环境保护标准”. 
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for Rare Earths Industry” (《稀土工业污染物排放标准》), outlined more stringent 
emissions standards for pollutants than had been previously been set under general 
environmental protection laws.  
Of course, it could be argued that by 2011, China had the luxury to make 
environmental protection a priority; after all, China had already climbed to the position of 
near-monopolist of rare earths. Just in the previous year, 2010, China had already flexed 
its rare earths muscles in the midst of a diplomatic spat with Japan, administratively 
denying rare earths exports to Japan until Japan had released the Chinese fishing trawler 
skipper who had been held in Japanese custody after his trawler had rammed two 
Japanese coast guard boats in September of that year (see Chapter 3). Thus, for China to 
make official statements in 2011 about mitigating environmental damage caused by rare 
earths mining through protective measures prescribed by law which had a direct effect on 
rare earths exports to rare-earth-dependent countries, the environmental protection 
rhetoric could have seemed less than believable to observers outside of China. Why did 
such official direction not come twenty years earlier, when China was destroying the 
environment on its way to rare earths dominance?  
Environmental protection is closely connected with the consolidation of China’s 
rare earths industry. Small scale, large number, low technological capacity, and 
regulation difficulty are the main reasons behind rare-earths-related environmental 
degradation and resource waste. From this perspective, larger corporations are usually 
more environmentally responsible and easier for the government to regulate. Therefore, 
some authors (Wu & Miao, 2012) suggest a greater consolidation of the rare earths 
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industry, a process that has so far created six large conglomerates and is continuing as of 
the writing of this thesis (Shen, 2014). 
Chinese government policies regarding rare earths have become directly 
connected to environmental protection. This fact reflects the Chinese government’s 
official position that seeks to realize the sustainable development of the rare earths 
industry through control of China’s rare-earths production excess. Zhu Hongren (朱宏任
), the Chief Engineer at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the 
People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国工业和信息化部), cites the following 
problems in China’s production of rare earths: (1) unconstrained development, (2) 
resource waste, and (3) serious environmental pollution. A comprehensive consideration 
of a host of factors including China’s economic development and environmental 
protection lead Mr. Zhu to the following conclusion: China must restrict rare earths 
exports. Chen Deming (陈德铭), Minister of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国商务部) from 2007 to 2013, made the following 
statement: “China’s restrictions on the rare earths industry are necessary measures based 
on the needs posed by environmental protection”59 (Yang, 2011). 
China constantly points to environmental protection to justify its behavior relating 
to rare earths. Cheng & Che (2010) hold that environmental protection should top the list 
of China’s rare earths priorities, if sustainable development is to be realized.60 In the 
                                                 
59 In Chinese: “中国限制稀土产业不得已而为之，主要是出于环境保护的需要”. 
 
60 In Chinese: “要合理规范资源利用总量和开发力度，加强科研与管理，提高资源得综合利用率；
加强三废治理，保护环境，实现人与自然的协调发展。稀土产业必须贯彻环保第一的原则，才能够
实现可持续发展”.  
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recent WTO case, as China was accused of breaking WTO rules with regard to rare earths 
export taxes, export quotas, and qualifications for rare earths exporters, China’s response 
to the accusations included a critical reason behind rare earths export restrictions: 
environmental protection. After US president Barack Obama announced the filing of a 
complaint with the WTO in March, 2012, China was quick to respond as to the reasons 
behind its restrictions of rare earths exports. On March 13, 2012, Liu Weimin, 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China made 
China’s position clear in his regular press conference. The question was posed: “It is 
reported that China’s restriction on the export of rare earth and other high-tech raw 
materials impairs the interests of US enterprises. The US side will file a complaint with 
the WTO on that. How does China respond?” Liu Weimin replied:  
Rare earth is scarce and nonrenewable. The exploitation of rare earth will exert 
impact on the environment. In order to protect the resources and environment and 
realize sustainable development, the Chinese Government adopts management 
measures not only on rare earth export, but also on its mining and production. 
Relevant measures meet WTO rules. China’s reserves of rare earth take up 36.4% 
of the world’s total. However, China has been supplying over 90% of the world's 
demand of rare earth. Over the years, China has been striving to maintain a 
considerable amount of rare earth export, despite enormous environmental 
pressure.  
China will continue to provide rare earth to the international market and 
carry out effective management of rare earth export in accordance with WTO 
rules. China hopes that other countries endowed with rare earth resources will 
engage actively in rare earth development and jointly shoulder the responsibility 
of global rare earth supply. China would also like to enhance cooperation with 
other countries on searching substitute resources and improving the utilization of 
rare earth (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press 
Conference on March 13, 2012”, 2012, emphasis mine; grammatical mistakes in 
official translation). 
 
From an examination of Liu’s statement, according to the Chinese government, 
the connection between China’s actions as a near-monopolist of rare earths and 
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environmental protection is solid. The connection is drawn between environmental 
protection and three phases of management: rare earths mining, production, and export. 
According to the Chinese government, it is with the two-fold goal of environmental 
protection and resource protection, that China has been restricting mining, production, 
and exports. The United States, Japan, and the EU did not accept China’s explanation, 
further accusing China of using environmental protection as a smokescreen for increasing 
the international market price of rare earths while preserving low rare earths prices 
domestically. China’s appeal to environmental protection was eventually dismissed, and 
the WTO case ended in defeat for China. In a scholarly paper reviewing the legal matters 
associated with the 2012 WTO rare earths case, Zhang (2012) makes the following 
suggestion to China’s lawmakers:  
Begin taxing rare earths resources as quickly as possible. With regard to the 
export of natural resources, China has implemented the following policies, all of 
which have had noticeable results in controlling the trade direction of these 
exhaustible resources: export taxes, export quotas, export qualifications, and low 
price limits, etc. All such policies are both easy to implement and low in cost. In 
fact, regardless of whether these exhaustible resources are exported or consumed 
domestically, their mining and production cause the same amount of 
environmental pollution. Therefore, it is imperative that China learns from the 
environmental protection and resource conservation practices of developed 
countries, and under the condition of complying with WTO regulations, regulate 
the export of rare earths (emphasis mine). 
Though some may consider Zhang’s suggestions outdated after the August 2014 
WTO decision against China’s rare earths export restrictions, nevertheless, it underlines 
the fact that environmental concerns are high on the list of reasons behind controlling 
China’s rare earths exports.  
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Li & Xu (2014) make a direct connection between environmental protection and 
restrictions on rare earths exports: First, China has two major policy goals with regard to 
rare earths management: resource protection and environmental protection. A desire to 
protect the environment is one of the main motivators, and actually protecting the 
environment is one of the main goals of China’s rare earths policies. According to Li & 
Xu, management of rare earths includes two very important aspects, which were 
discussed briefly in Chapter 3: (1) rare earths export restrictions and (2) rare earths 
production controls. The authors are of the opinion that the former will most likely be 
cancelled, in light of the WTO decision against China’s rare earths exports restrictions, 
but that the latter is a possibility for protecting the environment and pleasing the WTO 
simultaneously. By December, 2014, China had not made any significant changes to its 
rare earth export taxes and export quotas in the “Tariff Execution Plan 2015” (《2015 年
关税实施方案》), released by the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council (国
务院关税税则委员会) on December 16, 2014 (“Xitu Chukou Guanshui Quxiao Yuqi 
Luokong”, 2014), although changes are expected by mid-2015 (“Yenei: Xitu Chukou 
Guanshui Mingnian Quxiao Duoxiang Xinzheng Tiaokong Ziyuan”, 2014). Then, on 
January 1, 2015, the Chinese government announced to the world that export quotas for 
rare earths had been cancelled as of that date, and that export taxes on rare earths would 
see changes in May 2015 (Yap, 2015; Shen, 2015).  
(2) Rare Earth Resource Protection 
 
According to the 2012 statement by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin 
above, rare earths management measures including restrictions on mining, production, 
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and exports have been implemented for one of two goals: environmental protection and 
resource protection. Resource protection as a motivating factor for China’s behavior as a 
near-monopolist of rare earths is well-supported in the extant literature. 
Cheng & Che (2010) present a sweeping overview of the current (at the time) 
mining situation and future potential of China’s rare earths industry. While identifying 
several serious industry problems, including resource wastefulness, illegal mining, and 
environmental problems, the second most important suggestion for the future of China’s 
rare earths industry was resource protection: “[China should] standardize the mining 
order, strengthen resource protection, mine in a reasonable manner, and increase the 
utilization efficiency of resources…Our country should implement national protective 
policies with regard to the mining of rare earths, and put an end to production or cancel 
mining rights for offenders” (emphasis mine).   
In her discussion of the 2012 WTO case, Zhang (2012) gives two specific 
suggestions to the Chinese government. First, the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (《中华人民共和国对外贸易法》), revised last in 2004, should be 
updated to take into account for WTO regulations and changes in the world rare earths 
market. The crux of the issue lies in rare earths resource protection. China’s Foreign 
Trade Law allows for completely halting foreign trade of exhaustible resources for the 
purpose of resource protection, whereas the WTO at most allows for restrictions on 
exports for exhaustible resources, and that under one condition, namely that domestic 
measures also be taken to restrict the production and consumption of the said exhaustible 
resources. Putting aside the issue of China’s domestic laws being at odds with WTO 
regulations, Zhang’s obvious point is that all restrictions—whether domestic or 
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international—on the production or export of rare earths, exist for the purpose of rare 
earths resource protection. 
Second, Zhang suggests that the Chinese government issue a “Law for the 
Protection of Rare Mineral Resources” (《稀有矿产资源保障法》). Her argument is 
straightforward: there are several laws which indirectly protect rare earths resources,61 
but no law that exists solely for their protection. According to the article, China has about 
30% of the world’s rare earths resources, and is a “great power of rare earth resources in 
the world” (全球稀土资源大国) when compared to other countries with rare earths 
reserves, such as the United States, Russia, Canada, India, etc. Nevertheless, as the 
demand for rare earths continues to rise, the world’s reserves are being steadily depleted, 
with some places nearing complete resource exhaustion. Thus, according to Zhang, the 
time has come for China to pass legislation for the protection of rare earths, if China 
hopes to realize the sustainable development of these exhaustible resources. 
In an August, 2010 Rare Earth Information article, the author gives one of the 
strongest stances possible on rare earths resource protection and exports. “[China] must 
gradually decrease or terminate rare earths exports. Along with the speedy development 
of China’s national economy, and the continual increase in research and development of 
new materials and new energy resources, the demand for rare earths will increase 
tremendously, and it will be very difficult to satisfy the needs of China’s development 
[merely] from China’s [own] rare earths reserves. Therefore, we must resolutely protect 
                                                 
61 These laws include the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (《中华人民共和国刑法》); 
Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (《中华人民共和国矿产资源法》); and 
Provisional Measures on Administration of Survey and Extraction of Specific Types of Minerals for 
Protected Mining (《保护性开采的特定矿种勘查开采管理暂行办法》).  
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our national interests and hold up under the pressure of Western developed countries by 
strictly controlling rare earths export quotas, and reducing them year on year” 
(“Zenmeyang Bian ‘Xitu Daguo’ Wei ‘Xitu Qiangguo’ ”, 2010). 
The suggestions of the previous article came at a time when China’s new-found 
restrictive power over rare earths exports was at a strong point, just before the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku fishing trawler incident of September 2010. In contrast, the tone of 
policy suggestions in recent scholarly publications such as Li & Xu (2014) is much less 
aggressive with regard to export restrictions, in light of the recent WTO rare earths case. 
Regardless of these differences in tone and aggressiveness, the overall conclusion 
remains the same: the solution for the conservation and protection of China’s rare earths 
resources is through restrictions on exports or on production: “if restrictions are not 
imposed on the development and usage [of rare earths], [these] resources will be 
prematurely exhausted” (Yang, 2011). 
In his 2011 article, Yang gives a series of suggestions for China’s rare earths 
industry, the first of which being resource protection, along with consolidation of the 
domestic rare earths industry and the strengthening of the creativity and technological 
expertise of the same. Resource protection could be seen as part of China’s defensive 
strategy, while industry consolidation and technological advancement could be seen as 
part of China’s offensive strategy.  
In Wübbeke’s 2013 overview of China’s rare earth policies and narratives for 
reinventing the rare earths industry, a similar picture to that outlined in the Chinese-
language literature is presented in English. Wübbeke examines China’s current situation 
and future plans regarding the rare earths industry, and calls the environmental-resource-
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protection plan the “green narrative”. He highlights how the Chinese government named 
rare earths “special resource[s] for protected extraction” in 1991, but did not actually start 
to emphasize the need for resource protection until the end of that decade, after ever-
increasing production and exports of rare earths during the 1990s.  
A 2005 report by 15 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences rang the 
warning bell for China’s rare earths industry, gaining the attention of top leaders like 
Wen Jiabao. In the report, attention was called to the low return rate of REE mined at the 
Bayan Obo mine in Inner Mongolia, the waste of resources, and the possibility that the 
east pit at Bayan Obo could be exhausted within 35 years, if the current rate of extraction 
continued. Xu Guangxian, “China’s Father of Rare Earths” estimated that the southern 
rare earths deposits could be exhausted within ten years. Though some alarmists called 
for the complete closure of the Bayan Obo mine, China’s leaders have opted for a 
middle-of-the-road approach to rare earths resources protection that includes restrictions, 
but not complete closure (Wübbeke, 2013).  
Hurst (2010) makes the following summary of China’s recent actions as a rare-
earths near-monopolist as related to resource protection: “In an effort to try to protect its 
resources, the Chinese government has been clamping down on its domestic industry in 
several ways, including: restricting export quotas on rare earth elements…Of most 
concern to the international community, China has been restricting export quotas in order 
to have enough resources for its own industries and to regain control over its domestic 
operations.” 
Finally, Blakely et al. (2011) analyze China’s rationale behind its export 
restrictions. Though the authors mention “Save REM for future generations” as one of 
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China’s rationales, they are not convinced by China’s argument and so they claim that the 
idea of resource protection, while it could apply to other natural resources, should not 
apply to rare earths. The reasoning is as follows: “Despite their name, rare earth metals 
are relatively abundant, especially in China. The primary difficulty with REMs is 
extracting them, which is technically complex and environmentally degrading, but not in 
finding deposits”. In other words, the logic here is that if China plans to protect its rare 
earths resources based on scarcity, the argument does not hold water, because China’s 
rare earths are fairly abundant, though they may not be economically viable to mine. This 
opinion seems out of harmony with the general view presented regarding China’s rare 
earths resources protection, but nevertheless represents the view of a small minority.  
(3) Strengthening Rare Earths Industry Regulation 
 
A central problem faced by China’s rare earths industry is irresponsible and 
illegal mining, as well as export-restriction evasion and smuggling, etc. Recent 
restrictions on the trade of rare earths and China’s over-all behavior with regard to its rare 
earths industry cannot be disconnected from China’s push to increase regulatory 
measures on the industry. 
Regulatory measures are usually referred to under the broad umbrella term of 
“industry management” (产业管理). Sun (2011) described the disorderly situation in the 
rare earths industry. The disarray included (1) long-term above-quota production (超指标
生产) by Chinese rare earths enterprises; (2) inappropriate arrangements for export 
quotas and weighting, leading to competition for the lowest selling price and serious 
reselling of quotas for higher prices; (3) export quota evasion (playing the system) by 
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foreign enterprises; and (4) rampant smuggling by a complete underground network by 
which 20,000 to 30,000 tons of rare earths per year were smuggled out of China from 
2006 to 2009 using names like “iron ore”, “marble”, “cleanser”, and “lime powder”, etc.  
Sun (2011) reminds readers that beginning in 2006, China increased its efforts at 
re-ordering the poorly-regulated rare earths industry. The first item on the agenda in 2006 
was the change of government directives from “guidance-oriented” (指导性) to 
“command-oriented” (指令性). The new command-oriented directives included the 
implementation of production restrictions and export taxes. The Chinese government also 
released several new rare-earths-related policies and directives, including industry 
entrance qualification requirements and pollution requirements. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China, 
along with other government bodies, declared the decision to cease from offering new 
rare earths mining licenses, and the rare earths mining quota was decreased by 20%. Also 
in the same year, export taxes on rare earths products and chemical compounds increased 
by 10%, and 41 types of rare earths metal, alloy, ore, and salt products were added to a 
list of items prohibited for export; and the number of government-approved rare earths 
exporters fell from 47 to 39.  
In 2007, taxes on exports of rare earths concentrates increased from 10% to 15%, 
whereas rare earths metals were taxed at 10%. During the same year, the Chinese 
government restricted foreign enterprises’ ability to invest in rare earths smelting and 
separation (restricted to joint ventures and cooperation), while banning foreign 
enterprises from rare earths exploration, mining, and mineral processing. During 2008, 
the overall quota for rare earths exports fell by 21%, while export taxes for yttrium, 
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europium, dysprosium, and terbium increased to 25%, with export taxes for other types of 
rare earths products growing to 15%. In 2009, twelve government ministries and 
departments including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry 
of Public Security, and the Ministry of Finance formed the Rare Metals Inter-ministerial 
Coordination Mechanism (稀有金属部际协调机制). During 2010 and early 2011 (Sun’s 
analysis runs through February 2011), directives and regulations from China’s Central 
Government seemed to come with greater frequency than between 2006 and 2009. In 
May, 2010, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued its 
“Requirements for Entrance into the Rare Earths Industry” (《稀土行业准入条件》), 
detailing rules and regulations for layout conditions, production scale, techniques and 
equipment, energy consumption, comprehensive resource utilization, environmental 
protection, product quality, production safety, etc.  
Sun concludes that while China has put in place a large amount of rare earth 
legislation since 2006 in hopes of regulating the disorderly industry, it is far from 
bringing the rare earths industry under control. In 2010, after nearly four years of new 
legislation, implementation continued to be the greatest challenge facing China’s rare 
earths industry. For example, China’s rare earths export quota for 2010 was 30,258 tons, 
but in actuality, 39,813 tons of rare earths were exported, outshooting the quota by 
31.58%. Sun finishes his argument with several policy suggestions, one of which is 
similar to Zhang above: China should create new legislation entitled “Protection Law for 
Rare Earths Resources” (《稀土资源保障法》).  
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Yan, An & Hao (2011) analyze the existing regulation problems in China’s rare 
earths industry from the perspective of sustainable development. The authors point to the 
disorderly production practices of some rare earths enterprises that have led to an 
imbalance between production and selling. Also, the authors see larger problems on a 
national scale in the regulation and management of the entire rare earths industry: (1) The 
rare earths industry is lacking an effective market economy management system. This 
refers to problems such as multi-headed management and turf wars; as well as 
overlapping, decentralized, and inefficient administrative functions. (2) Rare earths 
production enterprises engage in disorderly competition, without effective market 
management. Price wars between rare earths producers have given the government a 
significant challenge, and there has been resistance within the rare earths industry. (3) 
Export practices are in disarray and disorder, and regulation is in need of being 
strengthened. This is the crux of the matter, as, according to Yan et al., if it were not for 
the lack of proper export tax and quota control, China would not be losing such a great 
amount of valuable rare earths resources.  
In conclusion, Yan et al. claim that the main reason behind the lack of motivation 
seen in China’s rare earths enterprises is lack of industry management, regulation, and 
integration. In simple terms, if China can put its rare earths house in order domestically 
(including mining, production, and export regulations), it will be able to “stand united” in 
its competition against international rare earths players. If higher levels of regulation and 
enforcement can be realized in China’s rare earths industry, perhaps it can accomplish the 
protection and sustainable use of China’s rare earths. From this argument, it is evident 
that China’s domestic obsession with whipping its rare earths industry into shape comes 
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from the ultimate motivation to strengthen its place as the rare earths near-monopolist in 
the world market. Also, China’s behavior in restricting production and/or exports of rare 
earths is seen by the industry as an integral part of the overall push by the Chinese 
government to rectify industry problems and improve management effectiveness and 
efficiency for the industry.  
(4) Protecting and Aiding China’s Domestic Rare Earths Industry 
 
Another domestic factor leading to and influencing China’s behavior as a near-
monopolist of rare earths is the protection and aiding of China’s own rare earths industry. 
This factor, though not as noticeable in China’s rhetoric, nevertheless is an important 
motivator, especially in the export realm. China’s restrictions on exports, including 
export taxes, export quotas, and qualification restrictions for enterprises engaging in the 
export of rare earths, all contribute to a two-tiered pricing system, with domestic prices 
lower than export prices (Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013). This is precisely what the United 
States, Japan, and the European Union protested in the recently decided WTO case. In the 
eyes of the US, Japan, and the EU, China’s simultaneous use of the three-pronged 
restrictive policies mentioned above increased costs, decreased supply, and made it more 
difficult in general to export rare earths out of China, all at a time when the world 
demand for rare earths continued to increase. Chinese-language literature rarely 
acknowledges the desire of the Chinese government to give pricing advantage to 
domestic rare earths producers, whereas this point is a major complaint found in the 
English-language literature. 
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In fact, when it comes to protecting domestic industry either in China or the rest 
of the world, both Chinese scholarship and scholarship outside of China tend to play the 
victim. On the Chinese side, researchers tend to paint the picture that China’s rare earths 
production and exports continue to expand, while prices continue to drop, and China is 
stuck in a position where the “price-setting authority” is held by “developed countries”, 
and thereby China is left with increasingly depleted resources and a lack of say in 
international pricing for rare earths (Yan et al., 2011). 
From the English-language literature, research seems to support a different story, 
in which China’s taxes on exports have created difficulties for foreign companies who 
have been accustomed to consistently importing, and in some cases almost 100% 
dependent on China’s cheap rare earths. In addition, export quotas have also frustrated 
international buyers, especially when it has seemed that while quotas have been enforced 
on China’s foreign exports of rare earths, domestic rare earth consumption in China has 
not suffered. In other words, China’s rare earths market has played favorites in its export 
policies. Of course, this was one of the main complaints of the US, Japan, and the EU in 
the recent WTO case. Also, with regard to China’s export taxes and export quotas on rare 
earths, another concern brought up in the English-language literature is the Chinese tactic 
of using export taxes and export quotas to attract foreign rare earths enterprises to move 
operations to China, especially research and development operations. Western 
researchers have noted that manufacturers which move operations to China can easily 
side-step China’s export quota restrictions, as export restrictions only apply to raw 
materials, not finished products (Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013). The obvious fear is that 
China will, through various means, obtain trade secrets and key technologies from 
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foreign companies which are lured into the “dragon’s lair” by lower rare earths prices and 
less-severe export restrictions.  
In Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013), the rare earths issue is discussed from a China vs. 
the Rest of the World (ROW) perspective. From the viewpoint of the ROW, the authors 
bring several “accusations” against China, including the use of rare earths as a 
geopolitical weapon, as discussed briefly in Chapter 3. The authors also highlight China’s 
protection of its own domestic rare earths industry by which an “unfair competitive 
advantage” is created on the side of China. Through export taxes, China raised the prices 
for certain rare earths by as much as 850%. However, it is informative to note that the 
increase in prices for certain rare earths elements (neodymium, praseodymium, europium, 
dysprosium, and terbium oxides) were the same within and without China, while for 
others, prices for export were considerably higher (samarium, cerium, and lanthanum). 
Along the same vein, Hayes-Labruto et al. make the following statement 
regarding the result of the protection of China’s domestic rare earths industry, namely the 
aiding of that same industry by attracting foreign investment62: “China’s de facto 
monopoly position and the creation of price differences is often interpreted as ‘an attempt 
to capture more rents along the value chain’ because companies that require REE inputs 
are forced to move their operations to China ‘to benefit from a steady and affordable 
supply of rare earths’ ”.  
The obvious rift in interpretations of China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of 
rare earths underlines the general phenomenon of mistrust between China and the rest of 
                                                 
62 As of 2012, $960 million had been invested by the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and Canada 
into China’s rare earths industry, indicating China’s strategy to attract foreign investment had been 
successful (Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013). 
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the world. As recent US Congressional research put it, China’s behavior is for the sole 
purpose of benefiting its downstream rare earths industry at the expense of the defense 
and commercial industries of other countries (Morrison & Tang, 2012). On the Chinese 
side, issues are seen differently, and the rift of mistrust is called by its name (Hayes-
Labruto et al. 2013).  
In summary, China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths has many 
domestic motivating factors, the most prominent among them being environmental 
protection, resources protection, industry regulation, and the protection of domestic 
industry. These factors, taken in conjunction with the international factors discussed in 
Chapter 3, and in the overall context of the guidance and support of the “omnipresent” 
state, paint a two-fold picture of the factors influencing China’s behavior as a rare earths 
near-monopolist, especially in the realm of production and export restriction. In the 
following chapter, discussion will focus on a synthetic understanding of the state of 
China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths, ultimately in the context of the 
direction and protection of the policies of China’s Central Government. 
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CHAPTER 5: TOWARD A SYNTHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING CHINA’S 
BEHAVIOR AS A NEAR-MONOPOLIST OF RARE EARTHS 
Introduction 
 
Thus far, I have shown how China became a near-monopolist of rare earths, 
primarily through (1) Government support and guidance of the domestic rare earths 
industry; (2) lack of or disregard for environmental regulations regarding the production 
of rare earths; (3) illegal and/or unregulated production; and (4) relatively low cost of rare 
earths production in China compared to the rest of the world.  
I have also examined the preeminent international and domestic factors 
influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. International factors 
include (1) international demand for rare earths in the context of lower rare earths 
production outside of China; (2) international pressure on China to conform to certain 
trade regulations; (3) international “price-setting authority” issues on the part of China; 
(4) geopolitical factors such as the condition of relations with Japan, etc.  
Domestic factors that exert influence over China’s rare earths-related behavior 
are: (1) Environmental protection; (2) rare earth resource protection; (3) strengthening 
rare earths industry regulation; and (4) protecting and aiding China’s domestic rare earths 
industry. Domestic motivations behind China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare 
earths have, in many cases, been overlooked by Western researchers, who tend to 
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emphasize the threat posed by China’s international motivators, such as controlling prices 
and utilizing the “geopolitical weapon” side of rare earths for its own advantage.  
In the current chapter, I will attempt to arrive at a synthetic understanding of the 
two-sided coin of China’s rare earths behavior motivation in the overarching context of 
state guidance. In the current literature—both in Chinese and English—there has been a 
significant lack of scholarship analyzing China’s rare earths behavior from an 
international-domestic integrated perspective. In my opinion, to understand China’s 
world-affecting behavior with regard to rare earths, sufficient and symmetrical weight 
must be given to all possible influential factors. Focusing attention on one side of the coin 
will yield, at best, only half an explanation. 
Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013) analyze China’s rare earths policy from two 
perspectives—China’s own perspective and that of the rest of the world (ROW). The 
authors “investigate whether China’s rare earth policy could be understood as a socially 
responsible strategy that balances environmental, social and economic needs catalyzed by 
stakeholders or whether it is a strictly economic, resource-nationalist strategy driven by 
China’s current dominance in rare earth elements”. The paper employs the “China Inc.” 
metaphor, designating the ROW as the dependent stakeholder, and offers suggestions as 
to how to increase salience, thus strategically adapting to and partially overcoming China 
Inc.’s dominant position. 
The reasoning behind an “us vs. them” comparison is not without its validity, and 
it is common to see such issues through a “polarized” lens. Even though Hayes-Labruto 
et al. attempt to see both sides of the China vs. ROW argument, the conclusion of the 
paper points to ways by which the ROW may overcome (if only partially) China’s 
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domination of the rare earths market. It could be deduced that if the goal of research is to 
give greater advantage to a certain “side” of an economic struggle, lack of research 
objectivity is a possibility. Whereas, if one aims to take an unbiased perspective on the 
issues, and identifies the factors influencing China’s actions as a rare earths near-
monopolist, with the research goal of arriving at an integrative synthetic understanding of 
which factors play decisive roles in China’s behavior, perhaps a more balanced 
perspective could be reached, which could be beneficial to a multiplicity of global rare 
earths actors.  
The purpose of the following synthetic treatment of the international and domestic 
factors influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths is to present a 
more well-rounded, integrated understanding of the foresaid factors. The current 
literature on the topic tends to see China’s near-monopoly on rare earths either as a threat 
to the world at large, or as an objective fact that calls for better resource management in 
China and the rest of the world. The proposed purpose of this thesis is an integration of 
the two views from the international-domestic factor perspective. In other words, instead 
of taking an “us vs. them” approach, I propose an objective synthesis of all possible 
factors, both international and domestic, that influence China’s rare earths supremacy. 
International Factors 
 
A. Demand. From the late 1990s, the demand on China’s rare earths industry 
increased as rare earths operations around the world cut or halted production. Of course, 
it could be argued that it was the flooding of the world market with cheap Chinese rare 
earths elements in the first place during the 1990s that caused considerable price drops, 
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which in turn drove many extra-Sino producers out of the market. Regardless, the 
objective fact that rare earths production around the world slumped in the late 1990s to 
early 2000s, in conjunction with growing production figures in China (see Chapter 1) 
created significant opportunities for China to establish itself in its position as the near-
monopolist of rare earths.  
While world demand for rare earths was high, China’s production was even 
higher during the 1990s-2000s. As China’s overproduction in relation to world demand 
continued, rare earths prices stayed relatively low, further exacerbating the situation for 
rare earths producers outside of China, and increasing China’s hold on the market. It was 
the fact that China could provide the world with the cheapest rare earths elements and 
products, in conjunction with increased demand from the rest of the world, that 
constituted to the fundamental nature of China’s near-monopoly.  
In this example, it is evident that a combination of one major international factor 
(demand) with the context of China’s domestic situation (cheap supply), directly 
influenced the near-monopoly situation. This scenario is not new, as China has gained a 
reputation as the “World’s Factory” over the last thirty years as a result of it Reform and 
Opening-up Policy (改革开放政策), strategically placing itself in the position of the 
world’s largest, most economical producer of consumer goods, based on its strategic 
advantages of lower wages, a well-rounded business ecosystem, lesser compliance with 
various labor and environmental restrictions, less taxes on exports, and an artificially 
depressed currency (Bajpai, 2014). The bottom line is, China is a master of supply and 
demand, and in the case of rare earths, it adds one more key strategic advantage to the 
list: resource abundance. 
 109
With regard to rare earths, China views its status as the largest producer with both 
self-congratulation and trepidation—self-congratulatory in that China is sure of its 
advantages, and desires to make full use of China’s status with regard to rare earths; and 
fearful that the demand—both domestic, and from other nations—will lead to a real 
depletion of its rare earths resources.63 All in all, China has largely been on the benefiting 
end of the rare-earths supply-demand relationship.  
B. Trade Pressure. China’s entrance into the WTO was welcomed by many 
domestically and around the world. Closer ties and promises of fair trade with the world 
were applauded (Shirk, 2008). By the time China had acceded to the WTO, it was already 
                                                 
63 This is not the first time in history that China has been wary of its being taken advantage of. Historically, 
trade relations with foreign nations have been a source of conflict. China has been intertwined in trade 
relations with greater Asia and other parts of the World since at least the Han dynasty (Adshead, 2000). 
During the Tang dynasty, Sino-foreign trade flourished during the first two hundred years of the rule of the 
house of Li; but near the end of that fabled era, foreigners and foreign trade were ousted from one of 
China’s greatest trading cities, Guangzhou (Ibid). By the end of the last Chinese imperial dynasty, the Qing 
(1644-1912) China had become a self-absorbed, self-centered power with little desire to communicate with 
the outside world. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, however, as opium smoking became increasingly 
popular among China’s vast population, the opportunity to open up the door of trade with China presented 
itself to certain opportunist individuals from the British empire (Brook & Wakabayashi, 2000), who began 
importing opium into mainland China, primarily through the southern port city of Canton (Guangzhou). 
The Chinese government had issued a ban on opium smoking many years earlier, to little avail. Finally, the 
Qing government sent Lin Zexu (林则徐), a powerful official, to deal with the opium issue. His treatment 
of the matter, though valiant, ended in failure, as the British subdued Chinese forces with superior fire-
power. As a result of the First Opium War (and the Second Opium war that followed), the door to trade 
with China was officially “cannon-blasted” open, and ports in the cities of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, 
Ningbo, Shanghai, etc. were opened to foreign trade. What followed the First Opium War was known as 
the “Hundred Years of Humiliation” (百年耻辱), ending with the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949. In the years following the birth of the 
PRC, China’s foreign trade was less than blossoming, until the Reform and Opening era began in the late 
1970s-early 1980s. What has happened in the more than thirty years since the adoption of a more open 
foreign trade policy has changed China and the world. After gaining traction for more than two decades of 
manufacturing and trade, China entered the World Trade Organization in late 2001. With greater 
opportunity, comes greater responsibility, and more than once, trade disputes through the WTO have 
blamed China for breaking rules of fair trade within the framework of WTO guidelines. Though China has 
a long history of foreign trade, as with anything, current trade issues are more easily influenced by recent 
events and viewpoints, as opposed to older ones. Yet in the case of China, the Hundred Years of 
Humiliation has deeply influenced the Chinese national psyche, even to this day. In the 5,000-year river 
that is Chinese history, the era of humiliation is fresh in memory. The result is, at the least severe, a distrust 
of foreigners and foreign companies or governments; and at the most severe, rabid nationalism and 
xenophobia (Wang, 2012).  
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the near-monopolist of rare earths. World demand for and booming production of cheap 
rare earths in China continued to guarantee China’s position at the “top of the pile”. But 
as China increased restrictions on exports, and especially after the 2010 unofficial 
embargo on rare earths exports to Japan, China had reason once again to be leery of 
greedy foreign interests, just as the rest of the world became increasingly less trustful of 
the motivations behind China’s actions. The WTO case battled out between the US, 
Japan, and the EU against China ended in a defeat for China, effectively silencing some 
hot-headed voices of trade restriction within China, but by no means ending the ongoing 
debate about how to protect China’s rare earths resources and natural environment.  
A reading of the Chinese language media and scholarly publications reveals the 
tremendous pressure that China felt internationally with regard to rare earths trade around 
the time of the WTO case. A group of articles published in the People’s Daily entitled 
“The United States, Japan, and the European Union Unite in Putting Pressure on China’s 
Rare Earths Exports”, includes an article by the title “Rare Earths Case Reveals the 
Insatiable Face of the West Scrambling For Resources”.64 The article summarizes the 
Chinese perspective on the pressure on rare earths exports restrictions:  
When protecting their own economic interests, the United States and Europe are 
accustomed to using double standards. The protective trade measures of some 
countries are dual in nature: in regard to items that the country does not lack, it 
closes its market to China, robbing China of a place to sell its goods; and those 
things which they lack, they force China to sell. There was nothing wrong with 
China managing and controlling the rare earths market, but since this increased 
the import costs for Western countries, the West said, “This is not going to work”. 
They have the voice of influence on the matter, and are able to turn bad into good 
with mere words. The bottom line is, the result must be in harmony with their 
interests (“Mei Ri Ou Lianshou Shiya Zhongguo Xitu Chukou”, 2012).  
 
                                                 
64 In Chinese: 稀土官司暴露了西方欲壑难平哄抢资源的嘴脸. 
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An article from Hong Kong’s Wenwei Po (《文匯報》) titled “China Levels 
Strict Controls on Rare Earths: Going In for the Long-haul in the Lawsuit with the 
European Union, America, and Japan” records part of an interview with an anonymous 
industry expert, who, at the time (July 23, 2012) expressed that China was under a great 
amount of pressure over the issue of whether or not China’s rare earths export restrictions 
were designed to protect resources and the environment or to gain the greatest benefit 
from a monopoly on the market (“Zhongguo Yanguan Xitu Yingzhan Ou Mei Ri 
Chansong”, 2012). 
These articles express strong opinions regarding China’s behavior as a rare earths 
near-monopolist, and should be considered carefully. While both articles are 
characteristically nationalistic in their treatment of the WTO case, nevertheless, it is clear 
that China had no choice but to be affected by the pressure originating from the WTO and 
the United States, Japan, and the EU.65 
In summary, if it were not for this international factor, it is very possible that 
China would continue restricting its exports of rare earths through export quotas 
indefinitely, or perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, even end its rare earths 
production at some time in the foreseeable future.  
                                                 
65 Recent industry analysis suggests that though China has cancelled export quotas for rare earths, China is 
nevertheless tightening its hold on rare earths, especially HREEs, through other methods such as export tax 
systems, making the export of rare earths even more prohibitive than before the export quotas were 
cancelled (Lifton, 2015). It should be noted that such analysis is only preliminary, based on less than one 
month of observation. In addition, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) held a 
key national rare earth conference on Wednesday, January 28, 2015. The two items on the agenda were (1) 
the continued consolidation of the rare earths industry into six major conglomerates and (2) gaining greater 
control over rare earths products for export. Some fear that the regulations in the making will result in even 
less rare earth material being exported from China (Shen, 2015).  
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C. “Price-setting Authority”. China’s “father of rare earths”, Xu Guangxian and 
others have referred frequently and with great emphasis to China’s need for a strategic 
rare earths reserve system for the purpose of claiming world rare earths “price-setting 
authority” for China (Chapter 3). In the eyes of the scholarly community in China, rare-
earth “price-setting authority” is yet another power that has been unfairly stripped from 
China by the West. As the Rare Earth Information article entitled “From Large to Strong 
in Rare Earths: How Can China Change?” states: 
China controls over 90% of the rare earths metals market, yet it lacks the ability 
that countries like Australia and Brazil have to control world prices.66 A strange 
phenomenon exists in the large commodity market: taking oil, coal, and iron ore 
as examples, whenever China is in the exporting stage, prices are extremely low; 
but as soon as China becomes an importer, prices soar. 
 
From the Western perspective, China has controlled the prices of rare earths since 
becoming the near-monopolist, and has continued to do so through rare earths export 
restrictions that caused price hikes which were detrimental to the world rare earths 
industry. In reality, the issue is simple. When supply exceeds demand, the buyer(s) 
has/have much more deciding power regarding the price of the product. In 2010-2011, 
when prices for rare earths increased by several hundred percent, the rest of the world 
found that the export restriction problem they had been carefully observing for nearly 
four years had indeed become a viable threat to the health of rare earths-dependent 
industries in the high-tech and defense sectors. 
Eventually, the soaring prices did come down to relatively earthly levels, yet the 
rest of the world was intent on fixing the root problem. That solution included at least 
two aspects: (1) finding alternative sources for rare earths, and (2) bringing China’s 
                                                 
66 Literally, it lacks the “world price-setting authority” (世界定价权). 
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export restrictions into check. The former being much more difficult to achieve in the 
short term than the latter, the rest of the world, under the leadership of the United States, 
Japan, and the European Union, took up the case regarding export restrictions with China 
through the intermediary channel of the World Trade Organization. 
China, on the other hand, knowing that extreme tightening of export restrictions 
like those in 2010-2011 are not long-term solutions to gaining true “price-setting 
authority”, has gone about searching for alternative methods for gaining this sought-after 
power. In other words, China is able to directly influence—in the short term, through 
export restrictions/embargos, etc.—the pricing of rare earths, but does not have the ability 
to set prices over the long-term, because as long as China is a member of the WTO, any 
pinch in the flow of rare earths exports on the part of China is sure to be met immediately 
with concerted defiance by the other WTO members. This is perhaps one of the “lessons” 
China has gleaned from its recently lost WTO case. Therefore, if China is to gain the rare 
earths “price-setting authority”, it must do so through means other than export 
restrictions. The current push in the Chinese academic community is toward establishing 
a vast reserve system by which the price of rare earths could be tweaked at will.  
The lack of world rare earths price-setting authority should be labeled passive-
negative, although China is fast working to turn the tables and make price-setting an 
active-positive factor for its rare earths industry. In August 2014, China was reported to 
have purchased 10,000 metric tons of rare earths oxides, adding this amount to its 
steadily-growing stockpiles—tools for pushing the prices of rare earths up (McLeod, 
2014). According to Bloomberg News: 
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China’s move may be an effort to reverse a decline that’s seen the price of at least 
one rare earth tumble 76 percent from its 2011 high, according to Peng Bo, an 
analyst at China Merchants Securities Co. In March, the World Trade 
Organization sided with the U.S., Japan and Europe in ruling that China hadn’t 
adequately justified imposing export duties and quotas on rare earths and other 
resources. “China is facing imminent pressure to abolish the export quota, so 
stockpiling is part of the policy reaction to help prop up prices and keep more of 
the resources at home for future use,” Peng said by phone from Shenzhen today 
(“China Said to Add 10,000 Tons to Rare Earths Stockpiles”, 2014, emphasis 
mine). 
 
 Price-setting authority is indeed a crucial factor directly influencing the actions of 
China as a near-monopolist of rare earths. If and when the Chinese government gains the 
power to set rare earths prices worldwide, this international factor will become a top 
consideration for countries like the United States and Australia, although this is highly 
unlikely in the near future, as China’s reserve stockpiles have not reached the “critical 
mass” necessary to wield such authority.   
D. Geopolitical Factors. During the China-Japan fishing trawler spat in 2010, 
media outside of China made very specific accusations confirming China’s use of rare 
earths as an economic-geopolitical weapon in the midst of a diplomatic crisis. As noted 
previously (Chapter 3), China never officially admitted to the charges, and blamed any 
disruptions in rare earths shipments on coordination issues between companies and 
customs, etc. Putting aside official rhetoric, for the purpose of this thesis, let us assume 
that the administrative halt on the export of rare earths from China to Japan in the final 
quarter of 2010 was indeed related to the trawler incident in the East China Sea, and that 
China did, as reported in western media, use rare earths as a weapon against Japan, the 
obvious underdog with regard to rare earths in this situation. How do these assumptions 
play out? 
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From China’s perspective, the geopolitical use of rare earths makes perfect sense. 
Deng Xiaoping is reported to have said in 1992, “The Middle East has oil, and China has 
rare earths”67 (See Chapter 1). Oil has been used to serve geopolitical ends on a multitude 
of occasions throughout recent history, e.g. the oil embargo placed on Japan by the 
United States and China during the Sino-Japanese war, preceding World War II; the 1967 
Oil Embargo; and the Oil Crisis of 1973 (“First Oil Shock”). It would only be fitting, in 
this context, to understand Deng’s statement to include the geopolitical tool/weapon 
aspect, or at least to include the possibility of such a use for rare earths. 
A thorough study of the background to the 2010 halt in rare earths shipments to 
Japan shows that China had been decreasing export quotas for years, beginning in 2006. 
In 2010, the export quota was 30,258 tons68, down from 48,155 tons in 2009, 49,990 tons 
in 2008, 59,643 tons in 2007, and 61,070 tons in 2006. Therefore, China’s alleged use of 
an administrative halt on rare earths export to Japan as a geopolitical tool was only 
adding frost to snow (雪上加霜), as opposed to a bolt of lightning from a blue sky.  
Taken from another perspective, regardless of China’s true motives in the alleged 
rare earths embargo, the fact that the halt in shipments of rare earths to Japan was 
perceived in the West to constitute an embargo, is enough reason to consider it a de facto 
embargo. From the Chinese perspective, perhaps the behavior exhibited in this case is 
merely a logical progression from the restrictive tendencies of the years preceding 2010. 
In fact, earlier in 2010, scholars were calling for a complete halt to all rare earths exports 
(Chapter 3). It could be that China had long been waiting for an opportunity to experience 
                                                 
67 In Chinese: “中东有石油，中国有稀土”. 
 
68 Figures include export quotas for domestic producers and traders, and Sino-foreign joint ventures.  
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the power of monopoly, when the perfect moment presented itself in September 2010. 
But to conclude that China is a capricious power that one day is doing business as usual 
with the world market, and the next completely shuts off exports, is an extreme view. 
China’s actions should be seen in the context of the gradual tightening of its restrictive 
policies on rare earths exports beginning in 2006, in light of environmental and resource 
protection concerns (China’s perspective); but at the same time, China’s actions in 
halting rare earths exports should also be understood to include the geopolitical factor 
(the Western perspective). To use a metaphor, China’s rare earths behavior since 2006 
could be considered a multi-faceted, multi-front war on those both inside and outside of 
China who would deplete China’s rare earths resources and degrade the natural 
environment; whereas the use of geopolitical force in the halt of rare earths exports in 
2010 was like a short-term, high-impact strike on a specific high-value target. China’s 
government knows that such actions are only feasible and effective in the short-term, and 
its long-term goal is to protect its resources through steady, gradual, legislative, and 
regulatory means—while always having the “big stick” of a possible “rare earths 
embargo” at hand.  
Though the long-term future points to a multi-polarized world of rare earths 
production, for the short-term, China is still the near-monopolist, controlling 
approximately 90% of world production. In this context, the geopolitical use of China’s 
near-monopoly is not out of the question for the foreseeable future. As the world’s 
dependence on China’s rare earths wanes (as the rest of the world seeks rare earths 
resources outside of China), and China’s domestic demand grows, the advantages to such 
a course of action as seen in 2010 will considerably decrease.  
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China’s use of rare earths for geopolitical ends is clearly positive, from the 
Chinese perspective. Conversely, it is a negative factor for the rest of the world. China, 
through active market manipulation, was able to achieve at least three goals, two 
geopolitical, and one economic: (1) punish Japan for its detention of the Chinese fishing 
trawler captain, Zhan Qixiong; (2) prove to the world that China is willing to use means 
such as embargo to fight back against what it considers incursion on its rights of 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; and (3) considerably increase the world 
price of rare earths (if only in the short-term), thereby increasing China’s rare earths 
rents. 
Domestic Factors 
 
A. Environmental protection. It is a well-known fact that China has enacted many 
laws and measures for the protection of the environment in the context of rare earths 
mining and production, the entire process of which is extremely degrading to the natural 
environment. From the perspective of China as the near-monopolist of rare earths, 
however, the implementation of rare-earths-related environmental codes brings negative 
impacts to China’s monopoly on rare earths.  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, China (1) gained status as the supreme rare 
earths producer and exporter partly because of lax environmental regulations, or lax 
enforcement of existing regulations, which in turn cut costs. As has been noted by several 
researchers (see Chapter 4), China has not truly included the environmental cost of rare 
earths production in its rare earths business. It has consistently passed off environmental 
costs to society.  
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Second, (2) China has also justified its rare earths exports restrictions on the basis 
of environmental factors, as Mr. Liu Weimin, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China emphasized in 2012 during the early days of 
the recently concluded WTO case revolving around China’s rare earths export policy. 
China has taken an active role in beefing up environmental legislation, and claims that 
restricting production and exports are a way to mitigate environmental damage. While 
cutting down on overall production would be sure to improve environmental pollution by 
simply cutting down on the pollutants being released into the atmosphere, water, and soil, 
merely restricting exports only causes friction with rare-earths-dependent countries like 
the US, Japan, and the EU. 
Regardless of the manner in which China does so (production cuts or export 
restrictions), if China prioritizes rare earths environmental protection, it will certainly 
cause a decrease in China’s competitive market advantage, due to increased 
environmental protection costs. Thus, while the Central Government continues to hand 
down new rare earths industry regulations relating to environmental protection, the 
industry, especially the smaller players, do not always comply, and when compliance is 
achieved, it may not be ideal in the government’s eyes. The combination of two 
phenomenon have kept implementation less than ideal for China’s rare earths 
environmental protection: (1) 上有政策下有对策 (“Policies come from above, 
countermeasures come from beneath”; or “Where there is a policy coming from above, 
there is a countermeasure coming from beneath”) and (2) 睁一只眼闭一只眼 (“Open 
one eye, and close one eye”). The two Chinese sayings encapsulate it well: there is 
always a loophole or two to be exploited in existing laws; and there seems always to be 
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an official or two (or more) willing to look the other way on issues like environmental 
protection. These problems, while not unique to China, nevertheless strike many 
observers as being more rampant when compared with the world at large. 
China’s environmental protection is positive for the environment, but it brings 
negative effects to China’s near-monopoly status in the world rare earths market. 
However, in the face of domestic social pressures to clean up its rare earths industry, 
China has no choice but to legislate. However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the gap 
between legislation and regulation is frequently chasmal. As greater strides are made in 
implementation of environmental regulations at the local level, China will be forced to 
recalculate portions of its rare earths strategy in light of rising mining and production 
costs. 
B. Rare earth resource protection. As discussed in Chapter 4, China has placed 
resource protection at the top of its list of rare-earths priorities, along with environmental 
protection. This has been reflected in recent legislation, research, and popular discourse. 
But contrary to the factor of environmental protection, China’s active pursuit of rare 
earths resource protection can bring positive impacts to China’s position as the near-
monopolist of rare earths.  
From the national perspective, China’s rare earths behavior, including production 
and trade quotas, as well as the establishment of strategic stockpile reserves, is easily 
understood in terms of resource protection. In the context of the rapid rare earths resource 
depletion that has occurred over the past half century, it is no surprise that China is 
concerned about the future of its rare earths resources. The most alarming of forecasts 
calls for the exhaustion of some rare earths resources within ten years (see Chapter 4). 
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The general consensus of the rare earths community in China supports the idea that 
China, if it does not do something quickly to protect its dwindling rare earths resources, 
will soon become a net importer of the strategic elements, at which point the rest of the 
world could flip the tables on China, and charge exorbitant prices to a rare-earths-poor 
China. This is by no means a pleasant scenario for the Chinese government. Thus, efforts 
to protect rare earths resources have strengthened in recent years.  
China has cancelled its export quotas for rare earths as of January 2015. This 
cancellation of the export quota system will have significant effects on the quantity of 
rare earths Chinese producers and traders can sell on the international market. This 
development has been in the making since China lost the WTO case earlier in 2014. 
Perhaps China’s next move will come in the form of strengthening mining and 
production restrictions, thereby effectively reducing production at the source, thus 
protecting China’s strategic rare earths reserves. The factor of China’s resource 
protection can be seen as one of the most effective in preserving and protecting China’s 
position as the world’s rare earths leader.  
C. Industry regulation. As China’s rare earths industry continues its path to 
greater consolidation, government control on the industry is expedited. Though illegal 
mining, reckless mining, environmental pollution, resource waste, and smuggling 
continue to plague the industry, China seeks to achieve greater cost efficiency and thus a 
stronger hold on the rare earths market through better management and regulation. If 
China’s efforts continue to prove successful, a better-regulated rare earths industry will 
benefit China’s position as the near-monopolist of the rare earths world through 
streamlining an overgrown and wasteful industry.  
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D. Protecting and Aiding Domestic Rare Earths Industry. During the recent WTO 
case, accusations were frequently hurled at China for playing favorites to its own rare 
earths industry by exacting export taxes and export quotas on rare earths. At the same 
time, voices of alarm in the rest of world attracted attention to another aspect of China’s 
export quotas and taxes: foreign rare earths producers were being lured into China to 
dodge taxes and quotas, and thereby increasing the risk for intellectual property and 
technology to be stolen.  
This factor could be seen as the second most important domestic factor following 
rare earths resource protection. The fact that China places great priority on developing its 
own rare earths industry is no surprise. China currently has the most advanced, most 
complete rare earths industry chain in the world. The United States, in contrast, will need 
approximately ten years69 to rebuild its broken industry chain, according to government 
estimates in 2010 (“Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply Chain”, 2010). China’s 
active competition in this aspect has, for the time being, played a great role in solidifying 
China’s position and influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths.  
In summary, it is an interrelated web of factors both international and domestic 
that influence China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. In the distant future, 
these factors will change, as is possible for China’s position as the near-monopolist of 
rare earths. But for the near future, an understanding of these specific factors is critical if 
one aims to understand China’s current rare earths situation.  
 
                                                 
69 The estimate was 15 years from 2010. This thesis was completed in 2015. 
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The Overarching Role of the Chinese Government 
 
In order to place all of the influential factors, both international and domestic, in 
their proper context, one must return to the theme of the ever-present role of the Chinese 
state. As noted in Chapters 1, 2, and 4, since 1986, with the advent of the 863 Plan, the 
Chinese government has placed a high priority on rare earths development, both 
production and application, as a part of its push for high-tech development, which in turn 
is a key part of China’s overall thirty-plus-year thrust for economic development, which 
has awakened the “sleeping giant” of the East. 
As China’s path to economic development has encountered challenges and 
obstacles since the Reform and Opening Up of the late 1970s until the present, China’s 
rare earths industry has also felt effects in turn. Perhaps the greatest negative event to 
occur early on in the period of China’s rare earths development was the temporary 
isolation from certain parts of the Western world after the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Shortly after the June 4, 1989 incident, the United States issued what would later be 
known as the “Tiananmen Sanctions”—a combination of actual and threatened actions 
against China, especially with regard to most-favored-nation (MFN) status,70 as 
“punishment” for what the West viewed as a severe violation of human rights.  
Due to isolation by the West, the three-year period following the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown was one of relative economic stagnation for China. During the early years of 
Reform and Opening Up, China had experienced the best years of domestic development 
                                                 
70 China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status, which had been revoked after the Tiananmen incident, was 
eventually renewed by President Bill Clinton in 1994. In the eyes of some Americans, the president’s 
decision showed that in the end, it was not political values and human rights that mattered most to America, 
but profits and political gain (Perry, 1995). 
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since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This was due in large part to the fact that 
China was on positive terms with all world blocs at the time, and enjoyed the privileges 
of memberships in international organizations. The three years between 1989 and 1992 
also marked the downfall of the former Soviet Union. Though China did not miss a beat 
diplomatically in recognizing the new nations formed as the former USSR dissolved, 
nevertheless it was especially wary of repeating the mistakes—especially economic 
mistakes—that had led to the ultimate failure of the once-strong communist state. One of 
the critical lessons learned was the importance of economic growth, which was the focus 
of Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” (南巡) of 1992 (Shambaugh, 2013).  
It was precisely during the critical juncture of 1989-1992 that China’s rare earths 
industry took off. 1988 had marked the first time in history that China had overtaken the 
United States as the world’s foremost producer of rare earths; thus, the potential of 
China’s rare earths production was already evident before the Tiananmen incident. I posit 
that the sanctions and isolation from the West in the aftermath of Tiananmen, which, 
according to analysts, came as a surprise to the Beijing leadership, served to highlight 
China’s vulnerability in the rare earths field (as well as a host of other high-tech fields). 
As noted in Chapter 1, China’s rare earths development during the 1980s had been helped 
along to a large degree by investment from abroad, and though China had large reserves 
of raw rare earths, it was quite vulnerable to cut-offs in technological assistance during 
this period. Though the “Tiananmen Sanctions” did not seem to phase the industry 
significantly, the threat of being cut off from the Western world seemed to have factored 
in to China’s rare earths development plan.  
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At this juncture, it is important to recall that China’s top leadership placed great 
importance on the development of China’s rare earths industry as part of the overall 
government thrust of high-tech development represented by the 863 and 973 Programs. It 
is within the context of rare earths being elevated to a strategic height by the Chinese 
government during the late 1980s-1990s, that China’s rare earths industry blossomed. It 
was at this crucial moment in history that Deng Xiaoping (1992) called on the rare earths 
industry to understand its strategic importance to China—on the level of Middle East oil; 
it was also in the 1990s that Jiang Zemin directed rare earths producers at Baotou to take 
greater advantage of China’s rich endowment of rare earths resources, and turn resource 
advantages into economic advantages (see Chapter 1). 
The 1990s ignited China’s rare earths boom. Production skyrocketed, increasing 
quickly year-on-year. Eventually, production was so voluminous that prices dropped. The 
vicious cycle of price wars between rare earths producers further exacerbated the 
downward spiral. As we have noted, China laments the fact that it cannot “set the price” 
of rare earths. In my interpretation, this statement simply means, China does not have the 
ability to set the price higher. If the international price of rare earths were higher, it would 
be more profitable for China’s rare earths industry. And, China would be able to funnel 
funds from higher prices into environmental projects. 
As the 2000s neared an end, voices of environmental protection were beginning to 
have an impact on the rare earths industry. Not long after, in the early 2010s, a host of 
government laws and regulations emerged regarding pollution and environmental 
protection targeted specifically to the rare earths industry. The dilemma faced by the 
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Chinese government is actually simplistic in its nature (cost-benefit relationship) yet 
nevertheless extremely difficult to amend: 
In the early days of China’s rare earths mining and production (1950s-1970s), 
there were few applications for the minerals. The industry was hampered by both 
technological and political handicaps, such as the Cultural Revolution. Once Deng 
Xiaoping initiated the Reform and Opening Up during the late 1970s-early 1980s, the 
industry was blessed with inflows of foreign investment and technology; as a result, the 
industry flourished, to the point that due to illegal, unlicensed production and rampant 
smuggling during the 1990s and 2000s, China rapidly depleted its rare earths resources, 
degraded natural environments and ecosystems, and pushed world rare earths prices 
through the floor. As noted earlier, for many years, China did not include environmental 
costs in its accounting of rare earths mining and production costs. In recent years, these 
environmental costs have gained the attention of lawmakers in Beijing, and have slowly 
begun trickling down to cadres in the provinces, who are beginning to become 
accustomed to being performance-critiqued on metrics that include environmental 
protection as well as the old metric—economic growth. 
The crux of the matter revolves around the relationship between returns from rare 
earths and environmental costs associated with the mining and production of rare earths. 
The ideal situation is to strike a balance between the two factors. For many years, China 
all but ignored the environmental costs brought on by rare earths mining and production, 
which continued to accumulate, without even a government agency to keep tabs on the 
damage. At present, due to years of excess production of rare earths, prices are very low, 
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and the returns on rare earths come nowhere close to balancing the loss created by 
environmental degradation.  
To sum it up another way, China’s behavior in regard to rare earths production 
and exports has gone through two major stages since the 1980s: (1) rapid and semi-
uncontrolled expansion, and (2) slower, regulated expansion. During the 1980s, and 
especially after the early 1990s, China’s rare earth production was, much like every other 
sector of the economy, focused on the sole goal of growth. Expansion increased by leaps 
and bounds, with a 425% increase in production between 1990 and 1999 (Hedrick, 1990; 
Hedrick, 1999), and rebates for companies that exported rare earths pushed exports 
higher and higher (Li & Xu, 2014).  
As the 1990s drew to a close, the Chinese government began to place emphasis on 
the strategic nature of rare earths (“973 Jihua Qidong Xitu Gaoxiao Tichun Zhongda 
Yanjiu Xiangmu”), and the need to protect these resources from premature “extinction”. 
Thus, beginning in 1998/1999, export control measures were gradually introduced 
(Hedrick, 1998). By 2005/2006, export quotas were significantly controlling the amount 
of rare earths that left the country, if only on paper (smuggling was and still is a major 
obstacle). Since 2011, the Chinese government has made significant strides in rare-
earths-related legislation, in theory making a 180-degree turn from its policies of 
“development or bust” during the 1980s and most of the 1990s.  
At present, China seems committed to fixing its environmental woes caused by 
rare-earths mining. What China has attempted to do through export restrictions is to raise 
prices, thereby increasing its near-monopoly rents, seeking thereby to mitigate a portion 
of environmental damage, an endeavor at which it has not been successful to date. Now 
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that China has lost the recent WTO case, it is imperative that it finds another way to 
maximize the resource protection, domestic use, and export pricing of rare earths. The 
present possibilities tend to point to a restructuring of China’s tax system, including 
resource tax, which could help to balance the economic return-to-environmental 
rehabilitation relationship. 
Regardless of how China accomplishes its many goals, and no matter which of the 
international or domestic factors influence China’s rare earths industry the most at any 
given moment, one thing is certain: China’s rare earths industry, like all other industries 
in China, exists and functions within the pre-determined context designated for it by 
China’s central government. That context is the context of sustainable development and 
overall economic growth.  
To conclude, in the future, China will undoubtedly continue to do all within its 
power to remain the near-monopolist of rare earths. That having been said, China’s 
ultimate goal seems to be one of comprehensive monopoly over the entire industry—
from “mine to magnet”. China is working untiringly to become a leader, not only in rare 
earths oxides and mining, but in a whole host of high-quality high-tech downstream 
products that will rival those produced in the West, all the while cleaning up its domestic 
rare earths industry, and protecting its own rare earths resources and environment. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In 1787, Swedish army lieutenant and chemist Carl Axel Arrhelius discovered a 
unique black mineral in a feldspar and quartz mine (Hedrick, 2003) near the village of 
Ytterby, not far from Stockholm, Sweden. The mineral proved to be a mixture of several 
different types of rare earths, and the first rare earth element to be separated was cerium. 
Cerium (atomic number 58), the most abundant of the rare earth elements (making up 
about 0.0046% of the earth’s crust by weight) was discovered by three scientists in two 
places in one year. Jöns Jakob Berzelius and Wilhelm Hisinger, of Sweden, and Martin 
Heinrich Klaproth of Germany were responsible for the 1803 find of cerium (Thomas 
Jefferson National Accelerator Facility - Office of Science Education, 2014), which 
Berzelius named after the dwarf planet Ceres, itself just recently discovered in 1801. 
Cerium is used widely in many applications ranging from glass to lighting (“Xitu Jichu 
Zhishi (San)”). 
Lanthanum (atomic number 57), often found in combination with cerium, was 
discovered in 1839 by Carl Gustaf Mosander, a Swedish chemist, who was examining 
what he thought to be impurities in cerium deposits. Uses for lanthanum include carbon 
arc lights used in the motion picture industry for studio lighting and Misch metal (of 
which lanthanum makes up 25%), used to make flints for lighters (Thomas Jefferson 
National Accelerator Facility - Office of Science Education, 2014). 
In 1885, Carl F. Auer von Welsbach, a German chemist, discovered 
praseodymium. He separated praseodymium from another element, neodymium. Both 
elements were found in a material called didymium. Praseodymium is used as an alloying 
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agent along with magnesium to strengthen metals used in aircraft engines, as well as 
having uses in glass coloring, carbon arc lighting, and accounting for 5% of the Misch 
metal used in lighter flints. 
Welsbach’s discovery of one twin—praseodymium—led to the natural discovery 
of its “other half”, neodymium. Neodymium, though commonly classed as one of the rare 
earth elements, is in fact found in the earth’s crust not more rarely than cobalt, nickel, and 
copper. Since early days, neodymium has been used as a glass additive, and more 
recently, neodymium has become well-known for its uses in the permanent magnet 
industry.  
Promethium, or “element 61”, is an element all of whose isotopes are radioactive, 
and which rarely occurs in the natural world. In 1902, Bohuslav Brauner suggested its 
existence when he predicted that there must be an element whose properties fell between 
the then-known elements neodymium (atomic number 60) and samarium (atomic number 
62). For years, “element 61” remained a phantom of the laboratory, until it was first 
produced in 1945, although a sample of the metal was not made until 1963. Promethium-
147, the only type of promethium used outside the laboratory, finds applications in 
luminous paint, atomic batteries, and thickness measurement devices. 
Paul Emile Lecoq de Boisbaudran, a French chemist, is traditionally credited with 
the final discovery of element 62, samarium, in 1879. Samarium was named after the 
mineral from which it was extracted, samarkite. Underscoring the fact that “rare earths” 
are not necessarily “rare”, samarium is the 40th most common element in the earth’s crust, 
and is more abundant than tin. Samarium’s most widely-known application is the 
samarium-cobalt magnet, which has permanent magnetic properties only second to 
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neodymium, and can withstand temperatures above 700 degrees Celsius without losing its 
magnetic properties. In addition, Samarium also has applications in cancer-fighting drugs 
and control rods in nuclear reactors. 
Europium (atomic number 63) was first discovered in 1896 by French chemist 
Eugene-Anatole Demarcay, who was the first to successfully isolate it (and subsequently 
named it). Europium is an element from which phosphorescent europium compounds are 
formed in combination with other elements. One of the most widespread uses for 
europium is in the red phosphors used for television and computer screens. After this use 
for europium was discovered in the 1960s, europium demand increased considerably.  
Atomic number 64 belongs to gadolinium, a rare earth element discovered by 
Jean Charles Galissard de Marignac in 1880. Gadolinium was named after the mineral in 
which it was found, gadolinite, which was also named after its discoverer, Johan Gadolin. 
Gadolinium was first successfully isolated by de Boisbaudran in 1886. Apart from being 
used as a phosphor in green television tubes, gadolinium has many other specific 
applications in the fields of neutron therapy, metallurgy, MRI technology (as part of an 
intravenous MRI contrast agent), imitation diamonds, and magnetic refrigeration. 
Lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, 
europium, and gadolinium, the eight elements above, are part of the Light Rare Earth 
Elements (LREEs). The following eight elements are part of the Heavy Rare Earth 
Elements (HREEs) group: terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, 
lutetium, and yttrium. The final rare earth is scandium (atomic number 21). 
Terbium (atomic number 65) was discovered in 1843 by Carl Gustaf Mosander, 
the Swedish chemist who had discovered lanthanum in 1839. Terbium was discovered as 
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an impurity in yttrium oxide. Like many of the other rare earths, terbium does not occur 
alone in nature, but is found in deposits of monazite, xenotime, and euxenite. Terbium 
finds application in crystal stabilizers for fuel cells, naval sonar systems, and green 
phosphors used in fluorescent lamps and color television tubes, etc.  
In 1878, de Boisbaudran, who would in 1879 discover samarium, laid claim to the 
discovery of dysprosium (atomic number 66). At the time of discovery, de Boisbaudran 
was experimenting on holmium oxide, from which he separated dysprosium oxide. He 
was successful in isolating dysprosium from the dysprosium oxide through a tedious 
process of dissolving and precipitation. It is claimed that de Boisbaudran succeeded in 
isolating dysprosium after thirty attempts of his method. Thus, he named the element 
dysprosium, which comes from the Greek “δυσπρόσιτος”, meaning “difficult to get”. 
Dysprosium is used in laser materials, commercial lighting, control rods in nuclear 
reactors, as well as being used in Terfenol-D, a material with the highest known room-
temperature magnetostriction. 
Holmium (atomic number 67) was discovered and named after the city of 
Stockholm by Per Theodor Cleve in 1878. It was discovered using the same method by 
which Mosander had discovered lanthanum, erbium, and terbium. Cleve’s method 
produced two oxides, one called holmia, and the other called thulia. Holmia oxide 
contains holmium, and thulia oxide contains thulium, both rare earth elements. Holmium 
has the distinction of having the strongest magnetic properties of any element, and is used 
in high-strength magnets as a magnetic flux concentrator. 
The village of Ytterby, Sweden, was the site where the first of rare-earth-latent 
minerals were discovered in 1787. It is not surprising that, then, that over the years, 
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Ytterby would be linked to more rare earths. In fact, four of the rare earths were named 
after the village (yttrium, terbium, erbium and ytterbium). In 1843, the Swedish chemist 
Carl Gustaf Mosander discovered erbium (atomic number 68), in addition to terbium. 
Erbium has specific uses in fiber-optic technology as an optical amplifier, as well as 
having uses in laser technology critical to medical surgery procedures. 
Atomic number 69, thulium, was discovered by Cleve in 1879, but not obtained in 
its pure state until 1911 by researcher Charles James at New Hampshire College in 
Durham. After promethium, thulium is the second rarest of the lanthanides, and is used in 
solid state lasers and as a source of radiation in portable X-ray devices.  
The fourth rare earth element to be named after the “rare earth capital” Ytterby, 
Sweden, is ytterbium (atomic number 70). It was separated and named in 1878 by Swiss 
chemist Jean Charles Galissard de Marignac, one hundred years after the first rare earths 
were discovered in Ytterby in 1787.  
Lutetium (atomic number 71), one of the rarest of the rare earths (though not as 
rare as silver in the earth’s crust), was discovered independently by three chemists in the 
same year. French scientist Georges Urbain, Austrian mineralogist Baron Carl Auer von 
Welsbach, and American Chemist Charles James all laid claim to the discovery of the 
element in 1907. In the end, Urbain and von Welsbach disputed the issue of first 
discovery, with the International Commission on Atomic Weights weighing in favor of 
Urbain. Lutetium’s uses are limited in scope by its scarcity, but by no means limited in 
importance. Lutetium has catalyst applications in key processes such as petroleum 
cracking, alkylation, hydrogenation, and polymerization.  
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Yttrium (atomic number 39) hails back to the early days of rare earth discovery. 
Originally discovered in the ytterbite mineral found by Carl Axel Arrhenius in 1787, 
Yttrium oxide was discovered by Johan Gadolin in 1789, and was named yttria by 
Anders Gustaf Ekeberg. Although yttrium is technically not part of the lanthanide series, 
because of its chemical affinity to the lanthanides, it has traditionally been treated as a 
rare earth element. Yttrium is used in the making of red phosphors that are critical to the 
production of cathode ray tubes used in color televisions and LEDs, as well as playing an 
important role in the making of superconductors and lasers.  
It was not until the 1970s that applications were found for scandium (atomic 
number 21), an element that has sometimes been classified as a rare earth due to its 
common presence in rare earths ores. Scandium was discovered by Lars Fredrik Nilson in 
1879, proving the earlier intuition of Dmitri Mendeleev that such an element existed. Its 
main applications are in aluminum alloys, finding its way into high-end products such as 
fighter planes and high-intensity discharge lamps, as well as lower-end applications such 
as baseball bats and firearms.  
 
 
